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Abstract  
 
This thesis examines two cases of Export Processing Zone (EPZ) programmes in sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA), specifically in Kenya and Lesotho. Using data from the respective 
countries’ EPZ programme authorities, central banks, relevant studies, and country reports, I 
show that although the programmes have facilitated employment generation and foreign 
exchange earnings from textile and apparel exports, such exports rely highly on preferential 
trade agreements such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The reliance on 
preferential market access, and the uncertainty regarding the continuation of such preferences 
are important sources of vulnerability. This causes fluctuations in investments and also helps 
explain the low level of backward linkages. This is especially evident in Lesotho. Moreover, 
such production within the zones is mainly of low productivity and low added value. The vast 
number of zone programmes that have materialised in the last decades has contributed to 
reducing the possible net benefit of EPZs, and the increase in competition has made it difficult 
to attract investors. Zone programmes in Kenya and Lesotho are seen as relatively successful 
compared to other SSA zone programmes, yet investment and employment levels within the 
zones are low compared to many programmes in other regions. Several factors hamper larger 
investments, such as high labour unit costs, high electricity prices, inefficient bureaucracy, 
corruption, as well as labour unions and political opposition. EPZ programmes may help 
make it easier to do business in the host countries, and improve investors’ perception of the 
countries’ attitudes towards foreign direct investment (FDI). However, SSA zone programmes 
should to a greater extent target industries and services in which they have good prospects of 
developing a competitive advantage, regardless of trade preferences, which provide good 
opportunities for human capital and technology transfers, and which generate demand 
linkages. SSA countries with large endowments of natural resources may be better able to 
capitalize upon their comparative advantage by focusing on industries that take advantage of 
the countries’ natural resources, rather than on the labour-intensive industries that have 
traditionally located in EPZs. Due to high competition and demand for good quality 
infrastructure, EPZ programmes are generally better suited in more developed SSA countries 
than as a tool to facilitate development in the poorest countries.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Economic Theory 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The last decade has seen significant economic growth in a number of African 
countries, with sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) one of the fastest-growing developing regions in 
2011. Most SSA economies have struggled to generate structural transformations of their 
economies, changing their export structure from a heavy reliance on natural resources and 
increasing higher-value production. SSA also needs to generate large-scale employment, 
especially to absorb the expected growth in the labour force (United Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), 2012a). This thesis attempts to understand the relevance of Export 
Processing Zones (EPZs) and Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in creating a more diverse 
economy and generating employment. This first chapter introduces relevant background for 
the topic and discusses the resource question and methodology in more detail.  
It is recognised that the manufacturing sector historically has been the most important 
engine of sustained and rapid growth in a number of countries. Manufacturing in SSA 
generally contributes to only a small share of gross domestic product (GDP), and SSA’s share 
of global light manufacturing has been declining rather than increasing.1 Africa as a whole 
has experienced a decline in manufacturing as a share of total GDP from 15% in 1990 to 10% 
in 2008 (UNCTAD, 2012a; Dihn et al., 2012).2  High export growth, especially of 
manufactured goods, has historically been closely correlated with high economic growth in 
developing countries.3 Higher export earnings improve a country’s ability to import capital 
goods necessary for investments and to purchase intermediate goods required for production 
(Cline, 1984). Labour-intensive manufacturing has in previous decades furthermore 
contributed to structural transformation in a number of regions and countries with economic 
                                                
1 Today the share is less than 1%, despite a number of duty-free and quota-free agreements giving access to 
markets in the US and Europe (Dihn et al., 2012).  
2 Southern Africa experienced a fall from 23% to 18%, Eastern Africa from 13% to 10%, and Central Africa 
from 11% to 6%. West Africa experienced the largest decline from 13% to 5% (UNCTAD, 2012a, p. 3).  
3 See, e.g., Todaro and Smith (2009). Cline (1984) argues that analysis shows that growth in exports has a 
stimulating effect on GDP, even if one controls for the fact that exports are included in GDP. Chow (1987) 
furthermore finds strong causality between export growth and industrial development.  
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success, such as in East Asia and China, but has yet to take place in SSA countries 
(UNCTAD, 2012a; Dihn et al., 2012).  
The establishment and use of EPZs, SEZs, and maquiladoras, as the zones are called 
in Mexico, is related to remarkable industrial development in some countries. The zones aim 
to enhance and diversify exports, and generate employment and foreign exchange earnings by 
attracting foreign capital.4 Foreign direct investments (FDI) may facilitate further positive 
externalities, such as technology and knowledge spillovers, that may contribute to improving 
the host countries’ competitiveness and integration in the global economy. The number of 
zones has increased considerably in recent years from 176 zones in 47 countries in 1986, to a 
remarkable 3500 zones in 130 countries in 2006.5 The number of SSA zone programmes has 
also increased substantially, with most of them established in the 1990s. Several countries 
have however had earlier comparable policies, e.g., South Africa (Stein, 2012; Jauch et al., 
1996). Today, between 20 and 30 African countries use different variations of EPZs to attract 
investments (Boyenge, 2007; Farole, 2011).6 The significant growth in the number of zones 
may have a substantial effect on the net benefit of zone programmes, as elaborated further, 
later in this thesis. Zone programmes should optimally use the country’s comparative 
advantage, build economies of scale, utilize trade preferences to encourage investments, and 
facilitate trade. The general conclusion in the literature is that African zones, with a few 
exceptions, have been unsuccessful relative to many non-African zones. Despite this and the 
increasing costs associated with the EPZ incentive packages, many African and non-African 
governments remain committed to zone programmes.  
This thesis aims to answer if EPZ programmes can be expected to have a positive 
long-term effect on economic growth in SSA, by exploring the potential benefits of EPZ 
programmes and the factors that determine and hamper investments within SSA zones. The 
first chapter gives an introduction to the economic theory of export-led growth and the use of 
export zones, and, as noted above, also discusses the research question and methodology. The 
second chapter reviews the literature regarding empirical findings of the effect of zones as 
well as the determinants of investments in both non-African and African (with the focus on 
                                                
4 FDI may reduce the gap between domestically available savings and desired investment, with consequent 
positive effect on economic growth (Todaro & Smith, 2009).  
5 The different definitions of the zones and difficulties in attaining reliable data bring about some differences in 
the exact numbers of zones and employees reported in the literature.  
6 ILO data includes Cape Verde, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, Mauritius, Mozambique, Togo, Senegal, Sudan, South Africa, and 
Zimbabwe (Boyenge, 2007).  
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SSA) countries. The literature review also looks at different reasons given for the failure of 
many SSA zones. Chapters three and four provide case studies of SSA EPZs, specifically 
Kenya and Lesotho, respectively. The zones’ effect on growth, diversity of exports, and 
employment, and the countries’ ability to attract investors are explored. These two countries 
have been relatively more successful than other zones in SSA, which make them interesting 
cases to study. They both have had relative success in the apparel sector, which allows a 
degree of comparison. The two countries do however differ in population size, location, 
natural resources, and economic significance in their respective regions. The fifth chapter 
takes the form of a discussion, whose ultimate aim is to address the research question by 
applying the context provided in the literature review to the case studies. It concludes with an 
examination of the potential and the limitations of EPZ programmes, and the policy 
implications they may have.  
1.2 The Aim and Definition of EPZs 
‘EPZ’ is the most commonly used term among a variety of names and forms of a 
rather popular trade policy instrument used in the last few decades. Other names used include: 
‘SEZs’, such as those found in China, ‘free trade zones’ (FTZs), ‘industrial development 
zones’ (IDZs, in South Africa), and ‘maquiladoras’ (in Mexico). The terms are most often 
used interchangeably in the literature. This thesis mainly uses ‘EPZ’ as a common term for 
the zones. The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines EPZs as “industrial zones 
with special incentives set up to attract foreign investors, in which imported materials undergo 
some degree of processing before being (re-)exported again” (2003, p. 1).7 Baissac (2011, p. 
23) defines SEZs as “geographical areas contained within a country’s national boundaries 
where the rules of business are different from those that prevail in the national territory”. The 
zones are intended to be both more liberal and more effective and the different rules include 
“investment conditions, international trade and customs, taxation and the regulatory 
environment” (Baissac, 2011, p. 23).  
The main objective of EPZs is to attract investments that would otherwise not 
materialize and, as such, promote nontraditional exports, generate employment, and enhance 
the host country’s foreign exchange earnings. The long-term logic of EPZs is that foreign 
investments have the ability to create much-needed transfers of skills and technology, 
fostering local spin-offs, increasing knowledge of how to enter the global market, and 
                                                
7 ILO (2003) includes free-trade zones, SEZs, and maquiladoras when talking about EPZs.  
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improving access to international distribution channels. These potential gains are used to 
justify the considerable investments needed to establish the zones, and are further explained in 
the next subsection (Stein, 2012; Wu, 2009).  
Firms established within the zones are most often given tax exemptions, called ‘tax 
holidays’, which are a reduction of corporate income taxes for a period of time (Rolfe et al., 
2004). EPZ firms are further commonly allowed unlimited duty-free import of raw and 
intermediate inputs and capital goods for production, and unrestricted repatriation of profits. 
Infrastructure, such as transport, electricity, and water, is generally well developed relative to 
the rest of the country, and subsidised by the government (Kaplinsky, 1993; Mandani, 1999). 
Service provisioning may also be subsidised, and bureaucracy simplified. Investors are 
typically given the benefit of dealing with only one office in setting up operations (see e.g. 
ILO, 1998). Some countries also restrict union activities within the zones and offer EPZ firms 
greater flexibility regarding working conditions and workers’ rights to make the zones more 
attractive for investors (Jauch et al., 1996). Poor working conditions and marginal wages are 
one of the main critiques against the use of zones as a development tool, as is discussed 
further in the next chapters.   
The traditional EPZ model mainly limits activities to light manufacturing, and allows 
for developing countries to take advantage of their low-cost and low-skilled labour by 
attracting export-oriented enterprises to the zones (Kaplinsky, 1993). Traditionally the zones 
have also been kept separated from the domestic economy by geography or jurisdiction. There 
has however been a gradual shift from the traditional EPZ model to a range of different zones 
offering a greater variety of incentives and economic activities, such as “agriculture, 
manufacturing, construction, communication, trade, catering, housing, public utilities, and 
other services as finance and tourism” (Stein, 2012, p. 325). The zones are often now also less 
isolated from the domestic economy, and may also produce for the domestic market. Zones 
are furthermore increasingly developed by the private sector. Some countries do however give 
EPZ incentives to single firms that mainly produce exports. These firms are called ‘export 
processing units’ (EPUs), or ‘single factory units’, and are in general not required to locate in 
a specific area (Stein, 2012; World Bank, 1992).  
1.3 The Benefits of and Obstacles to Trade and Industrialisation and the 
Role of EPZs 
The benefits of trade are often explained by the theory of comparative advantage, 
which states that a country should, and will, specialise in exports in which they have a 
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comparative advantage relative to other countries, in terms of resource endowments and/or 
natural abilities. A country has a comparative advantage in producing a good if the 
opportunity cost of producing it is lower than in other countries (Krugman et al., 2012; 
Todaro & Smith, 2009).8 A country’s comparative advantage may change over time, due to 
changes in prices on output, production costs, or the opportunity costs linked to production. 
This implies that countries can take measures to develop or change their comparative 
advantage (see, e.g., Wood and Berge, 1997). Developing countries often have abundant and 
cheap unskilled labour and for this reason have a comparative advantage relative to developed 
countries in labour-intensive production, such as primary production and low-skilled 
manufacturing jobs. A fall in prices of primary commodities relative to manufacturing goods, 
has however caused a continued decline in terms of trade for countries mainly exporting non-
oil primary goods. The Prebisch-Singer thesis predicts the decline to persist due to the low 
income from and price elasticity of demand for primary commodities. Developing countries 
that for the most part export primary goods will for this reason experience a further 
disadvantage relative to developed countries, making it difficult for them to ‘catch up’. Prices 
of primary commodities have also historically seen larger fluctuations than prices of 
manufactures, causing great uncertainty for countries dependent on export earnings from such 
products. Production of primary products is, moreover, typically a low productivity activity, 
causing overall productivity in the economy in many developing countries to remain low. 
Productivity growth is a central factor of economic growth. A transfer of labour and other 
resources to higher-productivity activities may hence have a substantial effect on economic 
growth, even if productivity levels within the different sectors do not increase (McMillan & 
Rodrik, 2011; Todaro & Smith, 2009).9 10 For these reasons many see the key to economic 
growth in industrialisation, and in an increase of higher-productivity activities.  
                                                
8 Comparative advantage in one industry is dependent on both productivity and wages, and wages are dependent 
on productivity in all sectors (Krugman et al., 2012; Todaro & Smith, 2009).  
9 Overall productivity in the economy will depend both on productivity within the different industries and the 
allocation of resources. A country may hence achieve productivity growth in the overall economy both by 
transferring resources to higher-productivity activities, and by raising productivity levels in the different sectors 
(see, e.g., McMillan & Rodrik, 2011).  
10 The Lewis (two-sector) model is maybe the best-known theory of structural transformation. The model 
includes two sectors: a traditional subsistence sector, with surplus labour and zero marginal productivity, and a 
high-productivity, modern, industrial sector. The modern sector will optimally expand and attract labour from 
the subsistence sector until all surplus labour is engaged in the modern, high-productivity sector, and marginal 
productivity in the subsistence sector is no longer zero. Due to the surplus rural labour, Lewis assumes the cost 
of labour in the modern sector to be constant until all surplus labour in the subsistence sector is transferred. The 
growth of output in the modern sector is determined by the rate of industrial investment and capital accumulation 
(Todaro & Smith, 2009).  
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Several countries have succeeded in transforming their economies and their 
comparative advantage from dependence on primary production, by using their abundant 
unskilled labour in light manufacturing, such as the ‘Asian Tigers’, including South Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, and also China and India (Todaro &Smith, 2009; Stein, 
2012). Many SSA countries have, however, as noted in the introduction, yet to see such a 
structural transformation of the economy. A diversification of SSA exports to labour-intensive 
manufacturing products and services is argued by many to be fundamental for economic 
growth in the region (see, e.g., Collier, 2007; World Bank, 2012). An increase in exports 
would also increase purchasing power to import “capital goods, material imports and 
consumption goods that can be necessary to spur industrialization and maintain living 
standards”, and to generate economic development (Milberg & Amengual, 2008, p. 11). 
Industrialisation and an increase in diversity in production moreover improve the prospects of 
enhancing trade among African countries with potential significant positive effects on growth 
(see, e.g., World Bank, 2012).11  
An increase in higher-productivity, higher-value activity is today an important aim of 
many SSA countries, together with an increase in net exports and foreign exchange earnings 
to ease balance-of-payment problems. Large investments are often needed to be able to enter 
the market as a large-scale producer that is able to compete with well-established 
manufacturing firms, due to the cost of entering the global market, and internal and external 
economies of scale.12 Income levels and domestic saving are, however, very low in many 
SSA countries making it difficult to accumulate capital and make the significant investments 
needed to transform the economy. Most SSA firms and countries, moreover, find it difficult to 
access sufficient capital on the international capital market, and borrowed capital often has 
high costs due to the risks associated with loans to developing countries. Undeveloped 
financial markets and credit market failures in developing countries also often prevent 
domestic firms from obtaining access to capital, inhibiting potential domestic competitive 
firms to emerge (McConnell & Brue, 2005).  
International aid, official loans, and private capital flows from portfolio and direct 
investment may be important to lessen the gap between domestic saving and desired 
                                                
11 Trade between countries in Africa is very low relative to other regions, and regional integration is a strategic 
objective for the region (World Bank, 2012).  
12 Internal and external economies of scale depend on the size of the firm and the size of the industry, 
respectively, and are important factors of trade. Economies of scale exist if there are “economies of growth 
resulting from expansion of scale of productive capacity of a firm or a industry, leading to increases in its output 
and decreases in its cost of production per unit of output” (Todaro & Smith, 2009, p. 821).  
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investments. Portfolio investments have generally favoured high-growth and middle-income 
countries, and investments are often short-term making the host economy vulnerable to 
instability in its financial markets. FDI, which EPZs aim to facilitate, offer the possibility for 
more long-term investments in plants, physical and social infrastructure, and equipment. FDI 
is today the largest component of international capital flows, and has been an important 
component of the economic success of the Asian Tigers, China, and India (see, e.g., Aseidu, 
2002; Todaro & Smith, 2009; Stein, 2012).  
An inflow of FDI not only increases investment in the country, but foreign investors 
also often bring skilled labour and the technology needed for production. Firms may find it 
difficult to enter the world market because they lack the necessary knowledge. Such 
knowledge or ideas may include “insights about packaging, marketing, distribution, inventory 
control, payment systems, information systems, transactions processing, quality control and 
worker motivation” (Romer, 1993, p. 544). According to Romer (1993), ‘idea gaps’ are one 
of the main reasons poor countries remain poor; these may be ameliorated by attracting FDI 
and multinational companies (MNCs) to the country. Foreign investors bring necessary ideas 
and skills to the country and MNCs may have important demonstration effects, knowledge 
leaks, and technology spillovers (Romer, 1993; Todaro & Smith, 2009). A transfer of ideas or 
technology may generate technological development in the host economy, the main source of 
productivity growth and long-term economic growth according to neoclassical theories of 
economic growth (Todaro & Smith, 2009; McConnell & Brue, 2005). The presence of foreign 
investors may, furthermore, provide access to better knowledge of the global markets. The 
character, size, and economic importance of MNCs often allow them access to government 
policy makers and information about global trends to which smaller local firms may not have 
access. An inflow of FDI, hence, both reduces the gap between domestic savings and the 
desired level of investment in the host country, and the gap in knowledge between developing 
and developed countries. However, although an inflow of FDI is generally perceived to 
improve the prospects of economic growth, the role of MNCs and FDI, and the actual long-
term effect of FDI on economic development are debated in the literature. The arguments 
against private foreign investments as a tool to achieve economic development mainly focus 
on their potential negative effect on domestic investments, and the vulnerability countries 
may experience if they become dependent on FDI. MNCs’ use of ‘transfer pricing’ and 
intellectual property rights, and their potential dominance in local markets is furthermore 
often argued to diminish the possible positive impact of FDI (see, e.g., Adams, 2009; Todaro 
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& Smith, 2009).13 However, as EPZs and similar zones generally only give investors the 
possibility to locate in specific areas, and sales within the host country often are restricted, the 
effect of FDI in zones may be somewhat different than FDI in the overall economy. This will 
be further explored in the next chapters. Being able to have foreign producers somewhat 
separate from the overall economy is one of the key properties of EPZ programmes, as will be 
elaborated in the next subsection.  
Zone programmes commonly aim to increase a country’s competitiveness in industries 
that can site production just about anywhere. When economies of scale exist, small firms or 
firms in small clusters of industrial activity often find it difficult to be competitive. An 
important aim with EPZ programmes is to promote clusters of industrial activity, which is 
hoped to have a catalysing effect on overall industrial development in the country (see, e.g., 
Johansson & Nilsson, 1997). Clusters of industrial activity may increase firms’ productivity 
through the ability to support specialized suppliers, pool skilled workers, and transfer 
knowledge (Krugman et al., 2012).14 Through upgrading a country’s ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
infrastructure, the government aspire to improve the countries’ ability to handle procedures 
linked to importing and exporting, and make production and trade more efficient and 
reliable.15 Improvements in infrastructure, such as regulatory environment, transport, and 
communication infrastructure, are together with policies that facilitate trade likely to have a 
noteworthy effect on the competitiveness and export performance of SSA countries, and 
hence expected to also impact inflow of FDI (see, e.g., Iwanow and Kirkpatrick, 2009; Nunn, 
2007).16 Successfully improved soft infrastructure, as well as hard infrastructure, even in a 
limited area, may have a significant impact on how attractive the country appears as a base for 
investors. By requiring investors to locate in specific areas, and mainly focus on infrastructure 
                                                
13 Transfer pricing is an “accounting procedure usually designed to lower total taxes paid by [MNCs] in which 
intracorporate sales and purchases of goods and services are artificially invoiced so that profits accrue to the 
branch offices located in low-tax countries (tax havens) while offices in high-tax countries show little or no 
taxable profits” (Todaro & Smith, 2009, p. 841).  
14 According to Kingombe and Te Velde (2013, p. 5), “[c]lusters are geographic agglomerations of companies, 
suppliers, service providers and institutions, linked across the supply chain”.  
15 ‘Hard’ infrastructure includes tangible or physical infrastructure, such as roads, ports, telecommunications and 
electricity. ‘Soft’ infrastructure comprises intangible infrastructure, e.g., institutions, customs, transparency 
practices, and business environments (see, e.g., Portugal-Perez & Wilson, 2012).  
16 According to Nunn (2007), the quality of countries’ judicial systems, in particular contract enforcement, have 
substantial effect on countries’ comparative advantage. He finds the quality of judicial systems to explain more 
regarding patterns of trade than the allocation of countries physical capital and skilled labour combined. 
Countries with better contract enforcement usually have less underinvestment, and hence lower costs of 
producing both customized inputs and finished goods. Countries with well-developed judicial systems may for 
this reason have a comparative advantage in industries where the use of intermediate inputs that require 
relationship-specific investments is high.  
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in these areas, costs in infrastructure are also kept relatively low. It is more financially viable 
for developing countries to upgrade infrastructure in limited areas than to upgrade 
infrastructure overall. The development of infrastructure and clusters of activity may 
optimally contribute to change countries’ comparative advantages, and increase the countries’ 
competiveness in higher productivity and/or higher value-added manufacturing or services. 
 
1.4 Export-Led Growth and the Development of EPZ Policies 
Many developing countries, including SSA countries, attempted to promote the 
development of a domestic manufacturing sector and achieve economic development through 
import-substituting industrialization between World War II and the 1970s. The manufacturing 
firms that emerged were however often unable to compete in the world market, as the costs of 
production were often considerably higher than for similar goods elsewhere. The failure of the 
policies was often a cause of the many obstacles to industrialisation and trade for developing 
countries, as mentioned in the above subsection. Policies to protect and develop domestic 
industry for this reason have not enabled most developing countries to catch up with 
developed countries as predicted by economic theory. The limited success of import-
substitution policies resulted in a change in policies, and several countries’ trade policies 
became increasingly liberalised from the mid-1980s (Krugman et al., 2012).  
EPZ programmes provide countries with an opportunity to experiment with trade 
liberalisation, and have been important policies for several countries as they departed from 
import-substituting policies. As EPZs may be kept separate from the domestic economy, as 
mentioned above, countries can enjoy the benefits from an increase in foreign investment 
without liberalising and deregulating the whole economy. The zones have been an important 
component of several countries’ export-led industrialization strategy (ILO, 1998; 
Jayanthakumaran, 2003). EPZ policies to realise structural transformation of the whole 
economy were one of the trade policy reforms advocated by the World Bank after 1979; they 
did, however, also promote economy-wide duty-free import systems as a superior alternative 
to the zones. The World Bank has supported several EPZ projects, e.g., Colombia, the 
Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Kenya, and Thailand (World Bank, 1992). However, the use of 
zones has been the subject of significant debate and critique, also from the Bank itself. The 
World Bank and several economists have expressed concern about the possible distortion 
effects that zones generate through the use of subsidies and by allowing countries to delay 
general liberalisation of the economy as a whole. The ILO has strongly criticised the working 
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conditions within several zones. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) aims to eliminate the 
type of export subsidies EPZs are built on, and the associated increase in regional trade 
agreements does not always harmonise with zone programmes. Despite the critiques and 
obstacles, the use of zone policies has increased spectacularly over the years (Milberg & 
Amengual, 2008). 
 
1.5 Measures of Performance  
Investments within the EPZs are critical for the zones to be able to have any effect on 
the host economy. Several studies determine success or failure of zone programmes by their 
ability to attract investments and by their effects on exports and employment, together with 
their costs to the host country. The different types of industries established, the different types 
of employment created, and the value of exports are furthermore often of interest (World 
Bank, 1992; ILO, 1998). However, zone programmes may succeed in generating employment 
and foreign exchange earnings, but still have few vertical and horizontal linkages, and hence 
low probabilities of positive spillovers (Wu, 2009; Omar & Stoever, 2008). The value and 
amount of local inputs over time, the variety and technical sophistication of the local inputs, 
and the shifts in industry may give a better indication of the zones’ actual effect. Ideally the 
use of local inputs, and the technological intensity of the local inputs, should increase as the 
host economy develops (Omar & Stoever, 2008).  
Greater diversity in the host country’s exports is furthermore often an important target 
when establishing EPZs. Improved human capital and productivity through knowledge and 
technology transfers are also often a central aim (ILO, 1998). Zones are however often only 
one of several tools a country uses to achieve development; it is thus difficult to determine the 
actual effect of the zones (Omar & Stoever, 2008). The share of exports from and 
employment within EPZs are likely to decline as the host economy develops and wages 
increase. The country’s dependence on attracting FDI to the EPZs, and its competitiveness, 
will then decline due to the increase in costs. Favourable location, well-developed 
infrastructure, and well-functioning administrative services may however potentially ensure 
that investors remain in the country. Production may adjust to higher labour costs by using 
more capital-intensive technology, which would contribute to a change in production and 
increase in labour productivity (Wu, 2009; World Bank, 1992).   
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1.6 Research Question 
The research question this thesis aims to answer is: Do EPZ programmes have the 
potential to contribute to long-term economic growth in SSA? The thesis addresses the 
question by answering two sub-questions: Do EPZ programmes provide the benefits 
anticipated? What factors determine and hamper investments within SSA zones?  
 
1.7 Methodology 
The thesis is a qualitative study, though the case studies use available quantitative data 
for the zone programmes and the respective countries’ economic development and trade. The 
literature review focuses on the most pertinent issues in the academic literature. The thesis 
tries to include all voices, but space constraints make it difficult to incorporate the extensive 
literature. Many SSA zone programmes are relatively new and have had less success, and 
empirical literature regarding SSA zone programmes is for these reasons scarce relative to 
other zone programmes. My objective with the thesis is to increase knowledge of the use of 
zone programmes in SSA, and provide a better understanding of the issues related to 
employment generation in SSA. However, the scarce literature available on SSA zone 
programmes limits the scope of the thesis to some degree.  
Cost-benefit analyses are at times used to evaluate the performance of EPZs. 
However, as it is often difficult to get hold of adequate data, and as benefits often are indirect, 
it becomes necessary to make several assumptions that affect the outcome. A cost-benefit 
analysis may hence be based on estimations and uncertainties, and some benefits and costs 
may be excluded (Mandani, 1999; Jayanthakumaran, 2003). Different targets and different 
available data about the zone programmes often make it difficult to compare programmes. For 
these reasons, the case studies in this thesis do not attempt full cost-benefit analyses or to 
explicitly compare the respective countries, but rather to interpret the data available.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
2.1 The Potential Benefits Linked to the Use of EPZ Incentives 
2.1.1 Export Growth and Foreign Exchange Earnings 
The relationship between EPZs and export growth is explored in several studies. Some 
studies find higher growth in exports in lower- and middle-income countries with EPZs than 
those without such zones, suggesting that EPZs have positive effect on exports (see e.g., 
Omar & Stoever, 2008). Johansson and Nilsson (1997) find the presence of zones to have 
varying effects on total exports, with a significant and positive relationship for some 
countries, such as Hong Kong, Mauritius, Singapore, and Sri Lanka during the period of 
study. In other countries in the study, however, the relationship was insignificant most years, 
or negative, as was found in the Dominican Republic and Mexico. Countries with a positive 
relationship between EPZs and exports all had an “outward-looking trade policy, 
characterized by a low degree of trade restrictions” (1997, p. 2121).17 Johansson and Nilsson 
argue that “countries with outward-oriented trade strategies are more likely to experience a 
positive impact on [total] exports”, in contrast to countries that choose to preserve inward-
oriented trade policies (1997, p. 2123).18 Several scholars argue that EPZs need to be part of a 
greater economic liberalisation process of the whole economy in order to be successful (see, 
e.g., Jauch et. al, 1996). Johansson and Nilsson also find evidence of a possible catalytic 
effect of EPZs on domestic exports.19 SEZs and industrial clusters have further been argued to 
                                                
17 South Korea was an exception. However, exports and employment from the zones only made up a very small 
percentage of manufacturing exports and employment. The EPZs programme was hence relatively insignificant 
in the country’s overall trade policy.   
18 Johansson and Nilsson (1997) argue that although zones are profitable they do not necessarily have a long-
term positive effect on the host country, as successful zones may allow countries to maintain inward-looking 
trade policies in general. Low foreign earnings and high unemployment are often important arguments for trade 
liberalization.  
19 Johansson and Nilsson (1997) find evidence to support the theory that EPZs may have a catalytic effect on 
domestic exports through positive spillovers, as they find that total export expansion in Malaysia was 
considerably larger than export growth from the zones alone. Limited available data made it infeasible to look 
for the effect in the other countries of the study.  
	   
13 
be important engines behind the significant growth China has experienced in the last decades 
(Zeng, 2011).  
Foreign exchange earnings are an important aim of many of the zone programmes, and 
are received through wage payments to the workers, purchases of local intermediate goods, 
tax payments, and the net profits that go to local shareholders (Mandani, 1999). The ILO 
(1998, p. 37) however argues that EPZs generate little foreign exchange earnings, as zone 
investors tend to buy “few local goods and services and the incentives normally provide for 
full repatriation of profits”. According to Jayanthakumaran (2003), cost-benefit analyses of 
zones in South Korea, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, China, Indonesia, and the Philippines illustrate 
that heavy reliance on foreign investors is unlikely to maximize the welfare of a country’s 
citizens; he therefore advocates a balance between domestic and foreign investors. Chinguno 
(2009) further argues that the effect of the current global recession shows that developmental 
strategies based on exports may be unsustainable, and production destined to the domestic 
market may be more sustainable in the long term.  
Another important aim when establishing EPZs is to increase diversity in exports in 
order to achieve higher economic growth and reduced vulnerability to global changes. EPZs 
do however often tend to be dominated by just a few industries. Apparel production and 
electronic assembly have historically been the two main sectors within EPZs. Some countries’ 
EPZs also produce a large share of their exports for a single market, making the country 
highly vulnerable to changes in tastes, market access, and recessions in the importing country 
(ILO, 1998). Preferential access to the US market resulted in the Dominican Republic 
exporting almost all of its manufactured exports to the US in the 1990s. US investors also 
made up more than half of the investments within the EPZs. A recession in the US market and 
a change in consumer demand caused a 20% decline in EPZ employment in 1990–1991 
(Kaplinsky, 1993). The ILO (1998, p. 47) argues that EPZ policies would be “more stable and 
sustainable if the investment was drawn from a wider range of countries and was spread 
across a broader group of industries and if the output was destined for diverse markets”.  
Although SSA zone programmes are argued to be less successful relative to non-SSA 
zones, several programmes have had a significant effect on exports for the host country. 
Mauritius’s use of EPZs is often seen as an African success story as the zones were of great 
significance for the country’s transition from exporting mainly sugar to exporting 
manufactures such as apparel products, as well as tourism and financial services (Romer, 
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1998; Rolfe et al., 2004).20 EPZ policies are furthermore found to have contributed to change 
in exports in several SSA countries, such as Madagascar and Mauritius. In the beginning of 
the 1990s, Madagascar exported mainly agricultural products, while manufacturing was 
marginal. By 2005, manufacturing products, mainly produced within the country’s EPZs, 
constituted half of total exports. About 90% of EPZ production in 2002 was textile and 
apparel products exported to the US and European markets. The African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) has been important for investments within the EPZs in the country, 
as is discussed further below (Cling et al., 2005). Farole (2011) finds that although investment 
level within SSA zones are relatively low, investors in SSA zones are generally from a wider 
range of countries and investments are spread across more sectors.21  
2.1.2 Employment 
Improved employment opportunities are the main target for many developing 
countries when establishing EPZ programmes. Most countries that have adopted EPZs have 
been characterized by high rates of unemployment in urban areas and hidden 
underemployment in the informal sector, as well as a heavy dependence on primary exports 
and low levels of technical know-how (Jauch et al., 1996). According to Khan (2012), high 
employment intensity is possibly the most important characteristic of poverty-alleviating 
growth, as seen in economic successes in Asian countries including the Republic of Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore.  
SEZs employed about 66 million workers in 2006, mainly within developing 
countries. About 40 million of the workers were employed within zones in China (Stein, 
2012). Employment within zone programmes make up a significant share of the formal and 
manufacturing sectors in some countries, such as the Dominican Republic, Mauritius, and 
Madagascar (Kaplinsky, 1993; Collier & Venables, 2007).22 Zones within SSA employed just 
above a million workers in 2006, more than half of whom were employed within zones in 
South Africa, as table 2.1 shows.23 Table 2.1 moreover shows that only zones in Nigeria, 
                                                
20 Romer (1998) argues that the EPZ programme is the only obvious explanation for the economic success of 
Mauritius.  
21 Farole (2011) draws on research conducted on zone programmes across 10 countries: Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Bangladesh, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Vietnam.  
22 In the Dominican Republic, 105,000 people were employed within the zones in 1989. The EPZ workers made 
up 56% of total workers employed within manufacturing in the country (Kaplinsky, 1993).  
23 Using data from Boyenge (2007), 1,043,186 workers were employed within zones in SSA, including Sudan 
and the islands in the Indian Ocean, Mauritius, Madagascar, and Seychelles. Zones in Sudan only employed 
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Madagascar, Mauritius, Lesotho, and Kenya employed more than 30,000 people (Boyenge, 
2007).24 Kingombe and Te Velde (2013) and Farole (2011) find that absolute and relative 
employment has been limited in SSA, as one can see in table 2.2, with the exception of 
Lesotho, which has seen relatively high employment in its workforce.25 Compared to many 
other zone programmes, however, SSA zones are young and have seen relatively high 
increases in employment within the zones in recent years, as can be seen in table 2.3 (Milberg 
& Amengual, 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
1,033 workers in 2005–2006. Employment data do however vary between sources and the definitions of zone 
programmes used.  
24 Some SSA zone programmes might only exist on paper, as they never have attracted notable investments, or 
may have been abandoned by investors (Johansson & Nilsson, 1997).   
25 Zones in Madagascar have also had significant effects on formal employment. The zone programme generated 
300,000 jobs between its establishment in 1990 and the political turmoil in the beginning of 21st century (Collier 
& Venables, 2007).  
	   
16 
Table 2.1. 
Employment within SSA zones in 2006 
Country No. of EPZs or similar zones Total employment 
Cape Verde  1,180 
Cameroon 1 4,690 
Cote d’Ivoire - - 
Gabon 1 791 
Ghana 4 9,828 
Kenya 43 38,851 
Lesotho 8 44,000 
Madagascar - 115,000 
Malawi 1 29,000 
Mauritius - 65,512 
Mali 3 17,593 
Mozambique 1 - 
Namibia 1 29,000 
Nigeria 6 111,375 
Senegal - 6,938 
Seychelles - 2,200 
South Africa 6 535,195 
Sudan 3 1,033 
Togo 1 9,000 
Zimbabwe - 22,000 
Source: Boyenge (2007) 
 
Source: Kingombe and Te Velde (2013, p. 6)  
Table 2.2.  
Employment within zones as a percentage of national employment in the different world 
regions 
 Direct employment (millions) Percentage of national employment 
Global 68,441 0.21 % 
Asia and the Pacific 61,089 2.30% 
Americas 3,089 1.15% 
Central/East Europe and 
Central Asia 
1,59 0.00% 
Middle East and North Africa 1,458 1.59% 
SSA 1,04 0.20% 
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Source: Milberg and Amengual (2008, p. 5) 
 
However, EPZ employment is not necessarily new jobs, and such employment may 
have been established at the expense or absorption of existing jobs in the domestic economy. 
Hence, it is important to look at the change in total employment (Jauch, 2002). Chinguno 
(2009) finds that of 2,000 jobs within South African IDZs, only 1,200 were new. The other 
jobs existed prior to the establishment of the zones and were merely relocated. Many of the 
jobs created were also part of the construction of zone infrastructure and likely to be 
temporary.26 According to ILO (1998), OECD data show that while employment within the 
Mexican maquiladoras increased by 10.4% in 1995, manufacturing employment in the 
domestic economy fell by 9% during the same period. Wang (2013) on the other hand finds 
the majority of FDI in Chinese SEZs is generating new activities. Kingombe and Te Velde 
(2013) argue that significant EPZ employment within EPUs can be questioned, as it is 
especially difficult to construct a counterfactual. EPZs are furthermore argued to attract 
mainly short-term, ‘footloose’ investments, that is, industry that is not tied to a location and 
that easily can relocate if better conditions appear elsewhere without significant effect on 
                                                
26 South Africa’s IDZ programme aimed to create 20,000 new jobs by 2014, but by 2009 the programme had had 
produced little job creation and little effect on the severe unemployment rate in the country (Chinguno, 2009).  
Table 2.3. 
Change in EPZ employment by region, 2002–2006 
Region 2002 2006 Per cent change 
North Africa 440,515 643,152 46.0 
SSA 421,585 860,474 104.1 
Indian Ocean 170,507 182,712 7.2 
Middle East 328,932 1,043,597 217.3 
Asia 7,710,543 14,741,147 91.2 
China 30,000,000 40,000,000 33.3 
Central America 4,490,757 5,252,216 16.9 
South American 299,355 459,825 53.6 
Caribbean 215,833 546,513 153.2 
Eastern and Central 
Europe 
543,269 1,400,379 157.8 
Pacific 13,590 145,930 973.8 
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input factors or costs. This is a major criticism of the EPZ policy as it forces countries to 
continually compete with each other. Footloose industry is highly sensitive to changes in the 
cost of production, and jobs created may consequently provide little employment security for 
the worker (Rolfe et al., 2004).  
EPZ firms have been heavily criticised for exploitation of workers, paying them 
negligible wages and providing poor working conditions. The prevalent violations to labour 
and social rights have contributed to making the zones unpopular in several of the countries 
where the policies have been adopted (see, e.g., Chinguno, 2009; Jauch, 2002).27 According to 
Warr (1989), however, many fail to take into account the employment possibilities and wages 
in poorer countries, and that workers are likely to be better off with EPZ employment than 
with no employment. Wages and benefits within the zones should be compared to those in the 
domestic economy and the unemployment rate taken into account in order to see the 
alternative for the workers. McCallum (2011) argues that as many of the investors in the 
zones are multinational companies they will be subject to more political awareness and 
pressure to pay at least the local minimum wages. Several studies find wages to often be 
higher and benefits to be better within zones than those in similar employment in the domestic 
economy (McCallum, 2011; Milberg & Amengual, 2008).28 Milberg and Amengual (2008) do 
however find that workers within EPZs tend to work longer hours, often illegally, and further 
highlight that compliance with minimum wages does not necessarily imply that the workers 
receive wages that are possible to live well on. Cling et al. (2005) do not find wages within 
zones in Madagascar to be significantly different from industrial firms in the formal sector 
outside the zones. They argue in contrast to the critique that the zones in Madagascar seem to 
have been important in improving the working conditions in the country. They do however 
emphasise that the effect EPZs may have on working conditions may be very different in low- 
and middle-income countries.  
Women make up to 70–90% of the workforce in some zones and employment within 
EPZs has been suggested to have the possibility of improving the social status and the 
economic power of women. The questionable quality and job security of EPZ employment 
does however make scholars argue that such employment does not necessarily contribute to 
the empowerment of women (Milberg & Amengual, 2008; Jauch, 2002). The development of 
                                                
27 Several studies find EPZs to be characterised by high labour turnover, labour unrest, absenteeism, stress, and 
low productivity (Jauch, 2002).  
28 According to Milberg and Amengual (2008), wages tend to be higher among EPZ workers than among 
workers in the domestic economy, in, among others, Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Honduras, Madagascar, and Sri 
Lanka.  
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the zones furthermore often results in an increase in the proportion of men over time as 
technology evolves and become more advanced (Kusago & Tzannatos, 1998).  
2.1.3 Backward Linkages 
A number of studies highlight the importance of encouraging the development of 
‘backward linkages’, that is the use of local raw and intermediate goods by the EPZ firms, as 
these are found to be crucial to increase the net benefit of the EPZ programmes.29 According 
to Farole (2011, p. 12), “policies to promote links between SEZs and the domestic economy 
are key to realizing the dynamic potential of the zones”. One of the main incentives to attract 
investors is duty-free import of raw and intermediate goods. Hence, local producers may find 
it difficult to compete with high-quality goods available at a low price from abroad. Watson 
(2001) argues that for this reason backward linkages are more likely to exist in more 
developed economies, with better prospects of producing quality inputs, and not necessarily in 
less developed countries. This is also supported by Milberg and Amengual (2008), who find 
that EPZs are more likely to enhance economic growth in countries with higher levels of 
industrial development. Industrial development may increase both available inputs and the 
domestic capacity to absorb positive spillovers. This is consistent with studies of the effect on 
economic growth of FDI to the overall economy; see, e.g., Alfaro et al. (2004), Hermes and 
Lensink (2003), and Xu (2000).   
A study of the EPZs in the Dominican Republic finds that even though the zones had a 
great effect on export levels, the zones had few linkages to the domestic economy, as they 
were merely enclaves outside the economy. The effect of the zones on the domestic economy 
was for this reason limited (Willmore, 1995). For the same reason Chinguno (2009) argues 
that the effect the zones in South Africa have on the economy is limited. Firms producing 
textiles and garments as well as electronics, which dominate many of the EPZs, have been 
found to have a low propensity to form backward linkages (Jenkins, 2006).30 Jenkins (2006) 
argues that low use of local inputs can be explained by the price of raw materials, 
components, and intermediate products within the sectors. The prices on these products tends 
to be high relative to their weight and volume, and it is thus “comparative[ly] less expensive” 
to take advantage of differences in costs across nations (Jenkins, 2006, p. 333). Farole (2011) 
finds the use of local inputs to be higher in African zones than in non-African zones, mainly 
                                                
29 Domestic sales are typically restricted from EPZs. Forward linkages are hence often limited.  
30 The propensity is measured by the likelihood of firms to purchase raw materials in the local market.  
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due to a higher share of the food and beverage sector within African zones. If only comparing 
firms within the garment sectors, the use of local inputs tends to be lower in African zones 
relative to non-African zones.  
Backward linkages depend on different factors. The age of the enterprise is positively 
correlated with the share of local raw materials used in production, suggesting that firms 
become gradually “more acquainted with the local environment and the ways of doing 
business” with time (Jenkins, 2006, p. 333). Jenkins (2006) moreover finds that a firm’s 
capital intensity is positively and significantly correlated to the propensity to form backward 
linkages, and argues that capital-intensive firms are likely to be less footloose and likely to 
remain in a country for longer. Smaller firms and firms that sell a larger proportion of their 
output in the domestic market are furthermore more likely to use higher shares of local inputs 
(Jenkins, 2006).   
2.1.4 Transfers of Knowledge and Technology 
Transfers or spillovers of knowledge and technology from FDI may be important 
engines of growth. Factories within an EPZ are most often labour intensive, using 
noncomplex manufacturing processes, such as in textile and garment production and 
electronic assembly, as mentioned above. Easterly (2002) argues that the substantial growth in 
garment production in Bangladesh in the 1980s was rooted in knowledge leaks from South 
Korean investors.31 Local workers learned how to produce textiles at a low cost, and how to 
enter the world market. Several of the workers trained by South Korean investors ultimately 
set up their own apparel-export firms, contributing to significant growth in manufacturing. 
Transfers of ideas or knowledge also had significant effect on apparel production in 
Mauritius, contributing to an increase in manufacturing and economic growth in the country 
(Romer, 1998). Other studies do however find little evidence of horizontal spillovers from 
FDI, or transfers of knowledge and technology to local competitive firms, e.g., Harrison and 
Rodrigues-Clare (2009). According to Winkler (2013) spillovers from FDI depend on the 
extent, durability, and quality of linkages between foreign investors and the domestic 
economy.  
LaRRI (2000) argues that most EPZ workers’ training is often limited to a specific 
task and not easily transferable. EPZ investors often require being able to use their own 
nationals in managerial and technical positions, perhaps to avoid the costs of training and to 
                                                
31 The South Korean investors settled in Bangladesh to circumvent garment import quotas from the US and 
Europe (Easterly, 2002). 
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maintain greater flexibility to move production (Jauch et al., 1996). Management- and 
advanced technical training do of these reasons tend to only happen on a small scale, with 
little effect on skill levels (Kusago and Tzannatos, 1998). Research and development facilities 
are moreover likely to be kept within developed countries when production is moved to 
countries with low-cost labour. This limits technological spillovers to the developing country 
(Wu, 2009). According to Fosfuri et al. (2001, p. 220), there is a heightened possibility for 
technology transfers to occur when “on-the-job training is general rather than specific, and 
when the absorptive capability of the local firm is high”. The process of learning or adapting 
new technology may induce significant costs in the short-term for domestic firms. The 
government in the host economy should aim to expand the opportunities and the capacity of 
domestic firms to learn from EPZ firms (Liu, 2008; Omar & Stoever, 2008; Warr, 1989).32  
 
2.2 Potential Economic Costs Linked to the Use of EPZ Policies 
The different incentives given to attract investors are not necessarily in harmony with 
a country’s developmental interests, and might impose significant direct and indirect costs on 
the host country. The costs of establishing the necessary infrastructure to attract investors are 
often substantial. Administrative costs and the costs of offering subsidised services may 
significantly increase the costs of zone programmes, if appropriate levies are not paid. There 
are furthermore several indirect costs linked to the establishment of zones, as zone incentives 
can potentially cause economic distortions. EPZ policies may cause a loss of government 
revenue from taxes and from import and export duties, if tax concessions are given to firms 
that would locate in the country regardless of the incentives. Zone programmes may moreover 
attract firms that would not be competitive without the given incentives (World Bank, 1992; 
Watson, 2001). The direct and indirect costs linked to the zone programmes are determined 
by the incentives given, as is further elaborated in section 2.3.  
The number of private zones has increased significantly in the last years, as mentioned 
in the previous chapter. The World Bank (1992, p. 9) argues that risks and costs for the host 
country will “largely disappear when private entrepreneurs assume responsibility for 
developing and managing EPZs”. Private EPZs are found to be more efficient and less 
expensive for the host country, as well as to attract higher-quality investments. However, 
                                                
32 According to Liu (2008), the cost of learning causes the effect of FDI on domestic firms to often be negative 
in the short term, The long-term effect is however positive. This may explain why some studies, e.g., Bwalya 
(2006), find a negative effect on local firms’ productivity from the increase in number of foreign-owned firms.  
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whether zones are under private control does not seem crucial for their success, as the zones 
in Mauritius and many East Asian zones are publicly controlled. About 60% of the zones in 
the world today are privately owned. African zones are almost equally split between public 
and private zones (Farole, 2011).  
There are also concerns that zones attract industries that aim to avoid environmental 
regulation in their home country. Poorer countries often have weaker environmental laws, or 
may often lack the capacity or knowledge to implement them. The result may be that negative 
externalities are not internalised by those responsible, and the population in the host country 
is left carrying the environmental costs notably reduce the net benefit of establishing zones 
(Mandani, 1999; Wu, 2009). The pollution levels linked to zones have generated concern for 
some zones, for example, the levels of pollution surrounding the maquiladoras in Mexico 
(Mandani, 1999). The World Bank (1992, p. 8), however, argues that the concerns about the 
zones’ environmental impact seems to be unfounded and finds no “evidence that EPZs 
systematically exempt firms from environmental regulations or that firms that locate there are 
heavy polluters”. In its 1992 report, the World Bank further asserts that clusters of activity, on 
the contrary, can reduce costs of control of pollution and disposal of hazardous industrial 
waste, and that if environmental problems exist, they are due to economy-wide policies and 
use of resources, rather than EPZs.  
 
2.3 The Determinants of Investments 
2.3.1 The Role of Traditional EPZ Incentives 
Despite significant investments in zone infrastructure and services at times, zones in 
SSA have mostly seen low inflows of both foreign or domestic investments, and the economic 
effects of several of the zone programmes so far have been disappointing. However, though 
the absolute level of foreign investments within African zone programmes is relatively low, 
foreign investments within the zones tend to make up a relatively high share of total foreign 
investments in the country (Farole, 2011). Hence, Farole (2011, p. 71) argues that “the 
relative failure of the African SEZ programs to attract investment may be due to a poor 
overall investment environment than to the failure of the zone programmes themselves”. 
Several factors have been found to hamper investment in African zones, such as “insufficient 
incentives and promotion, poor location, inadequate trade policy reforms in the host country, 
inefficient bureaucracy and inadequate infrastructure” (Kinunda-Rutashobya, 2003, p. 228). 
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Most of the successful zones have common features including “favourable location, 
adherence to the basic EPZ principle, i.e. duty-free imports of inputs, minimized red-tape 
procedures, guaranteed profit repatriation and the presence of a supporting infrastructure such 
as telecommunication, electricity and water” (Johansson & Nilsson, 1997, p. 2118). A study 
of the investors in the Caribbean Basin finds that investors tend to prefer countries with low 
labour costs, relatively long tax holidays, and relatively large zones (Woodward & Rolfe, 
1993). Woodward and Rolfe (1993) argue that EPZ incentives such as tax holidays and 
guaranteed profit repatriation may have an important signalling effect regarding the host 
country’s attitude towards FDI and affect the perceived business environment. Rolfe et al. 
(2004) furthermore find that most investors within Kenyan EPZs preferred a tax holiday 
followed by high tax rates to infinitely low taxes. This may suggest that investors put 
emphasis on short-term gains or plan on exiting the zones at the end of the tax holiday, which 
is consistent with the footloose nature one tends to find within EPZs. Farole (2011) does not 
find traditional zone incentives such as low wages, trade preferences, and fiscal incentives to 
be correlated with the success of the EPZs, rather, other incentives, including infrastructure, 
have greater significance for success. Woodward and Rolfe (1993) report that investors in the 
Caribbean Basin preferred countries that already had a high concentration of manufacturing, 
signifying that foreign investors favour agglomerations and the existence of external 
economies of scale. Hence, countries with relatively low levels of manufacturing may have a 
disadvantage to other countries where that sector is more developed.  
2.3.2 Domestic Sales and Domestic Investments 
The size of the domestic market is found to have a positive effect on investment within 
the zones, as larger markets supports large-scale production and infrastructure (Milberg & 
Amengual, 2008). This is consistent with the results from other studies of determinants of 
FDI, e.g., Asiedu (2006). Most African countries, however, are small, both in terms of 
population and in terms of GDP (Rolfe et al., 2004; Asiedu, 2006). According to Rolfe et al. 
(2004), the ability to sell goods in the domestic market does not affect the decision of apparel 
investors to invest, and only has a negligible effect on non-apparel investments in Kenya. The 
effect of allowing greater domestic sales is disputed. Improved access to low-priced goods 
from the EPZs can be beneficial for domestic consumers, but may also potentially prevent 
domestic producers from developing (ILO, 2003). Larger domestic sales from the EPZs may 
also increase linkages to the economy, as found by Jenkins (2006).  
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The share of local investments has increased and become more important in a number 
of zones over time, e.g., Mauritius, Malaysia, and the Republic of Korea, and is now 
increasing in zones in China, Bangladesh, and Vietnam. Domestic investments are argued to 
be essential for greater integration between the zones and the domestic economy, as they 
provide greater benefits for local firms and contribute to a higher share of revenues 
transferred to the domestic economy (Wu, 2009; Farole, 2011). Jenkins (2006) finds empirical 
evidence that firms owned mainly by local investors are more likely to purchase intermediate 
inputs from the local market, increasing the likelihood of backward linkages to the economy. 
Jayanthakumaran (2003) argues that the national interest in EPZs is likely to persist if the 
zones generate private profit to domestic shareholders and are more beneficial for the country 
in the long term.33 Many African zones have a relatively high share of local investments from 
the beginning, and the majority of investments within zones in Senegal, Tanzania, and Nigeria 
remain domestic. The relatively high share of local investors may indicate a failure to attract 
foreign investors, but also that local firms have been given EPU status (Farole, 2011).   
2.3.3 Labour Costs, Productivity, and Working Conditions 
Attempts to attract foreign investments by offering access to cheap labour in SSA may 
not be sufficient if other EPZs offer more favourable productivity and unit labour costs 
(Jauch, 2002). SSA has relatively low labour costs but also low labour productivity, and 
labour costs tend to be higher than what is predicted by the income level and labour 
productivity, at least when compared to East Asia (Clarke, 2012; Cling et. al, 2005).34 Some 
scholars attribute the relatively high labour costs to the large natural resource endowments in 
many SSA countries, as will be elaborated below. According to some scholars, SSA countries 
may be more competitive in industries that take more advantage of the countries’ natural 
resources than its surplus labour, as is further elaborated below. Watson (2001) does on the 
other hand argue that low levels of skilled labour and low levels of productivity do not imply 
that light manufacturing is not suited for Africa. According to Watson (2001), skills and 
productivity have improved steadily in countries in Asia and the Caribbean where EPZ 
programmes have been successful, and can also take place in Africa.  
                                                
33 The interest in EPZ programmes will, according to Jayanthakumaran (2003), tend to disappear with industrial 
development, due to the reduction of the gap between the market and opportunity costs of labour.  
34 Clarke (2012) finds labour productivity in many SSA countries to be relative high compared to other countries 
with similar income levels. However, wages are also higher reducing the firms’ competitiveness in the global 
market. If one compares per unit labour costs as a reflection of the competitiveness of labour, all countries in 
Africa have a disadvantage relative to China, according to Ramachandran et al. (2009).  
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Several countries partly or fully suspend labor rights within the zones to attract 
investment, e.g., India, Bangladesh, Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Namibia. Union activity in these 
countries is often banned and minimum wages are not applicable (LaRRI, 2000).35 According 
to the World Bank (1992), for the zones to be successful, it must be easy to hire and retrench 
workers, and regulatory interventions and controls within the zones must be minimal. Jauch et 
al. (1996) claim that use of EPZs is only “likely to lead to down spiral of labour standards” in 
SSA due to competitive pressure (1996, p. 48). Poor labour standards within the zones, and 
the potential for the vast numbers of zone programmes to cause a further weakening of labour 
rights are a matter of concern and critique of the use of zone programmes and also of the 
firms utilizing them (see, e.g., ILO, 1998). Poor labour conditions are also a potential source 
of conflict, which should be taken into consideration by the government (LaRRI, 2000).  
2.3.4 Infrastructure  
Farole (2011) finds a strong correlation between infrastructure quality and levels of 
investment, exports, and employment within SEZs. He argues that poor infrastructure has 
detrimental effects on investment levels in many SSA zones. Collier and Venables (2009) find 
energy and transport prices to be relatively high in Africa, due to the failure to take advantage 
of economies of scale and to pool risk for public goods. This disadvantage is a result of many 
African countries being small and undeveloped. Electricity supply in SSA is also often 
relatively unreliable, and as energy is a fundamental input in most manufacturing, energy 
supply and pricing may have a severe effect on the competitiveness of African manufacturing 
firms (Farole, 2011).36 The EPZ concept may be an attractive policy for African governments 
because it is easier to improve infrastructure in one specific area than the whole country (see 
e.g., Watson, 2001). The use of EPUs may increase the “logistical challenges of addressing 
investment climate challenges, [such as] special customs clearance regimes, one stop services 
and reliable infrastructure” (Farole, 2011, p. 148).37 However there is no clear evidence in the 
                                                
35 LaRRi (2000) finds reduced labour rights to be a central incentive for industries within zones in many 
countries.  
36 Data from surveys show a 50% downtime across African EPZ firms caused by electricity failure, significantly 
increasing the cost of production, according to Farole (2011). 
37 African countries as Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Mauritius, and Senegal are among the countries using single 
factory units or EPUs (Mandani, 1999). As Mauritius is a small island, it is however relatively easy to access key 
infrastructure, such as the airport and port, no matter where the investor locates within the country (Farole, 
2011).  
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literature that having EPUs makes a difference with respect to investments or the net benefit 
of the zone programmes (see e.g., Farole, 2011; Rolfe et al., 2004).38  
Soft and hard infrastructure may have major impact on transport, logistics 
performance, and trade facilitation, which in turn have potentially important impacts on trade 
costs. Trade costs moreover affect patterns of trade and investments, by affecting countries’ 
“ability to take part in regional and global production networks” (Arvis et al., 2013, p. 3). The 
cost of trade is also determined by location, as is further discussed below. The average trade 
costs for manufactured goods to the top 10 import countries, between 1996 and 2009, are 
estimated to be considerably higher from SSA than other regions. Many African ports have 
relatively low performance, and many African zones lack on-site customs (Farole, 2011). 
Landlocked countries within Africa may experience a further disadvantage (Watson, 2001). 
Farole (2011) finds that the reported time needed to clear imports from customs was 
considerably higher in the studied African countries’ SEZs than non-African SEZs.  
2.3.5 Location 
The geographic position of the host country may have significant impact on the 
amount of investments the zones are able to attract. Locating close to the finished goods’ 
markets gives firms the opportunity to reduce transport costs and shorten delivery time, and 
these benefits may make some zones preferable to others, and can also compensate for higher 
taxes or labour laws in the zone (Mandani, 1999). According to Sargent and Matthews (2004), 
geographical proximity to rich industrial areas gives zones an advantage relative to competing 
zones, which may keep investors within the EPZs even when relative costs increase. Hence, 
countries close to larger markets may be more likely to experience a shift to higher-value-
added and technology-intensive production.39 Kaplinsky (1993) argues that the Caribbean and 
Central America have a comparative advantage relative to Asian countries, due to their 
proximity to the US, which allows them to have higher wages relative to those in developing 
Asian countries.  
                                                
38 Farole (2011, p. 73) does not find any “strong evidence that enclave models are more or less effective than 
single factory models on a national basis”. Rolfe et al. (2004) furthermore do not find the freedom to locate 
anywhere in the country to have significant effect on investments, neither in apparel nor non-apparel sectors in 
Kenya.  
39 Sargent and Matthews (2004) find that when costs increased for the maquiladoras in Mexico, the firms 
producing goods for regional or regional and global markets were better able to secure investors than those that 
produced only for global markets, supporting the notion that proximity to the market may have a significant 
impact on a region’s ability to compete for investments with other regions.  
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A possible comparative advantage for SSA is the region’s abundant natural resources, 
and hence proximity to raw materials. Manufacturing activities related to the region’s natural 
resources could potentially be very advantageous for African zones and better utilize domestic 
capacity (Farole, 2011; Dihn et al., 2012; Chinguno, 2009). Some African countries have 
incorporated their natural resources into zone activities; for example, Ghana has managed to 
attract significant foreign investment in activities related to natural resources such as cocoa, 
wood, and fish. Nigeria has also had success with a zone established to act as a trans-shipping 
point to service the oil and gas industry in the country. Other industries in Ghana and Nigeria 
have not been able to attract a comparable level of investments (Stein, 2012; Farole, 2011).  
2.3.6 Location within the Country and Regional Development  
Location within the country may also affect how attractive zones appear for investors, 
and poor location is one of the main reasons given in the literature for failure of zone 
programmes. Foreign investors tend to favour agglomerations, access to quality infrastructure, 
and deep labour markets. Productivity furthermore tends to be higher in clusters of economic 
activity, due to lower transport costs, improved communication, and positive learning 
externalities, among other factors (Collier & Venables, 2009). Most zones are located close to 
trade gateways such as ports or airports, to provide good access to the global market. EPZ 
programmes are however sometimes used to generate an inflow of investment and an increase 
in employment opportunities in areas with low levels of economic activity (see, e.g., World 
Bank, 1992). The location of zones may have a significant impact on the net benefit of the 
project. The cost of establishing the necessary infrastructure in the area of the zone is 
radically higher if no prior infrastructure exists there, than if a more developed area is chosen. 
Furthermore, less developed areas most often do not offer easy access to skilled labour or 
well-developed infrastructure (Kusago & Tzannatos, 1998; Jayanthakumaran, 2003). Zones 
used as a tool to create regional development in less developed and more remote areas have 
rarely been successful because of these reasons, e.g., in Nigeria, Bangladesh, Vietnam, 
Dominican Republic, and Lesotho (World Bank, 1992; Farole, 2011).40  
                                                
40 Studies find the net benefit of the zones in Philippines to be negative due to very high costs, as infrastructure 
was built from scratch. In contrast, zones in Korea and Malaysia used existing infrastructure or located zones in 
areas close to existing industrial areas and were able to keep costs significantly lower (Kusago & Tzannatos, 
1998; Jayanthakumaran, 2003).  
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2.3.7 Political and Economic Stability 
“A suitable macroeconomic, exchange rate, and trade policy regime, together with a 
legal and regulatory environment favorable to business” is argued by the World Bank (1992, 
p. 10) to be critical for developing countries to build a manufacturing sector able to export to 
the world market. Woodward and Rolfe (1993) find empirical evidence that inflation had a 
negative effect on investments, while a depreciation of the exchange rate had a positive effect 
on investments within zones in the Caribbean Basin. A competitive real exchange rate is 
found to be key for export growth, and is especially important for exports of modern services 
according to Eichengreen and Gupta (2013). Exports of natural resources, which are relatively 
abundant in many SSA countries, may lead to an appreciation of the local currency and higher 
costs of living, and consequently higher labour costs compared to other countries. The inflow 
of foreign aid and monetary policies may moreover contribute to the effect (Nduli et al., 2007; 
McMillan & Rodrik, 2011).41 Stein (2009) argues that many African governments make too-
frequent shifts in policy, reducing investors’ confidence that favourable EPZ policies will 
persist, and that continuity is needed.42 In some SSA countries, opposition parties and the 
media have been critical of EPZ policies, showing a lack of consensus and concerted action 
with possibly negative effect on investments, e.g., in Namibia and South Africa (LaRRI, 
2000; Chinguno, 2009). According to Aseidu (2002) overall FDI to SSA is impeded by the 
perception that investments in region are of higher risk. Political unrest has affected 
investments within SSA countries. Mandani (1999) notes that foreign investment in Togo and 
in Zaire, today the Democratic Republic of Congo, were considerably affected by political 
unrest in the early 1990s. A political crisis in Mozambique in 2000, after a presidential 
election, also had a severe effect on investment and production levels within the zones, and 
caused about 70% of workers within the EPZs to lose their jobs. Investment levels did 
however later recover some (ILO, 2003; Cling et al., 2005).  
2.3.8 Trade Agreements  
Trade agreements may have significant positive impact on countries’ competitiveness, 
by giving some countries preferential access to certain markets. Trade policies may hence 
affect how attractive the countries appear for investors. There are several agreements with 
                                                
41 According to McMillan and Rodrik (2011), Asian countries in general have competitive currencies that have 
contributed to a structural change of the economy, while several African countries have overvalued currencies.  
42 According to Watson (2001) several existing and potential investors express worry that African governments 
may fail to maintain incentives, infrastructure, and services.  
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potentially significant effects on African trade, among them the Cotonou Agreement, AGOA, 
and the Everything But Arms (EBA) agreement. Prior to 2005, the Multi Fiber Arrangement 
(MFA) also contributed to reducing the competition African countries met from Asian 
countries, among others (McCormick et al, 2006). Jayanthakumaran (2003) finds a strong 
correlation between the growth of EPZs and the MFA, and finds the MFA to have a 
significant effect on global production patterns of apparel products, as firms moved overseas 
to obtain access to the quota shares under the MFA.43 AGOA was initiated in 2000, providing 
eligible SSA countries duty-free quota-free access to the US market.44 The effect of the 
AGOA has however been concentrated within textile and apparel exports, and in a few 
countries, specifically: Kenya, Mauritius, Madagascar, and Lesotho (Collier & Venables, 
2007). Cling et al. (2005) argue that beneficial access to large markets, through mainly 
AGOA, was one of the main factors that contributed to the EPZ policies being relatively 
successful in Madagascar. According to Collier and Venables (2007) AGOA has been critical 
in keeping investors and levels of exports in African zones after the phase-out of the MFA.  
The EBA agreement was initiated in 2001, giving countries classified as least 
developed countries (LDCs) by the United Nations (UN) duty-free access to the European 
Union (EU) market for almost all types of exports. The agreement has had less noteworthy 
effects on African processed exports than the AGOA. Collier and Venables (2007, p. 1335) 
argue that LDCs are less likely to be able to take advantage of preferential market access than 
more developed countries in Africa, if given access, as they are “least likely to be near the 
threshold of global manufacturing competiveness”. In contrast to the AGOA, the EBA 
agreement also applies a rule of origin for textile and apparel exports to LDCs “justified as a 
means of supporting more processing in developing countries” (Portugal-Perez, 2008, p. 21). 
The rule of origin has significantly depressed textile and apparel exports to the EU according 
to Portugal-Perez (2008).45 The end of the MFA in 2004 had a significant effect on garment-
sector exports in SSA. Apparel exports in East and South Asia, especially Bangladesh, 
Vietnam, and Cambodia, together with China grew rapidly between 2004–2008, while other 
regions such as Central America, the Caribbean, and SSA experienced declines of up to 40% 
in exports and large losses in market share (Farole, 2011; Milberg & Amengual, 2008). 
                                                
43 According to Mandani (1999), NAFTA had a positive effect on employment and exports in zones in Mexico, 
and a negative effect on Caribbean and Asian zones.   
44 See appendix for more information about AGOA. 
45 The appendix contains more information on the different agreements mentioned in this chapter. Table A1 
gives an overview of SSA countries’ eligibility for AGOA and/or EBA benefits.  
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According to Milberg and Amengul (2008) non-East Asian countries are still at great risk of 
losing significant shares in the world export market to countries like China.  
2.3.9 Timing and Number of Competing Zones 
The timing of the establishment of the zones in Africa is a possible explanation for 
why SSA zones have not been more successful. Many of the zones with the greatest success, 
in East Asia and Mauritius, were established in the 1970s, when there were fewer zones to 
compete with. The majority of SSA zones, with the exception of those in Senegal and 
Lesotho, were established much later, during the 1990s, when competition between the zones 
to attract investors was much higher, as seen in table 2.4 (Wu, 2009; Farole, 2011). One the 
other hand, zones established at a later stage have the advantage of learning from the 
experience of others (World Bank, 1992; Chinguno, 2009).  
 
Source: Farole (2011, p. 68).  
 
The noteworthy increase in number forces the different zones to compete with each 
other and offer costly incentives without necessarily being able to attract sufficient 
Table 2.4.  
Overview of African Zone Programmes by Decade of Launch 
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Liberia Djibouti Burundi Gabon 
Senegal Togo Cameroon Gambia 
Mauritius  Cape Verde Mali 
  Equatorial Guinea South Africa 
  Ghana Zambia 
  Kenya  
  Madagascar  
  Malawi  
  Mozambique  
  Namibia  
  Nigeria  
  Rwanda  
  Seychelles  
  Sudan  
  Uganda  
  Zimbabwe  
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investments. The net benefit of the zone programmes may decline with the increase in the 
number of zones. The attempt to offer incentives superior to other zones is called the ‘race-to-
the-bottom effect’ and traditional EPZ incentives, such as low labour costs, trade preferences, 
and fiscal incentives are argued to be unsustainable (Jauch, 2002; Wu, 2009). Kaplinsky 
(1993) argues that countries may experience a competitive disadvantage if a number of 
countries attempt to exploit their unskilled labour by attracting labour-intensive production at 
the same time. In the same way, it will lead to little gain for the country to devalue its 
currency if a number of other countries do the same. He argues that the most viable 
alternative is to increase industries that do not merely rely on unskilled workers, but use 
different types of skilled workers. According to Wu (2009), the increase in competition no 
longer makes it beneficial to establish EPZs that mainly rely on low-cost labour. There are 
also concerns that the increase in competition will diminish attention to workers’ rights and 
will lower wages, significantly reducing the gains of EPZ employment for the worker 
(McCallum, 2011). Farole (2011, p. 89) argues that SSA zones may have been “too late to 
take advantage of the massive globalisation of manufacturing that accelerated during the 
1980s and 1990s”. However even for successful zones it has taken time for investments to 
increase, for example in Malaysia and China. Farole (2011b) finds the age of zones to be 
positively correlated with export volume, but that age alone does not explain the vast 
differences in the outcomes of the zone programmes. 
 
2.4 Conclusion in the Literature 
According to Kingombe and Te Velde (2013) SEZ programmes can both generate 
employment and contribute to structural transformation. They do however find that most SSA 
zone programmes have failed to increase higher-productivity activities, with the exception of 
Mauritius and possibly Kenya. They argue that successful zone programmes must be able to 
respond to changes in the global economy, be part of a wider growth strategy, and take 
advantage of economies of scale. Watson (2001) argues that obstacles to successful EPZ 
programmes and manufacturing in SSA are not intrinsically African and can for this reason be 
overcome, and have a subsequent positive effect on long-term development. Stein (2012, p. 
339) is positive regarding the effect of EPZs in Africa, and argues that successful zones have 
shown they may have significant “impact on the structural and institutional transformation of 
African economies”. He does however stress that EPZs “should not be seen as a panacea for 
solving the diverse and complex economic problems for all African countries” (Stein, 2012, p. 
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339). Farole (2011) furthermore concludes that despite the weak performance of most African 
zones to this day, they do have a potential to be useful for many African countries. However, 
other authors are more critical about the effect the zones may have for African economies. 
LaRRI (2000) argues that neither employment nor backward linkages justify the considerable 
costs that the EPZs programme in Namibia incurred. LaRRI claims that the government’s 
expectations for the EPZ programme were highly optimistic and based on rather unrealistic 
projections. They do however note that their study was done in the very early stages of the 
Namibian EPZ programme. According to Jauch (2002) EPZ programmes have no prospects 
for solving the socioeconomic problems in Southern Africa, and he argues that use of zones 
will only result in a race to the bottom, with detrimental effects on regional cooperation, self-
sufficiency, and sustainable development. Jauch et al. (1996, p. 47) argue that the huge 
disbursements EPZs require can “be used more productively and more efficiently on larger 
scale national employment creation programmes”.  
Collier and Venables (2007) recognize that EPZs may not be sufficient to significantly 
increase manufacturing, but be more a necessity as Asian countries already have such zones. 
They emphasise the need for trade preferences for Africa to be able to increase manufacturing 
in SSA. However, due to its high wages relative to productivity and high transport costs, 
several scholars question SSA’s competitiveness in labour-intensive manufacturing. It is 
argued that SSA is more likely to be competitive in manufacturing industries that take 
advantage of Africa’s access to natural resources (e.g., Dihn et al., 2012; Chinguno, 2009). 
The somewhat different results and conclusions in the literature regarding the impact of EPZs 
may be to some extent explained by the use of different models and/or assumptions. The 
context and EPZ policies also vary between countries, and EPZ policies will for this reason 
not necessarily have the same effect in different countries.  
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Chapter 3 
Case Study −  Kenya 
3.1 Kenya’s EPZ Programme 
3.1.1 Introduction 
Kenya is known as the regional hub for trade and finance in the East African region, 
and as a popular tourist destination due to its outstanding wildlife. It is a low-income country 
with a population of about 41.6 million people.46 The country’s main exports are tea, 
horticultural products, coffee, tobacco, and textile and apparel items. Tourism also provides 
an important source of foreign exchange earnings. Agriculture still dominates and provides 
the main source of employment in the country, as was the case when the country became 
independent from Britain in 1963. However, the country has seen an increase in both the 
manufacturing sector and the service sector, reducing the dependency on subsistence 
agriculture (AEO, 2012a; KEPZA, 2012; World Bank, 2013c). Poverty remains urgent: 46% 
of the population lived on less than one dollar a day at the end of the first decade of the 21st 
century. Inequality is also high, especially between rural and urban areas (International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), 2010; World Bank, 2013a, 2013c).  
The country has implemented a number of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) 
since the mid-1970s to improve the economic growth rate and reduce government debt. Poor 
economic growth and a drop in GDP per capita at the beginning of 1990s (see figures 3.1 and 
3.2) resulted in several measures to improve economic performance.47 During the 1990s 
reforms were implemented to increase private investment and to move from import 
substitution to an export-led growth strategy. Numerous publicly owned companies were also 
privatised. All administrative controls on international trade, such as foreign exchange 
allocation, price controls, and import licensing, were removed by 1993. The aim was to 
accelerate the process of industrialisation, generate employment, reduce poverty, and further 
integrate the country into the global economy (Mwenga & Ndung, 2001).  
                                                
46 Kenya has a GDP per capita of US$808 (current dollars) (World Bank, 2013a).  
47 Kenya has seen a positive economic growth rate on average in the period 1980 to 2011, but the growth rate has 
seen large fluctuations. The level of GDP per capita notably dropped in the 1990s, before increasing again 
beginning in 2003, as figures 3.1 and 3.2 show.  
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Figure 3.1. 
GDP growth (% annual), 1980–2011  
 
Source: World Bank (2013a) 
 
 
Figure 3.2. 
GDP per capita (constant US$) 
 
Source: World Bank (2013a) 
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3.1.2 The EPZ Programme 
Kenya’s EPZ programme was initiated in 1990 as a tool in the export-led growth 
strategy.48 The programme aims to attract export-oriented investments and achieve “job 
creation, diversification and expansion of exports, increase […] productive investments, 
technology transfers and creation of backward linkages between the zones and the domestic 
economy” (KEPZA, 2013). The zone programme has a central role in the country’s 
development plan, ‘Kenya Vision 2030’, which aims to develop, split, and distribute the 
existing EPZ and develop three additional zones in Mombasa, Kisumu, and Lamu. The zones 
are also to allow a wider range of commercial activity. The construction of the new zones is 
however behind schedule, and has yet not started.49 The zones offer investors a number of tax 
benefits, among them a 10-year corporate tax holiday followed by a 25% tax rate, and 
incentives such as unrestricted repatriation of profit on capital and dividends from foreign 
exchange earnings, unrestricted foreign borrowing and capital, and exemption from certain 
licensing requirements. Additional incentives are listed in table A2 in the appendix.  
Investments in the zones must be export-oriented within manufacturing, commercial 
activities, or export-related services, and domestic sales are restricted. The EPZ firms are in 
general to locate within the existing zones in Kenya, which are situated in Nairobi, Voi, Athi 
River, Kerio Valley, Mombasa, and Kilifi. The country had 47 zones in 2012, but about half 
are single firms, or EPUs (see, e.g., McCormick, 2012). The largest zone is Athi River, one of 
two public zones controlled by the EPZ Authority. Athi River is situated 30 km from Nairobi 
in the Mavoko municipality; the EPZ is thus close to the capital of Kenya; the Jomo Kenyatta 
Airport, which is the largest airport in Eastern Africa; and the Nairobi–Mombasa railway 
(USITC, 2008). The Kipevu EPZ, the second public zone, is located close to Mombasa. The 
port of Mombasa is one of the busiest ports in Africa and also provides access by road and 
railway to Kenya’s neighbouring countries.50  
                                                
48 The EPZs were a part of an Export Development Programme. Other interventions in the Export Development 
Programme were manufacturing-under-bond, duty exemption, and VAT exemption schemes.  
49 The government of Kenya aim to transform the EPZ programme to a SEZ programme over time, and allow a 
wider range of commercial activities within the zones, and, among other goals, increase agro-processing, such as 
meat and fish processing and horticulture. The Kenya Vision plan aspires to transform Kenya into an 
industrialized middle-income economy by enhancing global competitiveness and increasing the diversity of 
industries. See Kenya Vision 2030 (2013) for more information.  
50 Most of the present zones are located close to Mombasa. The Kipevu EPZ did, however, remain largely 
undeveloped for an extended period after its establishment in 1996. In 2012 the zone was occupied by three 
enterprises linked to the textile and apparel sector. The Athi River EPZ had, by comparison, about 40 enterprises 
operating within the zone the same year (KEPZA, 2012).  
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Establishing infrastructure for the Athi River zone was estimated to cost about US$30 
million, or KSh2,536 million, to develop. The World Bank was to cover about 80% of the 
costs, and the Kenyan government the rest.51 The Kenyan EPZ Authority (KEPZA) 
constructed most of the zone’s industrial buildings that were built by 2005. Private contractors 
have since constructed a number of buildings for leasing within the zone, reducing the 
government’s direct costs and hence the financial risk of the zone programme. The cost of 
establishing the Kipevu EPZ was estimated to cost US$18 million. Funds were requested 
from the African Development Bank and the African Development Foundation (KEPZA, 
2012; KEPZA, 2013).52 Services within the zones are provided to tenants for a charge. The 
lease of the industrial buildings differs between the different zones from US$2.00 per square 
foot per annum in Mombasa, US$2.80 in Athi River, to US$3.60 in Nairobi (KEPZA, 
2013).53 The government further charges the EPZs for services such as water utilities and 
electricity. The EPZ firm’s expenditure on utilities such as power, water, and electricity is 
presented in table 3.4, and elaborated later in the thesis. Due to insufficient data on 
infrastructure costs it is difficult to assess the zones’ full costs for the government.54 The 
indirect costs, e.g., lost tax revenues from EPZ firms in Kenya, are furthermore especially 
difficult to assess due to a high number of EPUs and the difficulty in ascertaining if these are 
new investments.  
 
3.2 The Success of Kenyan Zones 
3.2.1 FDI and Export Diversity 
Investments within the zones remained rather low and stagnant in the years prior to the 
establishment of the AGOA in 2000. In 1995 there were 12 zones. Investments within the 
zones were only KSh3.9 million, and zone output was negligible in terms of GDP (Mwenga 
& Ndung, 2001; Omolu, 2006). The number of enterprises and the level of investments 
increased considerably following the initiation of AGOA, mainly within the textile and 
                                                
51 According to World Bank (1992), the Bank provided the Athi River project with US$24 million based on 
estimated costs.  
52 Jauch (2002) estimates significantly higher costs for the Kenyan government to establish the zones, calculating 
the costs to be about 40 billion Kenyan shilling (KSh), or US$514 million given the 2002 exchange rate.  
53 1sq. m. = 10.76 sq. ft.  
54 According to Briceno-Garmendia and Shakaratan (2011) electricity in the country prior to 2008 was 
underpriced; water services may still be priced too low, causing a financial burden for the state.  
	   
37 
apparel sectors. The exchange rate and the inflation rate were relatively stable in this period, 
which contributed to the increase in FDI (CBK, 2005). The number of firms within the textile 
and apparel industries increased from 10 to 40 in 2003 alone, and investments within the 
zones increased from KSh0.5 billion in 2000 to about KSh17 billion by 2004, as seen in table 
3.1.55 The increase in investments raised the amount of zone exports by 287% between 2001 
and 2004, as seen in table 3.2. It is estimated that between 70 and 90% of zone exports were 
textile and apparel products to the US, aided by the AGOA. Kenya became and remains today 
one of the largest SSA exporters of textiles and apparel to the US (KEPZA, 2013; McCormick 
et al., 2006).  
 
Table 3.1. 
Number of zones and enterprises, and level of investments within Kenyan zones  
Year  No. of zones Enterprises Investments (in 
million KSh) 
Investments (in million 
KSh, adjusted for 
inflation) 
1993 10 12   
1995 12    
1997 14    
1999 16 22 5,160 5,560 
2000 19 24 6,107 6,218 
2001 23 31 8,950 8,950 
2002 31 54 12,728 12,602 
2003 37 66 16,716 15,593 
2004 41 74 17,012 14,805 
2005 43 68 18,682 15,504 
2006 39 71 20,320 15,642 
2007 41 72 19,027 13,868 
2008 38 77 21,701 13,974 
2009 41 83 21,507 12,681 
2010 42 75 23,563 13,620 
2011 45 79 26,468 13,643 
2012 47 82 38, 535 18,040 
Note: Inflation adjusted using GDP deflator (2001 = 100) from World Bank (2013a).  
Sources: Mwenga and Ndung (2001); KNBS (2012–2013); ILO (1998); KEPZA (2003, 2005, 2008, 2012) 
 
 
 
                                                
55 See also Farole (2011), Chemengich (2010), and McCormick et al. (2004).  
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Table 3.2. 
Exports, share of total exports, sales, and EPZ contribution to GDP, 1999–2012  
 EPZ exports (in 
KSh millions) 
Share of total exports 
(in %) 
Total sales EPZ contr. to 
GDP (in %) 
1999 3,020  3,726  
2000 3,635  4,390  
2001 5,962  6,499  
2002 9,741 5.75 11,040 1.08 
2003 13,818 7.54 14,817 1.40 
2004 23,047 10.73 24,217 2.18 
2005 20,036 7.69 23,774 2.03 
2006 22,893 8.91 25,352 2.00 
2007 27,408 9.98 29,400 2.2 
2008 28,094 8.14 31,262 2.29 
2009 23,948 6.94 26,798 1.92 
2010 28,998 7.08 32,348 2.20 
2011 39,067 7.64 42,442 2.76 
2012 39,962 7.72 44,273 2.75 
Sources:  KEPZA (2005–2008); KNBS (2010–2012) 
 
Following the end of the MFA in January 2005, the level of investment within the 
textile and apparel sector declined by 11.5%, from KSh8.6 billion in 2004 to KSh7.6 billion 
in 2008. By 2010 there were only 26 firms left within the textile sector (Chemengich, 2010; 
Farole, 2011). Investments within other sectors, including “horticulture and food processing, 
call centres, human and veterinary pharmaceuticals” did, however, see an increase causing 
investments within the zones to still grow in the period (Farole, 2011, p. 91).56 Total sales 
from the EPZs also increased, despite a drop in exports in 2004–2005, as can be seen in table 
3.2 and figure 3.3.57 Production became increasingly more diverse and somewhat less 
concentrated in garment production. In 2008 the share of exports to the US had declined to 
57.5% of EPZ output, though about 98% of US exports from the zones were still apparel 
                                                
56 KEPZA attempts to attract investments within food and agri-processing, such as fruit, fish, and meat 
processing; coffee and tea packaging; wood products; building materials; minerals; essential oils; and plant 
extraction. The authority also advocates investment opportunities within export services, such as Internet 
services, software development, web design, call centres, and research (KEPZA, 2013). Textile and apparel 
production is however still the most important sector within the zones.   
57 Farole (2011) finds the average growth rate between 2000 and 2008 to be 31% annually.  
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products (KEPZA, 2008; Farole, 2011).58 Compared to a number of other African and non-
African zone programmes the absolute levels of investment within zones in Kenya are low, 
but the zones did attract about 20% of foreign investments in the period from 2000 to 2008, 
according to Farole (2011).59   
The post-election violence that occurred in 2008 had a detrimental effect on the 
manufacturing sector, through damage to supply chains and production, as it became difficult 
to obtain the necessary raw materials. Costs were also increased by halts in production and the 
need for extra security. The riots had visible effect on the economic growth rate and the 
country’s GDP, as seen in figures 3.1 and 3.2. However, despite challenges in the global 
market, hard competition, uncertainties regarding the continuation of access to the US through 
AGOA, and the 2013 general election, investment levels and total sales within the zones have 
seen an increase in recent years.60 Eighty-two firms operated within the zones in 2012 and 
total sales from the zones amounted to KSh44.3 billion. The value of exports notably 
exceeded the value of imports of the EPZ firms, as illustrated in figure 3.3. About a third of 
firms were textile and apparel producers or garment support services, which made up about 
half of total exports from the EPZs. Food- and agri-processing firms, haves become more 
prominent over the years, producing about 18% of exports in 2012. In 2012, exports from the 
zones made up about 8% of total exports, as seen in table 3.2, and 4.25% of the 
manufacturing sector.61 62 Hence, it is evident that though the zones produce an important 
share of exports, EPZ production only makes up a small share of the manufacturing in the 
country. Despite growth in the EPZs, the manufacturing sector in the country has seen a 
decline in the growth rate in the period (KEPZA, 2012; KNBS, 2013). Domestic 
manufacturing firms in Kenya mainly sell goods on the domestic market and to Kenya’s 
                                                
58 Of the EPZ exports, 14.4% went to Europe, 14.1% to Asia, and 13.6% to other African countries mainly 
within COMESA and EAC (KEPZA, 2008).  
59 Ghana by comparison has US$2.874 million invested within its EPZs and EPUs, Bangladesh US$1.435, and 
the Dominican Republic US$2.611, according to Farole (2011).  
60 Concerns about the rising levels of corruption in Kenya put its continued eligibility for AGOA benefits in 
jeopardy, as AGOA eligibility depends upon countries meeting human rights and governance requirements. 
Exports from Kenya that were eligible for AGOA benefits had a value of US$380 million in 2012, whereas 
US$262 million were produced within the EPZs (Liloba, 2013). Madagascar is, as an example, currently 
suspended from being an AGOA beneficiary due to the political crisis in the country that started in 2009 (AGOA 
info, 2013).  
61 According to Boyenge (2007) and Kingombe and Te Velde (2013), exports from the Kenyan zones made up 
80% of total merchandise exports in 2002 and 86.9% of national exports in 2006. Farole (2011) finds that 
exports from the zones made up 9% of non-oil exports and 25% of manufacturing exports in 2008.  
62 Total apparel and textile exports, from the zones and the overall economy, constitute the fourth-largest 
exported merchandise commodity, after tea, horticulture, and coffee.  
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neighbouring countries (see, e.g., Clarke, 2012). Moreover, though total exports have seen an 
increase, the growth in imports has been causing an increase in the trade deficit of goods and 
services over the period (KNBS, 2005, 2008, 2012; World Bank, 2013a).  
 
Figure 3.3. 
EPZs firms’ total sales, imports and exports 
 
Source: KEPZA (2003–2012) 
 
The shares of value added from agriculture and manufacturing have been relatively 
stable over the period from 1980, as figure 3.4 shows. The export structure according to the 
different sectors, and the destination of exports, have both also only changed a little from 
1995, though exports to other African countries have become more important (see figures 3.5 
and 3.6). Kingombe and Te Velde (2013) do find however that the use of zone programmes 
has contributed to some change in the export structure in Kenya, even though the change is 
limited relative to other countries, such as Mauritius, the Dominican Republic, Malaysia, and 
Costa Rica. The African Economic Outlook (AEO) (2012a) concludes that to some extent 
Kenya has seen an economic transformation of its economy. Kenya has yet, however, to see a 
sizeable change from low-value added production to higher-value production, according to 
the IMF (2010).  
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Figure 3.4.  
Manufacturing and agriculture as share of GDP, 1980–2011 
 
Source: World Bank (2013a)63 
 
Figure 3.5. 
Exports structure (in %) 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2012b) 
                                                
63 ‘Value added’ is defined as “the net output of a sector after adding up all the outputs and subtracting 
intermediate inputs” (World Bank, 2013a). Industry here includes manufacturing, mining, construction, 
electricity, water and gas. Services include wholesale and retail trade, transport, government, financial, 
professional, and personal services (education, health care, and real estate services).  
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Figure 3.6. 
Exports structure by destination (in %) 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2012b) 
 
3.2.2 Employment within the EPZs 
Kenya has a high unemployment rate, especially among youth, and employment and 
income creation are important targets for the EPZ programme, and in the country’s 
development plan.64 Direct employment within the textile and apparel sector rose from 10,000 
prior to the initiation of AGOA, to 36,600 in 2005. Total employment within the zones was 
about 39,000 in 2005, see table 3.3. It is further estimated that about three times the number 
of employees benefited from the textile value chain and from complementary services through 
indirect employment (see, e.g., Chemengich, 2010; Omolu, 2006). The textile and apparel 
sector accounted for about 90% of employment within the country’s zones in 2005 (Collier & 
Venables, 2007). The end of the MFA had a significant impact on employment in the textile 
and apparel industry, and though employment within nonapparel industry increased, total 
employment within the zones declined to 30,000 in 2008 (see table 3.3). Because women 
make up the majority of the workers in the textile and apparel industry, most of those who lost 
their jobs were women, often with few other opportunities for employment and income (see, 
e.g., Chemengich, 2010). 
                                                
64 Youth unemployment constitutes 70% of total unemployment according to the AEO (2012a), and the share is 
increasing as new workers enter the workforce.  
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Table 3.3. 
Employment within Kenyan zones 
Year Employment of 
Kenyans 
Employment of 
foreigners 
Total 
employment 
% of manuf. 
Employment 
% of total 
employment 
1993 1,594   0.84  
1998 3,645 74 3,719   
1999 7,077 83 5,160   
2000 6,487 133 6,620   
2001 13,444 314 13,758   
2002 26,447 701 27,148 11.5 0.38 
2003 38,199 912 39,111 15.93 0.52 
2004 37,723 837 38,560 15.58 0.48 
2005 38,051 800 38,851 15.37 0.46 
2006 36,757 649 37,416 14.49 0.43 
2007 34,446 511 34,957 13.38 0.37 
2008 30,187 471 30,658 11.43 0.30 
2009 30,115 508 30,623 11.54 0.29 
2010 31,026 476 31,502 11.75 0.29 
2011 32,043 421 32,464 11.80 0.28 
2012 35,501 428 35,929 12.77 0.28 
Sources: Rolfe et al. (2004); KEPZA (2005–2012); CBK (2012)  
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Figure 3.7. 
Total employment within the zones 
 
Source: Data from table 3.2 
 
In its 2007 strategic plan, the Export Processing Zone Authority in Kenya (KEPZA) 
set a goal of more than doubling employment within the zones by 2013, by targeting sectors 
with both high employment potential and high-quality jobs (KEPZA, 2007; Omondi, 2010).65 
However, a notable increase in employment has yet to take place due to a decline in the textile 
and apparel sector, and an increase in industries that are less labour-intensive, and hence have 
created little employment. The textile and apparel sector still accounted for about 80% of jobs 
within the zones in 2012, though less than a third of EPZ firms are within the sector. Only 
11% of EPZ workers were employed within the agri-processing sector (KEPZA, 2012). About 
3,500 jobs were created within the zones during 2011. Employment within the zones was 
however still lower than at the peak of 2004, when it rose to about 36,000 in 2012, as can be 
seen in table 3.3 and in figure 3.7. EPZ employment makes up 12.8% of manufacturing 
employment, which is notable given the smaller share of manufacturing production, but its 
share of national employment is marginal. The informal sector, called ‘Jua Kali’, remains the 
main source of employment generation.66 For this reason, employment within the informal 
                                                
65 Employment generation within the zones is also an essential part in the country’s development plan and in the 
poverty reduction plan prepared by the IMF.  
66 The informal sector constituted 80.8% of all employment in 2011 (KNBS, 2012).  
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sector has seen a greater increase compared to employment within the formal sector (KNBS, 
2012).   
3.2.3 Training Facilities and Knowledge and Technology Spillovers 
KEPZA aims to enhance skill development and technology transfers by implementing 
training- and skills-transfer programmes. Forty-one EPZ firms provided some type of training 
to their local employees in 2008. Training was also given at the management level, though 
this is limited and working permits are given to foreigners with special skills in management, 
as well as technology (KEPZA, 2008; KEPZA, 2013). Farole (2011) finds about a third of 
management positions to be held by foreigners, a relatively high share compared to many 
other zones, suggesting that management training is relatively low in Kenya. The high share 
of foreign management may also imply that foreign-owned firms are relatively footloose. 
KEPZA does not provide data on the number of unskilled and skilled workers within the 
zones, making further analysis of EPZs’ use of skilled workers and the effect of training 
infeasible.  
Five of seven public universities in Kenya offer courses related to the textile and 
apparel sector, within design, engineering, and technology, as well as business studies (see, 
e.g., Nguku (2012). The National Industrial Training Authority (NITA) has five training 
centres, with one each in Athi River, Kisumu, and Mombasa, and two in Nairobi. The centres 
offer training within a range of different sectors, including mechanical, electrical, electronics, 
automotive, textile and apparels, and information communication technology (ICT) (NITA, 
2013; Nguku, 2012). The IMF (2010) argues that training facilities are inadequate and 
linkages between the facilities and industries are poor, causing disparities between the 
technical skills available and the demands of the industries. The use of new technology, 
innovation, and research and development facilities within Kenya furthermore remains low.  
Knowledge spillovers from the EPZ firms are expected by KEPZA through labour 
circulation, among other means. According to Kimuya (2005) and the World Bank (2005), by 
2005 most EPZ firms in Kenya had few linkages with local firms and thus little possible 
impact on productivity. Farole (2011), however, finds evidence of labour circulation between 
zone-based and local firms, and argues that this implies possibilities for the transfer of skills 
and knowledge. According to Kingombe and Te Velde (2013), the zones in Kenya have 
contributed to increasing labour productivity in manufacturing by between 16% and 29% in 
the period between 1990 and 2007, or between 1.5% and 2.5% annually. Moreover, according 
to USITC (2008), joint ventures within the textile industry have enabled domestic producers 
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to secure technology that allowed them to expand operations in Kenya.  Studies also find 
evidence of increased productivity levels within the zones due to a change in production and 
the competitive pressure on EPZ firms from Asian producers to increase volume per worker 
(Farole 2011; Kingombe & Te Velde (2013).  
3.2.4 Backward Linkages 
Import substitution policies made the textile and apparel sector one of the largest 
manufacturing sectors.67 However, the change to export-led growth in the 1990s, a high 
inflow of used clothes, and reduced domestic demand significantly reduced textile production 
and halved the capacity utilization of the mills (KEPZA, 2005b). In 2005 there were 35 textile 
mills serving textile and apparel firms, and cotton production engaged 140,000 small-scale 
cotton farmers, down from 200,000 at the peak in the mid-1980s. Only a fraction of suitable 
land was used for cotton production, suggesting good possibilities to enhance production.  
Food security is, however, a growing problem in Kenya due to large fluctuations in water 
supply and high population growth (KEPZA, 2005b; IFPRI, 2013).68 Mills in Kenya struggle 
to be able to produce good-quality yarn and fabrics competitive with Asian countries; yarn 
and fabrics are primarily imported from lower-priced Asian countries, such as India, 
Bangladesh, China, and Malaysia (Kingombe & Te Velde, 2013; Farole, 2011). According to 
data from Farole (2011) the textile and apparel industry only sourced 17% of inputs locally in 
2008. The food and agri-processing sector had a considerably higher use of local inputs, as 
seen in figure 3.8. The textile and garment sector is still the largest consumer of local goods, 
due to its size (KEPZA, 2012).69 The government is aiming to increase investments in mills to 
increase African-sourced fabric, and to improve the quality and variety of Kenyan textiles. 
This is important to be able to meet AGOA requirements regarding the source of inputs for 
AGOA-eligible products (KEPZA, 2007; KEPZA, 2013). The insecurity related to the 
continued market access through AGOA has, as pointed out by Kingombe and Te Velde 
(2013), a significant negative impact on investments within the textile and apparel sector, as 
                                                
67 The government imposed a 100% import duty on textile and apparel imports since independence in 1963 until 
the 1990s, and encouraged backward linkages from the sector through textile mills sourcing cotton from small-
scale producers (KEPZA, 2005b).  
68 It is estimated that Kenya had 350,000 hectares of land suitable for cotton production, but only about 25,000 
hectares were used for this purpose in 2003 (KEPZA, 2005b).  
 
69 The textile and apparel sector made up 30.6% of EPZ expenditure on local goods in 2012 (KEPZA, 2012).  
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Kenya was unlikely to have been eligible if the third-country fabric provision had not been 
extended.70  
  
Figure 3.8. 
Average use of local inputs in the different sectors within the zones in 2008 (in %)
  
Source: Farole (2011) 
 
Total domestic expenditures on local inputs, utilities, salaries, and other expenditures 
by EPZ firms, and hence inflow of foreign exchange, have been increasing with the number 
of firms and investments and the change in sectors, from KSh2.2 billion in 2002 to KSh18.1 
billion in 2012, as shown in tables 3.4 and 3.5. The increase in domestic expenditures is, 
however, not as impressive if adjusted for inflation, as shown in figure 3.9. KEPZA aims to 
significantly increase domestic expenditures by encouraging greater backward linkages with a 
subsequent positive effect on indirect employment and possible spillovers. The aim was to be 
met by increasing the focus on sectors that use higher shares of local inputs (KEPZA, 2007). 
EPZ firms’ purchases of local raw and intermediate goods for production, and EPZ workers’ 
consumption have contributed to somewhat increase economic activity and growth in the 
areas surrounding the EPZs, according to KEPZA (2012). More precise measures of the effect 
                                                
70 The extension up to 2019 is contingent on there being a successful conclusion of the WTO Doha Development 
Agenda Round of Negotiations before the end of 2015. See further information about AGOA in the appendix.  
83 
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are however not available, which makes it difficult to estimate the value of demand linkages 
beyond total local expenditure by the EPZ firms.  
 
Table 3.4. 
Expenditures on utilities by EPZ firms, in KSh millions 
Year Power Telecommunication Water 
2001 112 54 17 
2002 147 73 24 
2003 258 82 61 
2004 302 105 72 
2005 366 112 84 
2006 522 117 121 
2007 421 114 75 
2008 575 88 55 
2009 488 90 58 
2010 522 135 71 
2011 701 61 87 
2012 757 66 117 
Source: KEPZA (2005a, 2008, 2012) 
 
Table 3.5. 
Local purchases, local salaries, other expenditures, and total domestic expenditures 
Year Local purchases Local salaries Other domestic 
expenditure 
Total domestic 
expenditure 
2001 718 832 502 2,235 
2002 1,127 1,582 698 3,651 
2003 1,176 2,398 994 4,969 
2004 1,893 3,258 1,701 7,331 
2005 2,388 3,017 2,288 8,255 
2006 3,253 3,299 1,861 9,173 
2007 3,454 3,197 1,289 9,110 
2008 4,476 3,044 3,127 11,365 
2009 3,942 3,274 3,180 11,032 
2010 4,661 3,585 4,315 13,287 
2011 6,276 3,769 4,024 14,921 
2012 8,027 4,509 4,619 18,097 
Source: KEPZA (2005a, 2008)  
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Figure 3.9. 
Total domestic expenditures by EPZ firms (2001–2012)
 
Note: Inflation adjusted using GDP deflator (2001 = 100) from World Bank (2013a).  
Source: KEPZA (2003, 2008, 2012)  
 
3.3 Kenyan Investment Environment 
3.3.1 Political and Macroeconomic Stability and Overall Competitiveness 
Kenya has generally been politically stable since independence in 1963. However, 
there have been episodes, such as the-post election crisis of 2007, with detrimental effects on 
investments. The country has also experienced a number of terrorist attacks, the latest in 
2013, which is expected to some extent have a negative impact on tourism and foreign 
investment, and subsequently economic growth, among other things (“Kenya: A murky 
aftermath”, 2013).71 Volatile inflation and exchange rate fluctuations have had an effect on 
macroeconomic stability and investments. Price stability is yet an important target for the 
government. The poor economic performance of the early 1990s was linked to steep inflation, 
as seen in figure 3.10. Figure 3.11 shows that the exchange rate has seen an almost continual 
                                                
71  The president and the vice-president moreover currently face charges by the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) for contributing to the violence in 2007–2008 (“Kenya: A murky aftermath”, 2013).  
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depreciation since 1980. The figure only compares KSh to US dollars, and does not take 
differences in inflation into account.72  
In 2012 Kenya ranked 109 of 185 countries in the ease-of-doing-business index from 
2012, which, while not a good ranking, meant it was still among the top ten countries in 
Africa.73 By comparison, Mauritius was ranked number 23 and South Africa number 35.74 In 
2013, Kenya’s ranking dropped to number 121 of 185. Hence, the obstacles to business in the 
overall economy increased relative to other countries (IFC, 2012, 2013). Corruption is one of 
the great obstacles the overall business environment faces.75 The World Economic Forum 
(WEF) (2013) ranks Kenya as number 106 out of 144 countries according to its global 
competitiveness index (GCI), as determined by the level of productivity.76 This is a better 
ranking than many other African countries, as with the cost-of-doing-business index. 
However, also according to the GCI, Kenya’s competitiveness has declined relative to other 
countries77 Improvements in factors determining competitiveness are needed, and increased 
competitiveness is an important target in the country’s development plan, where the zones 
have a central plan, as mentioned above.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
72 Data from the World Bank do not include the real exchange rate for Kenya this period.  
73 The index ranks countries from 1 to 185, depending on the ease of “starting a business, dealing with 
construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, 
trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency” (IFC, 2013, p. 2). Most SSA countries can 
be found close to the bottom of the list.   
74 Kenya is ranked, together with South Africa and Mauritius, as a low-risk country to invest in by the 
professional service company Ernst and Young (Ernst & Young, 2012).  
75 In a survey conducted by the World Bank in 2007, 38.3% of private firms in Kenya identified corruption as a 
major constraint to business. Table A3 in the appendix summarizes the findings of that survey, and compares 
the findings to SSA and low-income countries.  
 
76 WEF (2013, p. 4) defines competitiveness “as a set of institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level 
of productivity of a country”.  
77 The GCI for Kenya has declined from 3.81 to 3.75 in the period. The GCI ranges from 1 to 7. Kenya had a 
ranking of 93 in 2008, though more countries have entered the study (WEF, 2009, 2013)  
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Figure 3.10. 
Inflation in consumer prices (annual %) 
 
Source: World Bank (2013a) 
 
Figure 3.11. 
Official exchange rate (KSh per US$, period average)
 
Source: World Bank (2013a) 
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3.3.2 Infrastructure  
The infrastructure in Kenya is seen as adequate to attract investors to SEZs, and 
relatively better than many other African countries.78 KEPZA does, however, recognise that 
the zones are still negatively affected by low-quality infrastructure, such as poor 
transportation systems, high costs of electricity, unreliable water supply, inefficient 
administration, and a low level of business facilitation. These challenges increase the cost of 
doing business within the zones as well as within the domestic economy, reducing the 
competitiveness of Kenyan industries. KEPZA aims to minimize bureaucracy and 
administrative procedures and promises rapid project approval, a one-stop shop for investor 
support, and an on-site customs office (KEPZA, 2013). However, according to Farole (2011) 
and WEF (2013) Kenya has yet to implement an efficient one-stop shop that benefits zone 
investors.79  
Kenya has relatively good connections to international markets, through the port in 
Mombasa and three international airports. Nairobi is the key transportation centre for eastern 
and central Africa, and the largest African city between Cairo and Johannesburg.80 In terms of 
handling capacity, the port of Mombasa is the fifth-largest port in Africa. The port saw an 
increase of 145% in goods handled between 2006 and 2010 (IMF, 2012b). Efficiency 
measures at the port are, however, relatively poor, and both the capacity and the efficiency of 
the port need to be improved, requiring substantial investments (CBK, 2004).81 The road and 
rail networks connecting to the port are also in need of upgrading. Transport within the 
country is furthermore perceived as a major obstacle to business by private firms (World 
Bank, 2007).82 Development of road and rail infrastructure is one of the key areas of focus in 
a 2010 poverty strategy report by the IMF.83  
                                                
78 See, e.g., Rolfe et al. (2004) and KEPZA (2007). According to a survey, investor satisfaction was 60% within 
the zones in 2007 (KEPZA, 2008).  
79 According to the WEF (2013), 11 procedures were required to start a business in Kenya.  
80 Kenya does however lack direct flights to the US, the main importer of the apparel and textiles from the zones, 
increasing transport costs and reducing the country’s competitiveness (Chemengich, 2010). 
81 According to the 2012 Global Competitiveness report by the WEF, the quality of ports in Kenya got a score of 
3.8 out of 7. The average of all countries included in the survey was 4.3.  
82 See table A3 in the appendix for further findings. 
83 The World Bank, the EU, and the Nordic Development Fund are among the organisations that have 
contributed significant funds to carry out improvements to road infrastructure in the country.  
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Another obstacle to business is unreliable and expensive electricity.84 Electricity in 
Kenya has been relatively expensive compared to both Asian countries and other African 
countries as Egypt and South Africa (CBK, 2004; Chemengich, 2010; KEPZA, 2012).85  High 
prices and unreliable supply in Kenya has resulted in about 70% of firms owning their own 
generators. The government has also at times urged manufacturing firms to move to night 
production to reduce the strain on power capacity during the day (IMF, 2010; Brinceno-
Gamrendia & Shakaratan, 2011). Kenya has however managed to significantly improve 
electricity supply and shorten the waiting time for electricity connections within the zones, 
making the zones now globally competitive in terms of electricity (Farole, 2011). Electric 
capacity has seen a continuous increase, but it still has not been sufficient to meet the increase 
in demand; only 16.1% of the population had access to electricity in 2009 (CBK, 2010; World 
Bank, 2013a). According to Briceno-Garmendia and Shakaratan (2011), there is an acute need 
to double the capacity to produce power during the next decade.86 Hydropower provides the 
largest source of electricity, and large fluctuations in rainfall cause volatility in supply and 
uncertainty regarding both electricity and water supplies.87 Kenya is mainly dependent on 
surface water, and unreliable water supply and poor water utilities have a negative effect on 
investment, though water utilities are relatively more efficient than in other low-income 
countries, including Kenya’s neighbouring countries (Briceno-Garmendia & Shakaratan, 
2011; IMF, 2010). The costs of ICT services were in 2010 much higher in Kenya than in 
Asian countries, but EPZ firms’ expenditures on telecommunication have seen a noteworthy 
decline since 2010 due to a reduction in prices, as seen in figure 3.4 above (IMF, 2010; 
USITC, 2008).  
Today about half of the zones are concentrated in proximity to Mombasa. The 
government aims to increase the number of zones, in part by splitting existing zones, and 
evenly distribute the zones between the regions, with the goal of having at the minimum two 
zones in each province. The increase in the number of zones is intended to improve regional 
development and reduce rural-urban inequality (KEPZA, 2007; KEPZA, 2012). Significant 
                                                
84 The quality of the electricity supply in the country got a value of 3.6 by WEF (2012), where 1 is insufficient 
and suffers frequent interruptions, and 7 sufficient and reliable.  
85 The price of electricity in 2004 was US$.80, compared to US$.20 and US$.27 in Egypt and South Africa, 
respectively (CBK, 2004). 
86 Electricity generated from geothermal and thermal sources has increasingly reduced the share of electricity 
produced from hydropower. The share of hydropower declined from 67% to 38.8% of all electricity from 2004 
to 2010 (CBK, 2004; CBK, 2010).  
87 Large variations in water supply also affect agricultural production and have a subsequent effect on economic 
growth. See, e.g., AEO (2012a).  
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improvements in overall infrastructure are required to facilitate this. The country’s 
population, agriculture, and infrastructure are today concentrated in the south, from 
Mombasa, to Uganda, through Nairobi and Kisumu. The north has a low population density 
and poor infrastructure (Briceno-Garmendia & Shakaratan, 2011).  
3.3.3 Domestic Sales and Domestic Investments 
Kenya is an attractive entry point to the East African region, and investors within the 
zones have been and are from a variety of locations, such as East Asia, South Asia, Europe, 
and the US (Farole, 2011). The Kenya Investment Authority (KenInvest) and KEPZA 
encourage investments targeting the regional market and promise access to these markets for 
investors through Kenya’s membership in the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA).88 The East African Community (EAC) customs union does, however, 
restrict EPZs sales to the region, as member countries are considered part of the domestic 
market under the agreement. EPZ firms are only allowed to sell up to 20% of manufactures 
and services to the domestic market, and these sales are treated as imports from non-
COMESA countries and subject to VAT and import duties (KEPZA, 2013).89 The 
enlargement of the domestic market in 2010 to include the EAC region has according to 
Omondi (2013) caused inland zones to be less popular for investors relative to the zones close 
to the port of Mombasa, where access to export markets is easier.90 This challenges the 
government’s vision to spread out the zones, and is one of the current challenges facing EPZ 
firms and the EPZ programme. A number of firms have been required to shift their focus from 
regional to global markets (KEPZA, 2012). The level of domestic sales has, however, been 
significantly lower than 20% for most years, including after 2010, although relatively high in 
2005, according to data from KEPZA, as figure 3.7 shows. This suggests that the domestic 
market is either not an attractive target for existing investors or that the obstacles for domestic 
sales are too extensive. Fewer restrictions on sales within the EAC may enable Kenya to 
increasingly attract greater investments, as the region grows.91 Local domestic firms are 
                                                
88 Member states in COMESA are Burundi, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  
 
90 EAC consists of Kenya and its neighbouring countries: Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. EAC 
became a customs union and adopted common external tariffs on 1 January 2010 (EAC, 2013). 
91 The EAC region constitutes a potentially great opportunity for investors with more than 130 million people in 
2010 (EAC, 2013).  
	   
55 
however opposed to allowing EPZ firms better access to the domestic market, as they fear it 
the effect of an increase in competition (Omondi, 2010). Manufacturing firms in Kenya 
mainly sell their goods on the local market or to Kenya’s neighbouring countries. This 
suggests that they are not competitive with EPZ firms exporting to developed markets, such 
as Europe and the US (see e.g., Clarke, 2012).92  
  
Figure 3.12. 
Domestic sales as a share of total sales, 2001–2012 
 
 
Source: KEPZA (2005a, 2008)  
 
According to Odhiambo (2008), Kenya has one of the most developed financial 
systems in SSA, yet 41.8% of respondents in the World Bank’s (2007) enterprise survey 
identify access to finance as a major constraint to business. Locally owned investments within 
the zones were 17% in 2007, and KEPZA aimed to nearly double that amount by 2013 in the 
strategy plan of 2007.93 Local small and medium companies with high growth and potential to 
become full-time exporters have been targeted, through the Export Business Accelerator 
Programme. Firms have been chosen from targeted sectors, such as horticulture, commercial 
crafts, apparels and textiles, and ICT. The government also encourages joint venture 
                                                
92 Manufacturing firms in Kenya export rather high shares of sales, which could suggest that the firms are 
relative competitive. However, exports are mainly to neighbouring countries (Clarke, 2012).  
93 According to Farole (2011), 35% of investments within the Kenyan zones were controlled by local investors 
in 2008. He does, however, not distinguish between firms that are fully and partly owned by locals. 
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investments in the zones through a joint venture linkage programme.94 These programmes 
comply with Kenya’s aim to empower small-scale producers, and also to change the 
perception that the EPZ programme favours foreign over domestic investment (KEPZA, 
2007, 2012). Within the zones in 2012, 25.6% of firms were owned by Kenyans, 50% by 
foreigners, and 24.4% of firms were joint ventures. The share and size of domestic 
investments have hence increased within the zones since 2007, as targeted, though fully 
owned firms are still fairly lower.  
3.3.4 Wages, Labour Productivity, and Working Conditions 
Prior to 2005, the Kenyan government did not allow EPZ workers the freedom to 
unionise or engage in collective bargaining. Other social regulations were also partly reduced 
as an incentive to attract investors. Inspectors were, moreover, not allowed within the zones to 
ensure adequate working conditions (Farole, 2011; LaRRI, 2000; Kimungi, 2004). However, 
today firms within the zones are subject to the same labour regulations as other companies in 
Kenya, and minimum wages and the right to join unions apply.95 Farole (2011) finds the 
wages within the zones on average are 22% higher than minimum wage. The minimum wage 
in Kenya, however, is low, and argued to be less than the level needed to ensure a decent 
standard of living for workers.96 Kenyan labour laws have been found to be weak and far 
from international standards, and Kimungi (2004) finds that the workers within the Kenyan 
zones have put up with long hours and unpredictable work, and many are only hired on a 
casual basis. Farole (2011) finds 20% of the workforce within the zones was hired on a 
temporary basis in 2008. This is relatively high compared to many other zones and may be 
due to labour market rigidities or high uncertainty. The use of temporary employment has an 
effect on workers’ ability to unionise. Union membership of workers within the Kenyan zone 
programme has remained low. In 2008, only 14% of workers were unionised according to 
Farole (2011).  
Kenya has a well-educated population relative to the region.97 Yet, average labour 
productivity and total factor productivity in Kenya saw a decline between 1960 and 2000 in 
                                                
94 EPZ regulations do not include any obligations to have Kenyan shareholders (KEPZA, 2013). 
95 EPZ firms aspired to have minimum wages repealed again, to increase competitiveness with Asian countries 
(McCormick, 2006).  
96 See, e.g., Omolu (2006) and Kimungi (2004).  
97 According to the World Bank (2013a), 87% of adults in Kenya are literate, which is relatively high compared 
to neighbouring countries but lower than China and some other African countries, such as Namibia and 
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both absolute and relative terms, with a negative effect on economic growth (Kimuya, 
2005).98 Chemengich (2010) finds labour productivity to be comparable to China and India. 
Kenya however has a higher cost of living, which affects the country’s ability to lower wages 
to the level necessary to have competitive labour unit costs, which in turn affects the 
country’s ability to compete in labour-intensive manufacturing.99 Even though the average 
wage in Kenyan zones is lower than in many other African zones, such as Lesotho, Senegal, 
and Nigeria, it is still higher than in Asian countries, such as Bangladesh, China, and India 
(Farole, 2011).100 Labour costs are currently increasing and can potentially impede growth in 
the manufacturing sector without a subsequent increase in labour productivity (Chemengich, 
2010).  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The Kenyan government remains faithful to zone programmes, and their expansion is 
an important part of the country’s development strategy. The zones attract a significant share 
of foreign investments, and exports from the zones have contributed to increasing 
manufacturing exports and reducing the reliance on primary exports. Zone activity, however, 
remains too low for the zones to have a significant impact on economic growth or 
unemployment in the country. Large parts of the country remain undeveloped, and 
unemployment and poverty levels are still high. The increase in higher-value production has 
been limited and most manufacturing activities are still engaged in low-value-added 
manufacturing. Significant investments are needed to improve infrastructure, labour 
productivity, and the investment climate in order to attract greater investments within and 
outside the zones. However, a study by Kingombe and Te Velde (2013) finds that 
employment within the zones has contributed to an increase in workers’ labour productivity. 
                                                                                                                                                   
Zimbabwe. The share of students (3.1%) that enrol in tertiary education is also relatively high compared to the 
median level of 1.95% in SSA (IMF, 2012b). 
98 The decline in average labour productivity may have been a result of labour moving from higher to lower 
productivity activities, as displaced workers from state-owned companies ended up in less productive activities 
in the informal sector (see, e.g., McMillan & Rodrik, 2011). Labour productivity relative to the US also 
worsened in the period. In 2000, labour productivity was 25 times higher in the US than in Kenya, up from 20 
times higher in 1961. Technological breakthroughs in developed countries also had a negative effect on 
productivity relative to other countries (Kimuya, 2005).  
99 Farole (2011) estimates that the cost of living is 20% higher in the African countries in his study than in non-
African countries.  
100 Average monthly wages for unskilled labour in Kenya are US$117, compared to US$150 in Lesotho, US$202 
in Nigeria, and US$225 in Senegal, while the average in Bangladesh is US$46, less than half of the level in 
Kenya (Farole, 2011).  
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EPZ firms’ use of training facilities for the workers has seen an increase, and these skills are 
expected to reach the domestic economy. Public universities and training programmes, 
furthermore, offer education and training to assist industries. However, studies find linkages 
between training institutions and industries to be poor, suggesting that the skills taught at 
university and in training programmes need to be better tailored to industries’ needs.  
The textile and apparel sector has suffered from a decrease in competitiveness relative 
to Asian producers, due to the end of MFA, among other factors. Market access through 
AGOA are an important means of keeping textile and apparel firms in Kenya, but the trade 
agreement remain somewhat uncertain, as Kenya has high levels of corruption and is not yet 
able to produce large-scale competitive inputs to the textile and apparel sector. The textile and 
apparel industry is however still argued to have significant growth potential, and textile and 
apparel exports remain the fourth-largest merchandise export commodity (see, e.g., Nguku, 
2010). Firms within non-apparel sectors within the zones have increased. Kenya appears to 
possibly have a better competitive advantage in these sectors. The new non-apparel firms are, 
however, less labour-intensive relative to the textile and apparel firms, and employment 
within the zones has been limited and is lower than the peak in 2004–2005 despite the 
increase in firms operating within the zones. 
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Chapter 4 
Case Study – Lesotho 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Lesotho is among the smallest countries in the world, both in terms of land area and 
population. The country is landlocked within South Africa, the largest economy in Africa. 
Lesotho became independent from Britain in 1966 and is today one of three remaining 
constitutional monarchies in Africa. The country’s history includes military interventions, 
political unrest, and postelection violence, but Lesotho is today a relative stable democracy. 
While GDP growth has seen large fluctuations, it has been positive in the last three decades. 
GDP per capita has doubled since 1980 (see figures 4.1 and 4.2). The World Bank classifies 
Lesotho as a lower-middle-income country, but the country has one of the most unequal 
distributions of income in the world, and poverty is still high, especially in rural areas101 
(World Bank, 2013a). The country remains a LDC according to the level of its socioeconomic 
development as measured by the UN. Like other countries in this group Lesotho is mainly 
agrarian and has both low productivity levels and low levels of investment. Subsistence 
farming is still the main source of employment, employing about 40.6% of the economically 
active population. Unemployment is high, especially among the youth (World Bank, 2013a; 
ILO, 2012).  
 
 
                                                
101 The Gini-coefficient was 52.5 in 2005 (World Bank, 2013a). 
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Figure 4.1. 
GDP growth 1980–2011 (% annual)
 
Source: World Bank (2013a) 
 
Figure 4.2. 
GDP per capita 1980–2011 (constant US$) 
 
Source: World Bank (2013a) 
 
The Lesotho National Development Corporation (LNDC) was established in 1967, and 
its mission is to “initiate, promote and facilitate the development of manufacturing and 
processing industries, mining and commerce in a manner calculated to raise the level of 
income and employment in Lesotho” (LNDC, 2009, p. 2).102 LNDC is fully owned by the 
                                                
102 The LNDC was established by the LNDC Act No. 20 of 1967. The Act was later amended in 1990 and again 
in 2000.  
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government, and falls under the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Cooperatives, and Marketing 
(MTICM). The corporation aims to enhance foreign and domestic investment and to 
encourage public-private partnerships.103 The LNDC has particularly aimed to attract labour-
intensive industries, specifically to generate much needed employment opportunities by 
seeking investors who rely on low-technology and low-skilled labour104 (LNDC, 2000). 
LNDC-assisted firms are divided into a leasehold portfolio and an equity portfolio. The equity 
portfolio is further split between subsidiaries and associate companies, according to the 
corporation’s share in the company.105  
Lesotho offers a zero tax rate on manufacturing profit from goods sold outside of the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU).106 The country had a 15% flat tax rate in the 
period 1990–2006, in contrast to many other SSA countries trying to attract FDI with the aim 
to gaining more long-term investments. A zero tax rate was however reintroduced in 2006 to 
improve competitiveness of the industry (International Finance Corporation (IFC), 2010; 
World Bank, 1999). A 10% tax rate applies on profit from manufacturing goods sold within 
SACU. Domestic sales are otherwise not restricted (LNDC, 2013).  
Foreign investors are not allowed to own land in Lesotho, but may build property on 
rented land or lease buildings owned by the LNDC. The industrial areas, or zones, are located 
in Nyenye and Maputsoe, in the north of Lesotho and close to the South African border; 
Maseru West and Thetsane, two industrial areas in the suburbs of Maseru, the capital of 
Lesotho; and Mohales, south of Maseru. Most manufacturing plants are located in the Maseru 
and Maputsoe areas. In 2010 there were 7 industrial estates under the LNDC, with 139 factory 
shells. The total costs associated with providing the infrastructure and services necessary for 
investments is not available (LNDC, 2010).   
In addition to offering industrial and commercial buildings, the LNDC offers a wide 
range of investment support services for foreign and domestic investors, such as serviced 
industrial and commercial areas, and support services for businesses, i.e., assistance with 
                                                
103 “The purpose of the Corporation is to initiate, promote and facilitate the development of manufacturing and 
processing industries, mining and commerce in a manner calculated to raise the level of income and employment 
in Lesotho” (LNDC Act No 13 of 1990).  
104  The vision of LNDC is to have an 80% employment rate and to graduate Lesotho from the group of LDCs by 
2020 (LNDC, 2009).  
105 Associate companies are companies where the LNDC holds between 20% and 50% of the equity share 
capital, while the corporation’s share in subsidiary companies ranges between 51% and 100% (LNDC, 2005a).  
106 SACU consists of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland.  
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permits and licenses, company registration, and with other industrial relations issues.107 The 
corporation is to take care of all administrative procedures and to function as a one-stop shop 
for all red-tape procedures (LNDC, 2013).  Table A4 lists the main incentives given to 
investors.  
 
4.2 Success of Lesotho’s Industrial Areas 
4.2.1 FDI, Exports, and Export Diversity 
In the early 1980s, manufacturing mainly consisted of the food and beverage industry, 
which made up 72.7% of manufactures. Textile and apparel production started in Lesotho in 
the mid-1980s for South African-based firms to circumvent the sanctions that were imposed 
on South African goods by the US and Europe. Most of the owners of the firms that moved to 
Lesotho were of Taiwanese origin (LTEA, 2013; IFC, 2010). Manufactures grew slowly but 
steadily between the start of 1980s through the mid-1990s, but then slowed down due to 
social and political unrest in the country. Exports were mainly destined for South Africa 
(CBL, 2005). The economy was highly dependent on remittances from migrant workers in 
South Africa. In the late 1980s remittances made up almost half of the country’s gross 
national product (KoL, 2004).  
 
Table 4.1. 
The textile and apparel sector in Lesotho, 1985−2008 
Year Share of GDP 
(current prices) 
Exports 
($ million) 
Textiles exports 
(% of total exports) 
1985  6 2 
1990 3.1 35 5 
1995 4.9 80 50 
2000 7.9 138 65 
2005 13 528 78 
2008 11.9 487 52 
Source: IFC (2010) 
 
                                                
107 The corporation may also provide financial assistance and equity participation in projects considered to be 
strategically important to the economy of Lesotho (LNDC, 2013).  
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Lesotho was one of the first SSA countries that qualified for AGOA benefits.108 
Foreign investments and export levels grew after 2000. The number of leasehold firms saw a 
significant increase (see figure 4.3). Asian investors, mainly people of Taiwanese origin, were 
still the main investors (AEO, 2012b; CBL, 2005). Export earnings from the manufacturing 
sector exceeded remittances from South Africa in 2001. The manufacturing sector also 
surpassed the agricultural sector as a share of the country’s GDP, as illustrated in figure 4.6 
below. The textile and apparel sector moreover became the largest source of domestic formal 
employment, as is further elaborated below (CBL, 2005). The value of textile exports, 
according to data from the IFC (2010), increased by 282% between 2000 and 2005, to about 
US$530 million in 2005, making up almost 80% of Lesotho’s total exports (see table 4.1). 
Manufacturing exports made up 90% of exports, as seen in figure 4.4, which makes Lesotho 
unique compared to other SSA countries, which mainly have relied on exports of natural 
resources. The increased exports were primarily destined for the US, which received textile 
and apparel products with a value of US$456 million in the end of 2004. Lesotho was now the 
largest SSA exporter to the US of textile and apparel products, and known as the ‘jeans 
capital of Africa’. In 2005 the US received 83.4% of total exports from the country (see figure 
4.5).109 Relatively low inflation in China had a positive effect on input costs in the period, and 
a depreciation of Lesotho’s loti in relation to the US dollar also had a favourable effect on 
exports during this period. An appreciation of the currency in 2004, however, had a negative 
effect on the manufacturing sector. US retailers moved orders from Lesotho to more 
competitive countries such as China and India in anticipation of the end of the MFA. By the 
end of 2005 textile and apparel exports to the US had declined to US$391 million (LNDC, 
2004, 2005a; CBL, 2005).  
 
                                                
108 Lesotho also has preferential market access to the EU through the Everything but Arms (EBA) agreement and 
the Cotonou agreement, as it is a LDC. Special market access is also given to some products to a range of 
countries including Australia, Canada, EU, Japan, Turkey, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, 
among others (LNDC, 2013; MTICM, 2013).  
109 See also Collier and Venables (2007).   
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Figure 4.3. 
Number of LNDC-assisted firms 
 
Source: LNDC (2001−2010) 
 
The end of the MFA caused a significant increase in price competition for Lesotho’s 
export manufacturing. There was also uncertainty linked to an extension of the third-party 
provision under AGOA in 2004. The increase in competition and uncertainty about further 
market access to the US resulted in several companies closing down or retrenching workers, 
causing a significant decline in textile and apparel exports. The decline had an effect on total 
manufacturing exports (CBL, 2005; LNDC, 2005a). The visible vulnerability of future market 
access to the US and the high reliance on one product and one market, the US market, made 
the government put emphasis on targeting other export markets, such as the SACU and the 
EU, and to increase diversity in industrial production by targeting investments in nonapparel 
industries (LNDC, 2005–2010).110  
                                                
110 Investments within nonapparel production, such as water bottling, electronics and electrical assembly, and 
canned fruit and vegetables are especially encouraged today (LNDC, 2013).  
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Figure 4.4. 
Export structure (in %)
 
Source: UNCTAD (2012b) 
 
Figure 4.5. 
Export structure by destination (in %) 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2012b) 
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sector. Firms within other types of industries also slowly emerged, such as water bottling, 
cigarette packaging, and screen-printing. However, investments and exports later declined, 
due to low US demand, because of increased competition from Asian producers, poor global 
economic conditions, and an appreciation of the loti.111 The apparel industry in Lesotho also 
experienced an increase in competition after Mauritius was given LDC status under the 
AGOA in 2008, and hence qualified for the third-country fabric-sourcing provision under 
AGOA (see LNDC, 2009). Measures were taken to increase the relative competitiveness of 
the industry, such as reduced taxes and leases for industrial buildings (see table 4.1). Exports, 
including textiles and apparel, to South Africa have however seen a sizable increase, which 
has helped keep textile and apparel production plants in the country even as US demand 
declined (LNDC, 2010). Manufacturing as a share of total exports declined, from 90% in 
2005 to 67.7% in 2011. However, although manufacturing exports declined some in the 
period, the decline is mainly due to a notable increase in mining exports after the reopening of 
the Letšeng diamond mine (see figure 4.4).112 The share of manufacturing of GDP has also 
declined after a notable increase following the year 2000, as is seen in figure 4.6.  
The diversity in industrial production is increasing, but at a very slow pace, and 
investments are still mainly from East Asia, primarily Taiwan, although investments from 
South Africa have increased in recent years (LTEA, 2013; Farole, 2011). Eighty-five percent 
of LNDC firms in March 2010 were clothing and textile producers, 6% produced footwear, 
2% were agri-processors, and 3% produced electronics. The textile and apparel sector has 
remained the main sector within the leasehold portfolio, while the equity portfolio holds food 
and beverage firms, a hotel, a retail firm, and a brick producer (LNDC, 2010). The share of 
Lesotho’s total exports to Europe and to Africa, mainly within the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) region, has seen a notable increase, reducing the share of 
total exports to the US, as seen in figure 4.5.113 This can partly be explained by a decline in 
textile and apparel exports to the US. Although exports to the US improved by 28.6% from 
2010 to 2011, textile and apparel export were only US$315 in 2011 from US$456 million in 
                                                
111 The LNDC views Mauritius as a direct competitor to Lesotho’s apparel industry’s exports to the US (LNDC, 
2009).  
112 See also LNDC (2013).  
113 SADC consists of Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, the United Republic of Tanzania, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  
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2004  (USTR, 2013; LNDC, 2005a).114 Poor global economic conditions in recent years have 
not only affected the manufacturing sector, but also diamond exports, which are mainly 
exported to Europe, and remittances. The net trade of goods and services did for this reason 
worsen, and the current account became negative in 2009.115 The GDP growth rate has 
remained positive, but this is mainly due to public investments (World Bank, 2013b).  
 
Figure 4.6. 
Value added in different sectors 
 
Source: World Bank (2013a)116  
 
Lesotho stands out relative to many other African countries, as about 90% of FDI to 
Lesotho has targeted export-oriented manufacturing, mainly the textile and apparel sector. 
Most foreign investments to African countries are linked to the extraction of natural resources 
(AEO, 2012b). International Finance Corporation (IFC) (2010) estimates that the textile and 
apparel sector contributed to about one-third of GDP growth (in real terms) in the period 1999 
to 2008. Export earnings from industry have been important to improve the net trade, and/or 
                                                
114 Knit and apparel products made up 82% of exports to the US in 2011; total exports were US$384 million 
(USTR, 2013). 
115 See, e.g., CBL (2009) for more information. 
116 Value added is defined as “the net output of a sector after adding up all the output and subtracting 
intermediate inputs” (World Bank, 2013a). Industry here includes manufacturing, mining, construction, 
electricity, water, and gas. Services include wholesale and retail trade, transport, government, and financial, 
professional, and personal services (education, health care, real estate services).  
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to make larger imports feasible. However, as export-oriented manufacturing mainly has 
consisted of textiles and apparel to the US, diversity within the manufacturing sector has been 
limited. While foreign investments are essential for the country’s manufacturing sector, 
Kingombe and Te Velde (2013) do not find proof that the zone programme has contributed to 
an increase in higher-productivity activities or to a structural transformation of the economy. 
Lall (2005) furthermore find little evidence of FDI increasing higher-value-added production 
in Lesotho.  
4.2.2 Employment  
Table 4.2. 
Employment in LNDC-assisted firms, 2000−2011 
 Percentage of LNDC-employment 
within textile and apparel sector 
Aggregate employment within leasehold 
companies under LNDC 
2000 90% Approx. 18,500 
2001 88% 27,552 
2002 72 % 31,050 
2003  43 525 
2004  48,564 
2005 77% 48,818 
2006 92 % 44,318 
2007  52,169 
2008 91% 45,650 
2009  44,227 
2010 85% 44,098 
2011*  40,861 
* No Annual Report from LNDC for the year. All together, 40,861 workers were employed within LNDC-
assisted industries (CBL, 2011).  
Sources: LNDC (2000−2010); CBL (2003−2011)117 
 
The initiation of AGOA had a significant effect on employment within the textile and 
apparel sector. Employment increased by 9,000 workers from 2000 to 2001. In the end of the 
2001 financial year there were about 27,500 jobs within leasehold companies under the 
LNDC. The textile and apparel industry became the largest single employer of domestic 
                                                
117 Numbers do vary some between the different sources, and these differences are most likely to depend on the 
time of the year employment is measured. Annual reports from the LNDC and the CBL are only available after 
2000.  
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formal employment within the country in 2001, employing about 25,000 workers. The sectors 
hence constituted almost all employment within leaseholds firms under LNDC. It is estimated 
that between 80% and 85% of the workers within the textile and apparel sector are women 
(Farole, 2011; ILO, 2012). Prior to 2001, the main source of domestic formal employment 
was the public sector. The mining sector in South Africa still employed more workers, as seen 
in figure 4.9 (LNDC, 2001, 2002).  
Employment within LNDC-assisted firms increased to 48,564 workers in 2004. More 
than 7,000 workers lost employment between March 2004 and March 2005. Remaining firms 
hired some of the workers who were let go, especially skilled workers. A few new investors 
also arrived, helping to somewhat reduce the drop in total employment (LNDC, 2005a).118 
The extension of the third-country fabric-sourcing provision did however have significant 
positive effect on investments, and employment within leasehold companies increased by 
18% from 2006 to 2007 to 52,169 workers. Employment later declined, as seen in table 4.2 
and figure 4.7. The decline in LNDC-assisted employment and a concurrent increase in public 
sector employment in recent years have caused public sector employment to exceed 
employment within LNDC-assisted industry in 2010.119 Employment within the public sector 
has also come to exceed the number of migrant workers in South Africa, as employment in 
the latter has undergone a continuous decline, as seen in figure 4.9.120 It is estimated that 
about 80% of manufacturing employment in Lesotho in 2008 and 2009 was within the zones 
or LNCD-assisted industrial areas (Farole, 2011; ILO, 2012). The government aims to expand 
the manufacturing sector to realise employment creation and poverty reduction. It is hoped 
that employment within nonapparel firms will increase further with time (LNDC, 2013).  
Despite the zones’ success in creating employment relative to its population size and 
to other African countries, the formal sector remains unable to absorb the labour entering the 
market each year, estimated to be about 25,000 people. Hence, the share of employment 
within the informal sector is likely to increase and low-productivity agriculture to remain as 
                                                
118 Farole (2011) estimates about 53,000 people were working within the zones in 2004, and a loss in 
employment of 8,000 in the period 2004 to 2008, or 15% of workers at the 2004 peak.  
119 Employment within the equity portfolio has declined from almost 2,500 in 2001 to less than a 1,000 in 2009 
(LNDC, 2001, 2009).  
120 About 120,000 men were employed in South African gold mines in the late 1980s; by 2004 the number was 
halved, and in 2011 the number of workers was reduced by almost two-thirds. The retrenched workers have had 
few opportunities for other wage employment in Lesotho (KoL, 2004; CBL, 2011).  
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the main source of employment for a while longer. Unemployment remains high and youth 
unemployment is a particular challenge for Lesotho (AEO, 2012b).121  
 
Figure 4.7. 
Employment in LNDC-assisted firms, public sector, and mines 
 
Source: CBL (2003–2011) 
 
4.2.3 Training and Labour Productivity 
The government encourages the training of workers through tax incentives; costs 
related to training are allowable at 125% for tax purposes. Training facilities has also been 
established (LNDC, 2013) . AIDS-awareness programmes and HIV interventions have 
reduced absenteeism and improved labour productivity.122 The World Bank has also 
established two training centres in Maseru and Maputsoe, the two largest industrial cities to 
enhance skill development through the Trade for Aid-initiative.123 According to the Bank, the 
                                                
121 Only 45.1% of the population between 15 and 24 years old participates in the labour market (AEO, 2012b).  
122 According to World Bank (2013a), 23.3% of the population between 15 and 49 years was HIV-positive in 
2011, one of the highest rates in the world. HIV/AIDS is found to reduce both labour supply and have a negative 
impact on labour productivity due to sick workers and higher labour turnover (Fox et al., 2004).  
123 The World Bank-supported training centres aim to develop new skills, improve skills, and increase labour 
productivity to increase the competitiveness of Lesotho’s industry. Workers are trained in basic sewing, quality 
control, merchandising, export documentation, and marketing. The World Bank also targets increasing the share 
of locals within management positions (World Bank, 2009).  
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training centres have improved the chances for unskilled workers to be promoted within the 
textile and apparel industry, and also made it easier for investors to differentiate products 
(World Bank, 2011).  
Lall (2005) argues that though foreign-owned industrial firms in Lesotho have 
contributed to improving operating skills, work attitudes, trade infrastructure, and support 
services, training and productivity improvements are small. On-the-job training, such as the 
use of sewing machines, cutting, and pressing, is limited to basic production; the skills 
workers acquire for this reason are narrow, and productivity is little improved. According to 
Lall (2005), the Taiwanese investors make little effort to transfer technology and train their 
workers, even relative to other MNCs. The main group of investors are also reluctant to 
promote locals to managerial positions, and “[m]ost supervisory, technical, and managerial 
jobs remain with expatriates, even in firms that have been in Lesotho for a decade or more” 
(Lall, 2005, p. 1008). They are further poorly integrated with the local population, and few 
plan on settling. He further finds no notable entrepreneurial response by local firms. Farole 
(2011) finds that one in four managers is foreign, though he is unclear if he includes the many 
Asian immigrants as locals or foreigners. The government encourages an increase of locals at 
management levels, and payments made to foreigners at management levels are subject to a 
withholding tax of 10% (LNDC, 2013). Farole (2011) further finds labour circulation between 
zone-based firms and local firms to be low, reducing the possible transfer of skills and 
knowledge to the domestic economy.  
4.2.4 Backward Linkages 
The government aims to increase use of local inputs to both enhance greater vertical 
integration and backward linkages, and to secure sustained market access to the US. The 
textile and apparel sector in the industrial areas only sourced 9% of inputs locally in 2008. 
The Farmosa denim mill, located in the Thetsane industrial area, was completed in 2003 and 
has seen investments of more than $US100 million. The mill has generated employment 
opportunities, but cotton is mainly sourced from other African countries, as the potential for 
significant cotton production in Lesotho is low.124 Another textile mill is located in Mohale’s 
Hoek (LTEA, 2013; Central Bank of Lesotho (CBL), 2003). The mills export denim, cotton, 
and cotton-blend yarn to Nicaragua, Bangladesh, Hong Kong, Sri Lanka, Jordon, Kenya, 
                                                
124 Employment of small-scale farmers is hence limited. Lesotho also remains dependent on food imports. Food 
security through domestic production is not seen as a viable target, as Lesotho does not have sufficient fertile 
land to grow enough food. High population growth and land degradation put further pressure on land resources 
(KoL, 2004; UNDP, 2013).  
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Egypt, Madagascar, and Mauritius, in addition to selling to the local market. The mills hence 
contribute to increased foreign exchange earnings (LTEA, 2013). However, prices, quality, or 
quantities may be questioned as most inputs in the textile and apparel sector are sourced from 
Asia, especially India and Pakistan. The LNDC aims to attract investments to a knitted fabric 
mill and to production of buttons and zippers to complement the textile and apparel industry 
(LNDC, 2013). On average 14% of inputs in the zones were sourced from local markets in all 
sectors (see figure 4.8) (Farole, 2011; IFC, 2010). The increase in nonapparel industry within 
LNDC is likely to have had a positive effect on the share of local inputs. However, the decline 
in textile and apparel exports, and in salaries paid from the sector, is likely to have offset any 
increase in foreign exchange earnings. Data on total domestic expenditures from the industry 
within the industrial areas is not available to make an evaluation of the full foreign exchange 
earnings linked to salaries, utilities, local inputs, and other domestic expenditures.  
 
Figure 4.8. 
Average local input use within the zones in 2008, by sector (in %)
 
Source: Farole (2011) 
 
Local investments within the industrial areas are low, keeping local profit small. 
Sixteen of 74 LNDC firms were local projects, while foreigners controlled 58 of the firms in 
2009 (LNDC, 2009). According to Farole (2011), 20% of investments within the zones in 
Lesotho were locally controlled in 2008. Taiwanese and South Africans control most of the 
apparel and textile sector. The LNDC aims to increase domestically owned industrial firms. 
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Financial obstacles do however remain an important barrier for domestic investments (see, 
e.g., World Bank, 2009). A credit guarantee scheme has for this reason been initiated to 
address the financial challenges many domestic investors meet, in order to increase 
investments from the local private sector. Ten million maloti were approved to support the 
scheme in 2010 (LNDC, 2010).125  
 
4.3 Lesotho’s Investment Environment 
4.3.1 Political and Macroeconomic Stability and Overall Competitiveness 
Lesotho is today a stable democracy. The country’s monetary policy ensures parity 
between the country’s currency, the loti, and the South African rand. The government keeps a 
monetary policy similar to its neighbour. The country is however vulnerable to foreign 
exchange risk, and appreciations and depreciations of the loti have had notable effect on the 
country’s competitiveness, as seen above. Changes in the real effective exchange rate and the 
official exchange rate to the US dollar are shown in figures 4.9 and 4.10. The figures clearly 
show the depreciation in Lesotho’s currency in the beginning of the 21st century, which had a 
positive effect on investment and exports. The inflation rate, though relatively low today, has 
fluctuated some and was greatly affected by the political instability following the mid 1990s, 
and data between 1997 and 2000 is not available as figure 4.11 below shows. The ease of 
doing business in Lesotho’s has been somewhat improved in recent years according to the 
ease-of-doing-business index calculated by IFC (2012, 2013). Lesotho does, however, not 
have a particularly favourable ranking either globally or relative to other African countries.126 
The greatest obstacles to business are, according to the same report, access to finance, 
corruption, crime, and theft. Tax rates, inefficient bureaucracy, inadequate infrastructure and 
an inadequately educated workforce are further obstacles to business.127 The GCI ranks 
Lesotho’s competitiveness very low compared to the other countries in the report.128 
According to a survey of firms by the World Bank (2009), Lesotho does however do 
                                                
125 ‘Maloti’ is the plural of Lesotho’s currency, the loti.  
126 Lesotho’s ease-of-doing-business rating ranked the country as number 136 of 185 countries in 2013, 
compared to 143 of 183 in 2012.  
127 Ernst and Young (2012) places Lesotho among countries of medium risk in Africa to invest in.  
128 In 2013 the GCI ranked Lesotho’s competitiveness at 3.17, and as number 137 out of 144 countries. In 2008–
2009, the country’s GCI ranking was 3.4, with Lesotho at number 123 of 134 countries. Hence, according to the 
GCI, Lesotho’s competitiveness has declined (WEF, 2013).  
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relatively well in terms of perceived obstacles to business in the overall economy compared to 
SSA countries and low income countries as a whole, see table A5 in appendix.  
 
Figure 4.9. 
Real effective exchange rate index (2005 =100)
 
Source: World Bank (2013b) 
 
Figure 4.10. 
Official exchange rate (Loti per US$) 
 
Source: World Bank (2013b) 
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Figure 4.11. 
Inflation in consumer prices (annual %)
 
Note: data from 1997 to 2000 are missing.  
Source: World Bank (2013b)  
 
4.3.2 Infrastructure  
A one-stop-business facilitation centre was launched in 2007 to provide services for 
businesses and investors, including trading and manufacturing licences, import and export 
issuances, residency visas, and work permits. The centre has had a positive effect on the ease-
of-doing business in Lesotho, according to the IFC (2012, 2013), together with new 
legislation for companies, and improved investor protections through the increase of 
disclosure requirements and improved liability schemes. 
As a landlocked country, Lesotho is dependent on air transport or on transporting 
goods through South Africa. The capital Maseru is about 600 km away from the port of 
Durban, the busiest port in SSA, and 520 km from the port of East London. Maseru is 
connected to the South African rail network through a rail line between Maseru and 
Bloemfontein in South Africa. Transport costs have been reduced through significant 
investments in roads, but large investments are still needed. LNDC has located the industrial 
zones in different regions. Zones located in peripheral areas in Lesotho have however been 
relative less successful in attracting investors, with most investors choosing to settle in the 
industrial areas close to Maseru and Maputsoe. Workers have also found it more difficult to 
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get to industrial areas located in the less developed and populated parts of the country 
(LNDC, 2013; KoL, 2004; Farole, 2011).  
Although Lesotho has the disadvantage of being landlocked, South African 
infrastructure is relatively good to other African countries and may hence put Lesotho in a 
better position than other landlocked countries in SSA.129 Lesotho’s costs of trade was 
significantly improved by measures enacted by South Africa in 2011 and 2012 to reduce the 
time, costs, and documents required for international trade. The costs associated with trading 
are still a considerable obstacle to business and trade, though Lesotho does relatively well 
when compared to other SSA and low-income countries (World Bank, 2009; AEO, 2012b). 
Farole (2011) does however find that reported clearance times are higher for exporters within 
the zones in Lesotho than in the domestic economy, suggesting possibilities for rapid 
improvements.130  
Despite the slowdown in the manufacturing sector, the shortage of factory buildings is 
still perceived as an important obstacle for further investment. This shortage causes long 
waiting times for obtaining industrial premises, leading potential investors to lose interest. 
Infrastructure and factory shells are continually built through government support to eliminate 
the shortage, but large investments are still needed. The LNDC aims to increase investment 
from the domestic and foreign private sectors to develop commercial and industrial buildings 
(LNDC, 2013). LNDC froze and also reduced some rentals to improve the competitiveness of 
Lesotho’s industry following the end of the MFA (LNDC, 2009, 2010).  
Wastewater, solid waste management, and sanitation facilities within Lesotho remain 
inadequate to support industry, and have prevented some investors from settling (LNDC, 
2001–2010). The significant growth in industrial waste has caused large emissions of 
wastewater and problems of water pollution in some industrial areas. The emissions have 
especially affected livestock, irrigation, and low-income households in close proximity to 
industrial areas. The emissions have negative effect on the social benefits and the public 
opinion of the industry (Gibbs & Gibbs, 2003). The growth in the textile industry and the 
demand for water in industrial production has also put pressure on water resources. Water 
shortage is however perceived as less problematic for business in Lesotho compared to SSA 
                                                
129 Access to port facilities in Lesotho was given a 3.4 score out of 7, where 1 is extremely inaccessible and 7 is 
extremely accessible, in the Global Competitiveness Report. The quality of South Africa’s port infrastructure got 
a 4.7, where 1 is extremely undeveloped and 7 is well developed and efficient according to international 
standards (WEF, 2013).  
130 Average reported clearance times for imports were 11 days for zone investors versus 4 days for domestic 
investors (Farole, 2011).  
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and low-income countries (World Bank, 2009). Certain operations and services have, in the 
interim, been sourced out to South African and domestic private firms. The government aims 
to attract investment through the measurement and control of emissions, water recycling and 
treatment plants, and reuse of waste products, especially from the textile and apparel industry 
(LNDC, 2001–2010).  
Energy consumption has grown significantly in the last years, but traditional biomass 
energy dominates in most households. Lesotho is a member of the Southern African Power 
Pool and is connected to power utilities in the region. Despite having great possibilities for 
renewable energy sources, such as hydropower, solar energy, wind, and biomass fuels, the 
country is still a net importer of electricity.131 The LNDC aspires to attract renewable energy 
investments for domestic sales and export (LHWP, 2013; LNDC, 2013). South Africa has 
seen a rather substantial increase in electricity prices in recent years, and, though prices in 
Lesotho remain relatively low, the country has experienced frequent power cuts due to low 
regional capacity (Taele et al., 2012).132 Lesotho prioritizes supplying electricity to industrial 
areas during power outages in order to reduce losses caused by halts in production for the 
manufacturing sector. The supply of electricity within the zones is consequently considerably 
improved compared to nonindustrial areas. Industrial zones in Lesotho are for this reason 
ranked as the best among African zones in term of power outages (Farole, 2011). Lesotho’s 
competitors, such as China, are however ranked much higher by WEF (2012) in addition to 
having a much better overall competitiveness ranking.133  
4.3.3 Working Conditions, Wages, and Productivity 
Labour costs are relatively higher in Lesotho than in several other African countries 
with equal incentive programmes, such as Ethiopia, Tanzania, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, 
and Mozambique.134 Studies dispute if labour productivity compensates for this.135 Lall 
                                                
131 Great opportunities exist to improve domestic production and export of electricity to South Africa and the 
Southern African Power Pool, through projects such as the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. The Lesotho 
Highlands Water Project is a project between the governments of South Africa and Lesotho, which aims to 
provide water to meet a growing demand in some industrial areas and cities in South Africa, while also 
generating hydropower to cover the electricity needs of Lesotho (LHWP, 2013). The LNDC aims to attract 
investments for renewable energy within the country and make Lesotho a net exporter to its neighbouring 
countries.  
132 The quality of Lesotho’s overall electricity supply is given a relatively good evaluation by WEF (2013). 
133 Lesotho has relatively high utility costs for telecommunications, due to an earlier monopoly in the sector 
according to the AEO (2012b).  
134 Farole (2011) finds unskilled labour costs to be higher in Lesotho than some other African countries including 
Ghana, Tanzania, and Kenya, and non-African countries such as Bangladesh and Vietnam. Some other African 
and non-African countries do however have higher costs of unskilled labour, such as Nigeria, Senegal, 
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(2005) finds wages in Lesotho to be comparable with East Asian countries, but productivity 
within firms in Lesotho to be only 30% to 70% of that of similar firms in East Asia. Labour 
unit costs are for this reason higher. Higher costs of living in Lesotho, compared to Asian 
competitors, make it difficult to reduce wages, even though unemployment in Lesotho is 
severe. Wage levels in the textile and apparel sector have been significantly lower than the 
wages received by men in the mining sector in South Africa, but Farole (2011) find wages in 
the zones to still be 17% higher than the national minimum wage (see, e.g., KoL, 2004). 
Piecework and bonuses are permitted, but only in addition to the minimum wage. The 
possibility to increase wages through performance may encourage greater labour efficiency 
(IFC, 2010). The level of minimum wages, especially in the textile and apparel sector, have 
been notably contested over the years, and are argued to be lower than the level needed to 
meet basic demands (LNDC, 2005a, 2005b).136 The need to remain competitive with Asian 
countries remains an important objective, and wages have been frozen and in some cases 
reduced to be able to keep industrial firms in the country and export levels stable. The 
insecurity linked to the volatility of the markets in the last years has increased the number of 
workers with temporary employment, possibly reducing the possibility for workers to 
unionise (LNDC, 2010; ILO, 2012). Forty-two percent of workers are unionised, a relatively 
high share for both African and non-African countries according to Farole (2011).137 
However, Shakya (2011) argues that foreign-owned firms have improved labour standards in 
the country. The government aims to ensure satisfying working conditions and environmental 
standards in the production of material sourced locally and from abroad, in order to satisfy 
consumers’ increasing demands regarding standards. It is also hoped that Lesotho in this way 
is able to stand out from its competitors even though the cost of production and transport are 
higher (LNDC, 2013).  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
Dominican Republic, and Honduras. However, productivity levels are not included and thus not taken into 
account.  
135 See, e.g., Shakya (2011) and IFC (2010).  
136 The ILO provided technical assistance in setting the minimum wage in the textile sector after negotiations 
failed between the industry and the workers in 2011. Workers however did not find the minimum wage 
acceptable and protests were held in 2012 (GoL, 2013).  
137 Farole (2011) finds 16% of workers to be temporarily employed.  
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4.4 Conclusion 
Government-provided infrastructure, service provisioning, and tax incentives have 
been essential for Lesotho to take advantage of access to the US market through AGOA. The 
existing industry in Lesotho prior to 2000, already located there by chance, also seems to have 
been an important factor for Lesotho to attract further investors with the initiation of AGOA, 
as the Taiwanese investors attracted additional investors from Taiwan.  
The zones’ textile and apparel industry has been the key source of FDI, the main 
export commodity, and the largest source of foreign exchange earnings. The sector has also 
significantly increased formal sector employment, and constituted to almost half of formal 
sector employment. Few other opportunities exist for formal sector employment aside from 
the public sector and the mining sector. The growth in the manufacturing sector has 
contributed to positive economic growth, and an increase in GDP per capita. However, 77% 
of the population still lives in rural areas and primarily depends on subsistence farming, and 
employment rates and poverty levels remain about the same as three decades ago. Wealth is 
concentrated in the capital (ILO, 2012).  
Foreign investors dominate the manufacturing sector, but the investments are 
relatively footloose, making the country vulnerable to exchange rate risk and changing 
conditions in the international market, such as market access and competition. The years 
following the end of the MFA have been challenging for the industry, with low demand from 
the US as the main importer, an unfavourable exchange rate, and a substantial increase in 
competition from China in particular. Several factories have as a result closed down, though 
an increase in textile and apparel exports to South Africa has helped lessen the drop in 
exports.  
There is little evidence of either horizontal or vertical linkages from foreign investors 
to the domestic economy. Use of local inputs is low, especially within the textile and apparel 
industry. Government incentives have facilitated investments in mills using mainly African 
cotton. The country’s prospects for cotton production are poor due to scarce arable land, 
which limits employment generation because it limits backward linkages. Lesotho has few 
natural resources to utilize in industrial production, though the government aims to encourage 
industries such as water bottling and clay and sandstone processing to increase diversity and 
take better advantage of the country’s resources. Technology and knowledge spillovers from 
FDI moreover remain small, and although the government and the World Bank operate 
training facilities and on-the-job training is provided by investors, productivity improvements 
	   
80 
remain small. Domestic investments remain low, though funds have recently been allocated to 
reduce financial constraints for domestic investors within the industry.  
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Chapter 5 
Discussion 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter’s aim is to answer the research question posed in the introduction: Do 
EPZ programmes have the potential to contribute to long-term economic growth in SSA? The 
question is answered by addressing the two subquestions: Do EPZ programmes provide the 
benefits anticipated? What factors determine and hamper investments within SSA zones? To 
answer the first question, zone programmes’ prospects for realizing benefits—such as 
increased foreign exchange earnings, export diversity, employment, demand for local inputs 
(and subsequent generation of indirect employment), as well as human capital and 
technological development, and industrial and regional development are assessed. The 
conditions needed for such benefits to occur, the significance of governments’ incentives, and 
additional policies supporting the EPZ programmes are explored. Policy recommendations are 
included. The last section of the chapter attends to the second subquestion, and discusses EPZ 
programmes as a policy to increase FDI to SSA. The section also looks more closely at the 
significance of trade preferences on investments in SSA zones, the zones’ ability to facilitate 
labour-intensive industry, and the zones’ expected long-term effect.  
 
5.2 The Potential Benefits of EPZ Programmes in SSA 
5.2.1 EPZ Programmes as a Policy to Increase in Foreign Exchange Earnings  
Foreign exchange earnings from EPZ programmes depend on a range of factors linked 
to the success of the particular zone programme, such as tax income, wages paid to local 
employees, EPZ firms’ emoluments to local employees, use of local raw and intermediate 
inputs, prices on electricity and water utilities relative to production costs, lease income on 
industrial or office buildings, profit to domestic investors, and domestic sales. Tax income is 
often low, as EPZ firms typically pay little or no taxes on profit, or import or export duties. If 
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taxed on profit, multinational firms may also take advantage of transfer pricing, and record 
profit in low-tax countries to reduce the tax burden for the company (see, e.g. Todaro & 
Smith, 2009). The footloose nature of many EPZ firms makes it difficult for state and regional 
authorities to increase earnings by extracting a greater share of firms’ surpluses, by, e.g., 
increasing tax rates, leases on industrial and office buildings, costs of utilities, and 
administrative services, as investors may relocate if such costs exceed opportunity costs (see, 
e.g., Romer, 1998). The significant increase in the number of zone programmes offering 
different tax incentives to attract investors may make it harder to attract investments with a 
perpetual low-tax rate. The government of Lesotho found it necessary to reduce the taxes on 
manufacturing profits and reduce the cost of leases on industrial buildings to improve the 
competitiveness of industry in Lesotho after the end of the MFA. These measures 
significantly reduced the government’s income from the manufacturing sector. The actual loss 
of tax income, however, depends on whether firms settle or stay regardless of the reduction in 
taxes, and whether the EPZ programme succeeds in its main objective of attracting 
investments that would otherwise not materialize. This is difficult to ascertain, in Kenya as 
well, as is also argued by Rolfe et al. (2004) and Kingombe and Te Velde (2013).  
5.2.2 EPZ Programmes as a Policy to Increase Export Diversity 
Industries within the zones may contribute to economic diversity and the composition 
of exports. Zone exports make up the majority of Lesotho’s total exports. The textile and 
apparel sector has given the country an exceptional possibility to increase foreign exchange 
earnings and generated important formal employment opportunities. The EPZ programme in 
Kenya has also contributed to increase manufacturing production and total exports, yet the 
effect seems less evident in comparison to Lesotho. Industry composition within the Kenyan 
zones has changed somewhat since 2005, and food- and agri-processing provides potential for 
a further increase in zone activity if political and macroeconomic stability persist. Scarce data 
makes further analysis of the zones’ effect on total exports infeasible.  
Textile and apparel production and electronic assembly dominate most EPZs, though 
zone programmes in general increasingly include a greater range of industries. To some 
extent, this is likely a response to the significant growth of zone programmes and a struggle to 
stand out and attract attention from investors. Clusters of firms are an important incentive for 
additional investors, but if only a few commodities are produced within the zones it makes 
zone programmes vulnerable to potential changes in market access and demand. Such 
vulnerability is highly evident in Lesotho. Zone production in Lesotho remains largely 
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dependent on special market access and a small range of goods to a single market. The 
government has ambiguous targets for an increase in investments within nonapparel industry 
and new export markets. Textile and apparel exports to South Africa have increased and have 
been important to lessen the reduction in production when exports to the US drastically 
declined. Investments within nonapparel production do however remain low. Though the 
building up of a particular industry may have important economies of scale, it is imperative 
that the zones develop the capacity to adapt to changes in taste and demand in the global 
economy to be less vulnerable to risk, and industry diversity can support that goal. EPZ 
policies are also then more likely to be sustainable.138 The vulnerability of an industry with a 
narrow line of production may also decline if export markets and group of investors are 
diverse, and if investors are from several different locations, as argued by, e.g., ILO (1998). 
Like SSA zone programmes in general, Kenya’s programme includes a larger variety of 
industries, is less dependent on a single market, and has a more diverse group of investors, 
and thus was better able to adapt to a notable decline in textile and apparel exports to the US 
following 2005, as well as to increase production of nonapparel products. The low levels of 
investments within SSA zones cause single firms to potentially have considerable effect on 
both investments and diversity within the zones. This is evident in both Kenya and Lesotho, 
and the closures of relatively large firms within the textile and apparel industry have had 
significant effect on investments. New investments within nonapparel industry exports have 
also affected the diversity of the composition of firms, though the production output of many 
of these firms is small.  
5.2.3 EPZ Programmes as a Policy to Generate Employment; Labour Productivity  
5.2.3.1 Employment Generation in SSA Zones 
Employment generation is one of the most evident accomplishments of many zones. 
By utilizing surplus labour from agriculture, and transferring labour from lower-productivity 
activities to higher-productivity activities, the zones are likely to have a positive effect on 
overall productivity in the economy by allocating resources more efficiently.139 However, if 
labour is merely relocated from existing industry without an overall increase in higher-
productivity activities, zone production will have little effect on the structural transformation 
                                                
138 If external economies of scale exist, beneficial externalities, such as knowledge and technology transfers, may 
be positively linked to the number of firms, or size of the cluster of firms, within the industry in an area.  
139 Marginal productivity of labour should be equal in the different sectors, when resources are allocated 
optimally (see, e.g., McMillan & Rodrik, 2011).   
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and economic growth of the economy. It is, however, difficult to ascertain the actual cause of 
changes in overall employment and what would be happen in the absence of a zone 
programme. Limited data makes it further problematic. Moreover, an increase in higher-value 
and higher-productivity production, if it occurs, does not necessarily significantly affect the 
economy if profit mainly goes to foreign investors, and little technology and knowledge 
spillovers accrue to the overall economy.  
Employment within zones in Africa as a share of total employment is low on average, 
as seen in table 2.2. Table 2.1 does however show that there are large differences across the 
SSA region, and both Kenya and Lesotho have been relatively successful in attracting labour-
intensive industry when compared to some other African countries, for example, Ghana, 
Zimbabwe, and Gabon, although, labour-intensive industry in both Kenya and Lesotho has 
declined, causing employment generation to stagnate. Within the zones, the textile and 
apparel sector is a major source of domestic formal-sector employment, especially in Lesotho, 
providing an important source of income for many families who otherwise mainly depend on 
subsistence farming. Other opportunities for formal sector employment are few in Lesotho, 
apart from employment in the public sector, and in the mining sector in Lesotho and South 
Africa. Export of energy, in particular hydropower, provides possibilities for significant 
foreign exchange revenues, but the potential for employment generation in this sector is 
small. The zones in Lesotho and Kenya employ about the same number of workers, but 
employment in the Kenyan zones has had less noteworthy effect on manufacturing 
employment and total employment. However, although formal-sector employment is 
heightened, neither of the countries’ shares of informal employment or high unemployment 
rates have been significantly reduced. Informal-sector employment remains the main source 
of employment, and still provides the main source of employment generation, increasing the 
share of informal-sector employment in the countries. Even if ambitious targets for 
employment generation are met, direct employment within the zones will only absorb a small 
fraction of the number of workers entering the labour force in the coming years. Hence, the 
findings of these case studies are consistent with the argument made by Kusago and 
Tzannamos (1998) that the EPZs’ potential to solve the problem of unemployment is at best 
limited. Backward linkages from industry within the EPZs may however substantially 
increase indirect employment and the effect of zone programmes. The significance of using 
local intermediate and raw inputs will be further discussed below.  
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5.2.3.2 Training and Experience as Labour Productivity Improvements  
Although an inflow of capital may significantly increase employment and exports and 
improve economic growth in the short-term, the long-term effect may be limited. According 
to neoclassical growth theory, the long-term effect on economic growth depends on 
improvements in human capital and technological development. Experience, on-the-job 
training, and training programmes implemented by the employer have the potential to 
improve workers’ skills and labour productivity. However, the production that traditionally 
has been located in developing countries, including Kenya and Lesotho, has mainly been in 
need of low-skilled labour, and thus training of workers has often been limited to specific 
tasks in the production chain. Employment may still make workers accustomed to 
manufacturing work, as Lall (2005) argues is evident in Lesotho, but may not necessarily 
provide workers with broader skills that are easily applicable elsewhere, or provide good 
opportunities for technology and human capital spillovers (see, e.g., Fosfuri et al., 2001). Yet, 
Kingombe and Te Velde (2013) find evidence that employment within the EPZs has 
improved labour productivity in Kenya, implying that job experience and training provided by 
the EPZ firms have a positive long-term effect on the economy. The EPZs’ effect on labour’s 
skills and productivity is likely to depend on the type of investments within the zones, 
suggesting that some types of investments within the EPZs are more valuable, especially in 
the long term, than others. This aspect should be emphasised by zone authorities when 
targeting investors, to enhance the possible benefits of zone programmes.   
Training and education programmes undertaken by the government have been rather 
poorly tailored to the needs of the industry and hence inefficient in complementing the 
industry in Kenya. Training in Lesotho is moreover insufficient, and the government of 
Lesotho is attempting to enhance investors’ incentives to provide training, by making the 
costs of training tax deductible at 125%. Ultimately, training and an increase in skills and 
labour productivity will benefit both investors and workers, with subsequent positive effect on 
economic growth. For the investor, the advantage of such financial incentives is that the skills 
obtained are likely to be tailored to the needs of the industry. Training programmes 
implemented by the government may still be important to increase labour productivity and 
labour competitiveness, and to better ensure technology and knowledge spillovers. 
Government-supported training facilities also increase overall human capital, and provide 
local workers with better opportunities to rise to management level and ultimately open their 
own businesses (see, e.g., Fosfuri et al., 2001; Kusago & Tzannatos, 1998). An increase in 
skilled labour through training and experience is likely to have a positive effect on wages 
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within the zones, as firms pay higher wages to secure skilled workers with a positive effect on 
foreign exchange earnings. The increase in wages is to some extent dependent on the 
flexibility of the labour market and the existence of other employment opportunities. Higher 
labour productivity will, however, generally allow the workers to demand higher wages.  
5.2.3.3 The Effect of Labour Markets, Wages, and Working Conditions on Employment 
Gains 
Flexible markets are argued to be critical for zone programmes to attract investors and 
be successful, by, for example, the World Bank (1992) and ILO (2011), although labour 
markets are likely to be more important for investors within labour-intensive industry. 
Countries’ labour markets have a potential effect on employment generation: if high costs are 
associated with hiring and firing employees, firms may find it cost effective to increase the 
capital intensity of production by improving plants and equipment. The flexibility of the 
labour market furthermore affects the potential for labour circulation between EPZ firms and 
local producers, and the possibility for transfers of knowledge and technology from the EPZ 
firms (see, e.g., Fosfuri et al., 2001). If the labour market is rigid, or few other employment 
possibilities exist in close proximity, spillovers through labour circulation are less likely to 
occur. These findings are in line with McMillan and Rodrik’s (2011) conclusion that countries 
with flexible labour markets are more likely to see a structural transformation of the economy 
with productivity growth. The fact that Kenya has a larger locally owned manufacturing 
sector outside its zones than does Lesotho, and also possibly less rigid labour markets, might 
help explain why Farole (2011) finds evidence of significantly greater labour circulation from 
zones to domestic firms in Kenya than in Lesotho. Low costs associated with hiring and firing 
workers may, however, also result in poor job security, which must be weighed against the 
potential benefits. The more rigid labour market in SSA may to some extent explain why SSA 
zones in Kenya, Ghana, and Lesotho, for example, have a significantly higher share of 
temporary employees than non-African zones according to Farole (2011). However, other 
factors such as higher uncertainty linked to trade agreements, future demand, government 
incentives, and/or political and macroeconomic stability are also plausible factors that may 
influence the use of temporary employees. The latter factors’ effect on investment and 
employment levels within the zones will be further discussed in the next section.   
Low wages and poor working conditions are often the main critique of the zone 
programmes, though the literature contains disputes over EPZ investors’ actual effect on 
labour standards in the host countries. Their effect on labour standards will differ between 
countries, depending on labour standards in the local economy, type of investors, level of 
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competition, monitoring, the unemployment rate, and consumers’ demands regarding 
standards, among other things (see, e.g., Cling et al., 2005). Rational workers should however 
view themselves as better off working within the zones than in alternative employment.140 
Yet, poor working conditions are a potential source of conflict, with significant social and 
economic costs, and also have potentially detrimental effect on investments, as pointed out 
by, e.g., LaRRI (2000). Poor working conditions may also negatively impact workers in the 
long run, which they may not be able to anticipate or take into account. The long-term benefit 
of generated employment may significantly decline if workers are exposed to health risks, or 
other negative factors. It is however difficult for the government to balance workers’ welfare 
and possible future costs of conflict, health risks or environmental degradation, with the 
desire to be become or remain competitive. This is evident especially in Lesotho, though 
wages within the zones are found to be somewhat higher than minimum wage in both Lesotho 
and Kenya. Low wages in the textile and apparel industry have caused some tension between 
workers and employers in Lesotho, and are likely to influence the general opinion of zone 
programmes.  
Reducing wages or keeping minimum wages low can be a relatively inexpensive 
measure for the government to perform, while improvements in other areas affecting 
investments, such as labour productivity and infrastructure, may have significantly greater 
costs, take longer time, and/or be outside government control. This does cause a concern for 
wages and labour conditions for zone programmes, especially those for whom the main 
attraction is low labour costs, as argued by, e.g., Wu (2009) and Jauch et al. (1996). Lowering 
wages are however not expected to impact the zones’ competitiveness or investments in the 
long run. The key to reducing the pressure on wages and working conditions is to improve the 
zones’ overall competitiveness, preferably by improving factors that also have a long-term 
positive impact on the economy. The government in Lesotho aims to ultimately sell export 
goods at higher prices, which would allow for higher wages, as consumers put more emphasis 
on labour and environmental standards. However, this requires consumers being 
knowledgeable about current working conditions in different countries and being willing to 
pay higher prices. Working conditions in Lesotho must also be better relative to other 
countries, while still being fairly competitive, which is not necessarily easily established. The 
next section will, however, look into factors that may have significant positive effect on both 
the zones’ competitiveness and the prospects of long-term economic growth.  
                                                
140 See, e.g., Warr (1989) and Maloney (2004).  
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5.2.4 EPZ Programmes to Foster Local Suppliers and Indirect Employment 
Although the significance of linkages between the zones and the domestic economy in 
enhancing spillovers and increasing the net benefit of zone programmes is widely recognized 
in the literature, many countries still fail to facilitate noteworthy linkages between the zones 
and local firms and suppliers (see, e.g., Chinguno, 2009; Jenkins, 2006). This is evident 
especially in the textile and apparel sector in the case studies. Local suppliers find it difficult 
to compete with Asian producers, in particular China and India, due lower labour costs and 
economies of scale in production in these countries. Use of local intermediate and raw 
materials for this reason remains low, with subsequently small indirect employment 
generation and foreign exchange earnings. As a consequence, the effect of the programmes 
remains small in relation to the potential benefits and to the zones’ possibly substantial costs. 
If investors utilize only local labour, and little training or spillovers occur, other types of 
employment generation programmes may for this reason be more reasonable, as has been 
argued by Jauch et al. (1996).   
Foreign investors may gain from improving the quality of products and efficiency of 
local suppliers, ultimately increasing the use of local inputs over time. Several empirical 
studies find support for significant vertical spillovers from FDI (see, e.g., Harrison and 
Rodriguez-Clare, 2010). The footloose nature that characterizes many EPZ firms, and the 
opportunity to import raw material and intermediate inputs duty-free, do however to a large 
extent reduce the incentives for EPZ investors to foster local suppliers, as argued by for 
Farole (2011). According to Jenkins (2006), the likelihood of backward linkages is heightened 
if firms within the zones are small, well established, capital intensive, partly or fully owned 
by local investors, and/or sell greater shares of production to the domestic market. Firms with 
these characteristics are likely to be less footloose and more rooted in the domestic economy. 
Both an increase in domestic investment and reduced restrictions on domestic sales may also 
increase backward linkages according to Jenkins (2006). Increases in domestic investments 
within the zones are being targeted in both Kenya and Lesotho. Domestic expenditure has 
increased concurrently with domestic investment in Kenya in recent years, though overall 
investments have also increased. Both governments have also encouraged a more integrated 
production within the country, by facilitating investments in industries’ supply chains, e.g., 
fabrics and yarn. Financial support or training programmes may also make local producers 
more efficient and improve the quality of local products, and subsequently increase the 
competiveness of local producers.  
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EPZ programmes may have better prospects for greater backward linkages if they 
attract industries in which the countries have good prospects of providing local inputs. Kenya 
has large areas of land suitable for cotton and agricultural production that can support textile 
and apparel production or the food and agri-processing industry, though food security is a 
rising challenge in the country according to IFPRI (2013), and the country sees large 
fluctuations in rainfall. Although cotton production has been low compared to its potential, 
the textile and apparel value-chain has generated income for a significantly larger number of 
small-scale farmers than direct employment within the textile and apparel industry. Use of 
local inputs in the textile and apparel industry is relatively low, suggesting potentially large 
gains if production becomes more competitive. In Kenya, the increase in nonapparel industry, 
such as food- and agri-processing, has the potential to significantly enhance backward 
linkages as the industry sources the majority of inputs locally. Lesotho has, in contrast to 
Kenya, a more limited capacity to produce cotton without further deteriorating food security 
in the country, and the mills in Lesotho source the majority of cotton from other African 
countries. Employment opportunities for small-scale farmers linked to production of raw 
materials for the industry within the zones are hence limited. Poor potential to grow cotton 
can explain the lower share of local inputs used in the textile and apparel sector within the 
zones in Lesotho. Production of intermediate inputs may still increase overall employment, 
for example in the country’s mills. It is evident that the use of local inputs, as well as training, 
and hence the overall long-term effect of the EPZ programmes depends on the type of FDI the 
zones are able to attract. Zones that are able to attract higher quality investments, or choose 
the investors and the type of investments with the largest overall gain, are for this reason 
likely to have a significantly higher net benefit from the zone programmes. As most SSA 
zones have considerably lower levels of investment than targeted, the zone authorities may 
not feel they have the luxury of being too critical. It is however of importance that zone 
authorities focus on overall economic gains, i.e., overall employment generation over direct 
employment generation as well as potential for spillovers. A rise in economic activity in the 
areas surrounding the zones may have a significantly greater impact for a larger number of 
people in the country than only the number of people employed within the zones. Difficulties 
measuring the overall effect on the economy and limited available data in many developing 
countries however makes estimations possibly inaccurate, and easier measures such as direct 
employment and level of investment are for this reason used to get an indication of the zones’ 
overall effect.  
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5.2.5 EPZ Programmes as a Policy for Industrial Development  
Demonstration effects and transfers of technology and knowledge from FDI may 
ultimately have a significant positive effect on competitive domestic firms, with a subsequent 
positive effect on overall industrial development, as noted above. EPZ programmes can be a 
potentially important policy to increase the presence of foreign investors in the country, as 
further discussed below. Technology and knowledge spillovers may be crucial to prevent a 
further increase in the productivity gap between SSA and other regions.141 Ultimately the 
inflow of FDI will reduce the gap, and allow SSA to ‘catch up’ with developed countries.  
Although local investment is relatively high in several African zones, among them 
Kenya, there is little evidence of a sizeable increase in the number of local globally 
competitive producers through knowledge and technical spillovers, or demonstration effects, 
as Easterly (2002) finds evidence of in Bangladesh. This is however consistent with other 
studies that find few horizontal spillovers from FDI (see, e.g., Aitken & Harrison, 1999; 
Harrison & Rodriguez-Clare, 2010). It is also in line with Collier and Venables’s (2007) 
argument that though EPZ programmes may increase industry, they are not necessarily 
sufficient to stimulate large-scale industrial development. Locally owned manufacturing firms 
remain few in Lesotho. There are several factors that appear to affect spillovers from foreign 
investors within the zones. Domestic firms’ ability to absorb knowledge and adopt new 
technology is one of them. In the short term, the process of learning may impose significant 
costs on domestic firms, as resources are devoted to learning and to acquire and adopt new 
technologies and techniques (see, e.g., Liu, 2008). Domestic firms may not necessarily have 
the incentive or financial ability to focus on the long-term benefits. The government may 
therefore need to improve the chances for spillovers to occur by giving local firms financial 
aid or loans in times of transition, improving their ability to finance the process of learning. 
However, capital is scarce in developing countries, and it may be difficult to establish which 
firms may ultimately become globally competitive. Firms within desired sectors with 
significant growth potential need to be targeted, which is the aim of the Kenyan Export 
Business Accelerator Programme. 
The probability of transfers of technology is furthermore likely to be higher when EPZ 
firms’ profits are not negatively affected by an increase in the number of local competitive 
firms. Spillovers may be more likely to occur if domestic firms do not compete in the same 
market, or if competition is weak, if economies of scale exist in the industry, or if profit is 
                                                
141 See, e.g., McMillan and Rodrik (2011).  
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dependent on collaboration (see, e.g., Fosfuri et al., 2001; Aitken & Harrison, 1999). 
Transfers of technology may hence increase if domestic and foreign investors are able to 
complement each other. Joint ventures offer good opportunities for collaboration and linkages 
between foreign and local investors. A joint venture programme is an important part of 
KEPZA’s strategy in Kenya, though no requirements exist to have local investors to receive 
EPZ benefits.142 This is also the case in Lesotho. Most SSA zones do not appear to have the 
competitiveness or attractiveness to be able to require this from investors, but further benefits 
for local ventures compared to EPZ firms fully owned by foreigners may induce investors to 
look for domestic investors to partner with.  
Technology and knowledge transfers may for the above reason potentially be greater if 
local firms serve the domestic market alone, or if price competition in the export market is 
low. Restrictions on domestic sales remain part of the main attraction of EPZs for many 
governments. EPZ programmes provide countries with the possibility to slowly increase the 
competition domestic firms face by increasingly allow greater domestic sales. An increase in 
competition is likely to increase domestic firms’ incentives to improve efficiency and to 
hence adopt new technology. Low domestic sales also limit forward linkages, and also 
potentially backward linkages to the domestic economy (see Jenkins, 2006). Domestic 
manufacturing firms are however likely to be opposed to giving EPZ better access to the 
domestic market, as seen in Kenya.  
5.2.6 EPZ Programmes as a Policy for Regional Development 
Foreign investors tend to prefer clusters of economic activity and access to skilled 
labour, making zone programmes poor tools to generate regional development in 
disadvantaged areas without substantial investments in infrastructure.143 Regional 
development is however still a target for some zone programmes, as with the programmes in 
Kenya and Lesotho, and many zones are located in areas with otherwise poor employment 
opportunities. It is evident that zone activity to some degree has generated development in the 
areas surrounding the EPZs in Kenya, and also Lesotho, but investors in both Kenya and 
Lesotho tend to locate where large clusters of industry already exist, e.g., in Mombasa and 
Nairobi in Kenya, and in Maseru and Maputsoe in Lesotho. Other zones have been less 
successful in attracting investments. Significant investments in overall infrastructure are 
                                                
142 Aitken and Harrison (1999) find evidence that technology spillovers from FDI in Venezuela tend to be 
entirely internalized by joint ventures.  
143 See, e.g., Kusago and Tzannatos (1998); Jayanthakumaran (2003); and Farole (2011).  
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needed in both countries to support a greater distribution of zones, as targeted by the zone 
programmes. This may however cause a substantial increase in the costs of the programmes, 
which needs to be weighed towards the expected benefits and the alternative tools to use. It is 
clear that regional development is an important aim for both of the countries. It is crucial for 
governments to recognize the limitations of FDI and zone programmes, and also to identify 
the factors necessary for investments to occur to better facilitate investments, and avoid 
misusing and thus wasting scarce resources. KEPZA has had rather unrealistic or at best 
highly optimistic targets for foreign investments, exports, local investments, and employment 
within the zones, as has also been the case with many other SSA zone programmes (see, e.g., 
LaRRI, 2000; Chinguno, 2009).144 If few local suppliers or competitive firms are in 
proximity, locating zones in less-developed areas makes it difficult to ensure linkages with the 
domestic economy. If a zone’s location, on the other hand, provides EPZ investors with 
proximity to raw or intermediate inputs, the zone programme may potentially encourage a 
natural agglomeration of industry or clusters by removing some of the obstacles for 
investments, such as lack of infrastructure and excessive red tape. Table 5.1 summarizes the 
findings in the case studies linked to the first subquestion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
144 KEPZA’s strategy report of 2007 was however published prior to the global financial crisis, and followed a 
period of significant growth in investments, exports, and employment, making high expectations for the 
subsequent period somewhat understandable.  
	   
93 
 
 
Table 5.1. 
Expected benefits – Do they materialize? 
 Kenya Lesotho 
Increase in 
exports 
The value of zone exports, as well as 
domestic expenditures, has increased 
substantially since 2000. In 2012, EPZ 
exports made up about 8% of total exports. 
The majority of textile and apparel exports 
to the US under AGOA are produced 
within the EPZs.  
Textile and apparels exports from the zones 
constituted 80% of exports in 2005. The 
share later declined, mainly due to an 
increase in the export of diamonds, but zone 
production still constitutes very important 
foreign exchange earnings.  
 
Export diversity Manufacturing within the EPZs is small 
relative to domestic manufacturing sector, 
but the zones may still have contributed to 
increasing both diversity and higher-value 
exports.  
Inflows of FDI have ensured that 
manufacturing exports have become the 
main export commodity, but exports mainly 
consist of textile and apparel products to the 
US. Investment in other types of industry has 
been limited.  
Foreign exchange 
earnings  
Foreign exchange earnings have increased 
over the years, but earnings are limited due 
to the tax holiday on profits and duty free 
imports of inputs.  
Textile and apparel exports are the largest 
source of foreign exchange earnings. 
Domestic profit from the sector is however 
low.  
Employment 
generation 
EPZ employment currently makes up 13% 
of manufacturing employment, though 
only a marginal share of total employment.  
Employment within the industrial areas 
makes up the majority of manufacturing 
employment, and almost 50% of domestic 
formal-sector employment. Few other 
opportunities exist for formal employment 
beyond the public sector and mining industry 
in Lesotho and South Africa. 
Backward 
linkages and 
indirect 
employment 
Use of local inputs is increasing with the 
change of industry within the zones. Use 
of local inputs within the textile and 
apparel sector remains low, though Kenya 
has the potential to produce both raw and 
intermediate inputs.  
Use of local inputs within the zones is low, 
due to production being mainly within the 
textile and apparel sector, where use of local 
inputs is very low. Potential for production 
of raw materials, such as cotton, is limited.  
Transfer of 
technology and 
knowledge 
A relatively large manufacturing sector 
outside the zones and share of domestic 
investors within the zone together provide 
potential for spillovers, e.g., through 
labour circulation. However, little 
evidence of such transfers exists.  
Potential for spillovers is limited, as the 
number of locally owned manufacturing 
firms remains low. Financial assistance to 
local industry and leadership training is 
critical for the development of domestically 
owned industry.  
Regional 
development 
Economic growth in less developed areas 
is a goal of the EPZ programme. Most 
investors do however prefer to locate close 
to Nairobi and Mombasa because of their 
good access to international export 
markets. Restricted sales to the EAC 
region has further increased the share of 
investments located in areas close to 
Mombasa.  
The most successful zones are located close 
to Maseru and Maputsoe. Zones located in 
less developed areas have been less 
successful.  
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5.3. EPZ Programmes as a Policy to Increase Investments 
5.3.1 Political and Macroeconomic Stability  
The other subquestion this thesis explores is the main determinants and obstacles for 
investments within zones in SSA, and whether EPZ programmes are a good policy to increase 
FDI to SSA countries and their industrial competitiveness. Political and macroeconomic 
stability stands as an obvious factor that has affected investments and industrial production 
levels in both Kenya and Lesotho, including the social and political unrest in Lesotho in the 
mid-1990s and the postelection violence in Kenya in 2008. These periods also saw high 
inflation. It is further evident that fluctuations in the exchange rates have had a significant 
effect on the competitiveness of the countries’ industries, through both input and output 
prices. This is consistent with empirical findings (see, e.g., Woodward & Rolfe, 1993; Cling 
et al., 2005; Aseidu, 2006). Political stability and good exchange rate management is hence 
fundamental for the success of zone programmes. Some uncertainty has been linked to the 
Kenyan election this year, and high levels of corruption also constitute an investment risk, in 
part because AGOA eligibility depends on good governance and adherence to human 
rights.145 In general the political and macroeconomic situation in SSA offers good prospects 
for an increase in investments, as factors affecting investment risk are improving. Inflation 
has on average been declining, and average economic growth rate is relatively high, despite 
poor global economic conditions, although some countries are affected by drought and 
political instability. A further deterioration of the global economy could potentially have a 
large effect on economic growth and macroeconomic stability in some counties (see, e.g., 
IMF, 2012).  
Insecurity regarding the continuation of EPZ incentives has affected investments 
within SSA zones, according to, e.g., LaRRI (2000) and Chinguno (2009). Overall support 
from labour unions and political opposition may be important for the signalling effect 
regarding the country’s overall attitude to foreign investments, which according to Woodward 
and Rolfe (1993) is central for inflows of foreign investments. A country’s overall attitude 
toward EPZs is likely to become more positive if wages and working conditions improve 
within the zones, as this is often the main argument against the use of EPZs. This is however 
not necessarily straightforward to achieve, due to the extensive pressure on zones to be 
                                                
145 See appendix for more information about the different agreements. Table A1 shows that some SSA countries 
have been suspended from AGOA and EBA benefits, while others have never benefit, due to political instability 
and human rights violations.  
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competitive, as discussed above. A perceived higher risk of investing in SSA zones and 
insufficient knowledge about the investment climate in SSA countries may be important 
factors for why many investors have shunned SSA zones. In the western media, the SSA 
region is frequently portrayed as suffering from poverty and conflict, and often more like a 
country than a diverse region (Aseidu, 2002).146 The perception of SSA is changing, and the 
region currently holds several of the top high-growth countries, as pointed out in the 
introduction. The region as a whole does however continue “to face the biggest 
competitiveness challenges of all regions” according to WEF (2013, p. 12). Although SSA 
EPZ programmes have yet not managed to attract targeted levels of FDI, EPZ policies may 
still have an important signalling effect about SSA countries’ attitudes towards FDI. EPZ 
policies hence may somewhat help change investors’ perception of SSA’s investment climate. 
Confidence about continued preferential market access has moreover a significant effect on 
investments within the textile and apparel industry in both Kenya and Lesotho. The 
significance of trade agreements is further discussed below.  
5.2.2 EPZ Programmes as a Policy to Reduce Production and Trade Costs  
Infrastructure development is argued to be a key for SSA to increase investments and 
to see a structural transformation of the economy, by, e.g., UNCTAD (2012a). Energy and 
water security are major problems in many SSA countries, making it difficult for countries to 
facilitate a significant expansion of the manufacturing sector. The countries also lack capital 
to be able to ensure large improvements in overall infrastructure. A very favourable aspect of 
zone programmes is that, to a certain extent, countries can focus infrastructure improvements, 
such as industrial buildings, water and electricity supply, road network, access to port, and 
administration, in a limited area and reduce costs of trade and production. This may be more 
economically feasible for the government to facilitate. However, even though infrastructure 
within the zones may be noticeably better than that of the domestic economy, it may not 
necessarily be globally competitive, depending on the overall infrastructure, as argued by 
Farole (2011). Overall infrastructure in the country determines the base of improvements, as 
well as the quality of supportive infrastructure and the costs of the programme. More 
developed countries will hence have lower costs of providing globally competitive 
infrastructure than less developed countries where larger investments are required. 
                                                
146 Aseidu (2002) finds that a country being African has a significant negative impact on overall FDI, and that an 
increase in return to capital to have less effect on inflows of FDI than in non-African countries, ceteris paribus. 
Based on these findings Aseidu concludes that investors perceive investments in Africa to be at higher risk.  
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Infrastructure in the overall economy may moreover affect how easy it is to access local 
suppliers and how the business environment is perceived. Hence, while limiting infrastructure 
development to a specific area may offer a place to start, overall infrastructure does affect the 
programmes’ success. More developed countries are likely to have a better general 
infrastructure, and a higher capacity of government, and, for these reasons, a heightened 
possibility of ensuring the success of an EPZ programme. Higher unit labour costs might 
however offset these factors. Lesotho does however demonstrate that poor, small and 
landlocked countries can have relative successful zone programmes, if circumstances are 
favourable. The number of EPUs in many African countries, such as in Kenya, may put 
greater pressure on overall infrastructure, and also potentially reduce external economies of 
scale. However, rational investors should be expected to settle in areas that are most 
favourable to them, and the literature does not provide any evidence that the use of EPUs has 
any effect on zone programmes’ success (see, e.g., Rolfe et al., 2004; and Farole, 2011).  
Both Kenya and Lesotho offer zone investors access to water and electricity that is 
superior to that in the domestic economy. Yet, the unreliable supply of electricity and water is 
still an important obstacle for investments in the zones, together with costs of trade, including 
high transport costs, the time taken to export and import, and excessive red tape, as seen in the 
case studies. An increase in manufacturing industry has put significant pressure on both 
electricity and water supply in the countries, and an increase in industrial activities also 
requires infrastructure to handle substantial flows of wastewater. Well-developed 
infrastructure that can ensure waste and wastewater treatment is central to reduce 
environmental costs of a significant increase in manufacturing activities. Substantial 
investments in infrastructure are needed in both Kenya and Lesotho; the countries have 
invited private investors to develop zone infrastructure and to provide services, which can 
somewhat reduce the governments’ expenses linked to zone programmes.  
Electricity production is typically linked to economies of scale, which to a degree 
explains why electricity prices in Kenya are relatively high when compared to other African 
countries, such as South Africa and Egypt. Lesotho has managed to significantly improve 
electricity supply within its zones, in part by prioritizing electricity supply to industrial areas. 
Such prioritization reduces the need for improvements in capacity, as the industry’s cost of 
power outages are reduced. Nonindustrial areas may on the other hand be negatively affected. 
Due to high production costs, electricity in many SSA countries may be underpriced, which 
can impose great costs on the government while foreign investors benefit. Yet, electricity 
provided at a higher cost affects the competitiveness of manufacturing industry in SSA, and 
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can impede the development of the larger manufacturing sector. Pooling the supply of 
electricity between African countries may considerably reduce instability in supply and 
production costs. Such a regional cooperation does however require substantial investments in 
infrastructure over time (see, e.g., Collier & Venables, 2009). The government of Lesotho has 
together with the government of South Africa made substantial investments in a water and 
hydropower project that should significantly improve electricity supply in Lesotho.  
Zone programmes can potentially have a substantial effect on a country’s logistics 
performance with subsequent effect on trade costs, as many programmes establish simplified 
procedures linked to starting a business, and to exporting and importing. An EPZ programme 
may hence be a central way to improve the ease of doing business and as such enhance the 
host country’s attractiveness to foreign investors. According to Nunn (2007), soft 
infrastructure, such as the juridical system, is critical to explain global production and trade 
patterns. Improvements in overall infrastructure may however be needed to see substantial 
effects on investment and trade. Infrastructure that ensures good access from the industry to 
port facilities and a well-functioning port may further significantly reduce costs of trade, and 
have a positive effect on investment levels (see, e.g., Arvis et al., 2013).  
 SSA does not have the advantage of being close to large markets, and distance may 
significantly increase trade costs. However, the success of zones in South Asia, East Asia, and 
Mauritius show that geographical location is not necessarily an obstacle for SSA zones to 
succeed. SSA’s 16 landlocked countries may, however, find it difficult to attract production 
that can locate anywhere, if their lack of a port induces a further increase in costs of trade. 
This relies on infrastructure in the country itself and its neighbours. Industry in Lesotho gains 
by access to South African ports, which is well developed, compared to other SSA countries. 
Distance to the ports may however cause a disadvantage to industry located in closer 
proximity to same-quality ports. Furthermore, barriers to trade are not utterly in the control of 
Lesotho’s government, as South African ports’ capacity and efficiency, and the performance 
of South African customs services, affects the time taken to export and import to the country.  
To realise an increase in investments it is imperative that governments attend to the 
factors that are in reality hampering investments. If several obstacles exist, they might need to 
be removed simultaneously to see a notable improvement in zone investment, which may 
require considerable investments by the government. However, several measures that will 
enhance the possibility of successful EPZs will also have a positive effect on the overall 
economy, such as reduced red tape, improved business environment and institutions, and 
macroeconomic and political stability. Measures, such as reducing wages and lowering taxes, 
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on the other hand, though relatively inexpensive for the government to execute, may neither 
have a notable effect on investments within the zones nor the overall economy, above all in 
the long run.  
5.2.3 The Effect of Regional Trade Unions in SSA on EPZ Programmes 
The size of local and regional markets is positively correlated with levels of 
investments, employment, and exports within and from the zones, and with FDI to the overall 
economy (Farole, 2011; Aseidu, 2006). However, as noted above, one of the perceived 
benefits of EPZs is that they allow the country to liberalise trade in just one limited area. 
Local markets in SSA are also often too small in both size and income to attract market-
seeking foreign investment (see, i.e., Rolfe et al., 2004; Aseidu, 2006). This may explain low 
domestic sales from zones in both Kenya and Lesotho.147 Although, if SSA countries continue 
to see significant positive economic growth Kenya and Lesotho may both constitute arenas to 
enter the rapidly growing market. Regional trade agreements and customs unions can 
potentially increase the size of the domestic market. However, if domestic sales are restricted, 
such an increase will not benefit EPZ investors and may require them to find new markets, as 
was the case in Kenya. Restrictions on domestic sales from EPZ firms are a heated topic in 
Kenya, where, although EPZ sales to countries within the EAC are restricted, the government 
targets an increase in regional sales from EPZ firms.148 The East African region is already an 
important destination for the country’s manufacturing exports. EPZ firms often have an 
advantage over local firms due to their size and international relations, and the incentives 
given to EPZ firms may put local firms at an even greater disadvantage. A central argument 
against allowing greater domestic sales is the fear that foreign firms may potentially crowd 
out domestic firms. This is also one of the main critiques of policies that aim to facilitate the 
inflow of FDI in the overall economy. This concern is however likely to be eased with an 
increase in the level of domestic investments within the zones. However, fewer restrictions on 
domestic sales may multiply the number of existing domestic firms eligible for EPZ status, 
which may significantly reduce the government’s tax income. Moreover an overall trade 
liberalisation may be easier to facilitate. Domestic sales from the zones are often less 
restrictive today than earlier, but the long-term effect of domestic sales on long-term 
                                                
147 Lesotho does not restrict domestic sales, though profit from sales within SACU is subject to a 10% tax rate. 
Sales to South Africa have seen a significant growth in recent years, but as the Lesotho’s market is small both in 
terms of population and in purchasing power, domestic sales can be expected to remain low.  
148 See, e.g., Omondi (2013). 
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economic growth is disputed in the literature. An increase in regional trade is central in many 
SSA countries’ development plans, including Kenya and Lesotho, and governments need to 
ensure that EPZs’ policies harmonize with regional trade agreements for zone programmes to 
be most efficient.  
5.3.4 The Significance of Trade Preferences for Investments within SSA’s EPZs 
The existing textile and apparel industry in both Kenya and Lesotho, and government 
incentives, such as the EPZ programmes, appear to have been essential in allowing both 
countries to take better advantage of the AGOA. These factors may also explain why the 
opportunities given by the AGOA have had a greater effect in these countries relative to many 
other SSA countries, especially in textile and apparel production (see, e.g., Collier & 
Venables, 2007). The end of the MFA and poor global demand has to some extent later 
eliminated the significant increase in production both Kenya and Lesotho saw following the 
initiation of AGOA. Yet, continued duty-free and quota-free market access to the US appears 
vital to sustain the textile and apparel sector in both countries. The exemption to the rule of 
origin and the third-party fabric provision under AGOA do moreover need to be continued for 
export levels to maintain, as neither of the countries are yet able to produce competitive 
inputs.  
 It is evident that trade agreements can have substantial impact on production and trade 
patterns. Preferential market access improves eligible countries’ relative competitiveness, 
depending on the number of countries given beneficial access. The LNDC for this reason 
expressed concern for Lesotho’s textile and apparel production when Mauritius was exempted 
from the rule of origin under AGOA in 2008. Zone production that is dependent on 
preferential trade agreements remains somewhat vulnerable. The uncertainty linked to the 
continued exemption to the rule of origin under AGOA and the trade agreement itself, and 
hence access to the US market, has had a notable effect on investment levels in zones. This is 
especially evident in Lesotho at the end of every exemption period, as demonstrated in the 
case studies. The rule of origin has, however, also put pressure on the countries to attempt to 
build a broader industry and increase backward linkages, and to some extent enhance regional 
trade. Although integrated textile and apparel production in African countries may be the 
ultimate target, the possibility for it to come about in the short run is small, and for this reason 
the potential for an increase in textile and apparel exports to the EU even with the EBA 
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remains low.149 Trade agreements that are applicable for longer periods may reduce 
fluctuations in investments some and facilitate more long-term investments, including in the 
overall supply chain, with larger positive spillovers. Such trade agreement(s) may also better 
achieve the aim of facilitating economic growth in one of the poorest regions in the world.  
5.3.5 SSA Countries’ Ability to Facilitate Labour-Intensive Industry  
The traditional EPZ model allows developing countries to take advantage of their 
surplus labour, while giving firms the possibility of significantly reducing their labour costs. 
Many SSA countries have been found to have high labour costs relative to labour 
productivity, causing unit labour cost to be uncompetitive with many non-African countries, 
such as China, India, and Bangladesh (see, e.g., Farole 2011; Clarke, 2012, Cling et al., 
2005).150 High living costs make it difficult for many SSA countries to reduce wages to 
improve competitiveness in labour-intensive industry. Such low competitiveness was 
illustrated in the case studies by the sizeable effect of the end of the MFA, even when given 
duty-free and quota-free market access. While EPZ incentives and trade preferences have 
fostered a textile and apparel industry with important direct and indirect employment, it has 
yet to become competitive. A relative increase in labour costs in other regions following 
economic development, or an increase in economies of scale in SSA, which could potentially 
be facilitated by EPZ programmes, may improve SSA competitiveness in labour-intensive 
industry, but this has yet to occur.  
Several scholars argue that SSA countries with large endowments of natural resources 
might have a better possibility to develop a competitive advantage in industry that takes 
advantage of natural resources than in labour-intensive industry (see, e.g., Farole, 2011; Dihn 
et al., 2012). Kenya has slowly seen an increase in nontextile industries within the zones after 
the end of the MFA. The textile and apparel industry is still the largest industry and the main 
source of employment within the zones. The increase in other types of sectors, such as the 
food- and agri-processing sector, does however potentially provide better opportunities to 
develop a competitive industry, also regardless of trade preferences. Lesotho has on the other 
                                                
149 As the UN does not classify Kenya as an LDC, exports from Kenya do not have duty-free and quota-free 
access to the EU. Kenya is, as a developing country, still given lower duties on exports to the EU market through 
the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences (European Commission (EC), 2013a, 2013b).  
150 Labour unit costs are not a perfect measurement of the competitiveness of labour. Labour productivity are 
often measured using value-added per worker, and may be estimated rather high in many SSA countries as many 
local firms meet relative low competition. The use of capital and its effect on labour productivity is furthermore 
not included. The measurement does however give a useful indication of the competitiveness of labour in SSA 
countries (see, e.g., Clarke, 2012).  
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hand fewer natural resources and less land suitable for agricultural production, and its 
prospects for significantly increasing agricultural production to support a larger food- and 
agri-processing sector, or support industry based on natural resources, are hence poorer. 
Opportunities within industries such as water bottling and sandstone processing are promoted 
by the LNDC, but investment levels within these industries remain low, and most food-
processing and beverage firms in the industrial areas remain partially or fully owned by the 
government. However, Lesotho has good prospects for sourcing inputs to food and agri-
processing industry regionally, and to facilitate such regional trade and production chains, as 
has been the case in yarn and fabric production in the country. Beneficial trade agreements, 
such as the EBA agreement and the AGOA, allow a range of goods duty-free and quota-free, 
but most SSA countries, including Kenya and Lesotho, only produce and export a few of 
these. Opportunities exist for SSA countries to take better advantage of these possible goods, 
regional inputs, and trade and production chains. 
EPZ industries based on natural resources may however be poor tools for employment 
generation, as these activities are often more capital-intensive, with consequently smaller 
direct-employment generation within the industry relative to the level of investments. Ghana’s 
zone programme has for example seen substantially higher investment levels within the 
country’s zones compared to other SSA countries, including Kenya and Lesotho, but 
employment creation has been relatively limited as most investments are related to processing 
of the countries’ resources (Farole, 2011; Boyenge, 2007). Natural resource processing, as an 
industry, may however be more stable, as it is dependent on a more location-specific resource 
than labour, and may also generate higher indirect employment due to greater use of local 
inputs, as discussed above. Proximity to natural resources may also provide a more 
sustainable source of competitiveness and potentially provide SSA countries with an 
advantage, ultimately reducing the pressure on wages, and as a consequence increasing value 
added in production (see, e.g., Sargent & Matthews, 2004). Unsustainable incentives and the 
race-to-the-bottom dilemma are the main weaknesses argued to be associated with EPZ 
programmes based on traditional incentives. If a country lacks any advantage compared to 
other countries with similar zone programmes, or is unable to develop one, zone programmes 
are more likely to only facilitate production of standardized low-value-added products, and 
for this reason are less likely to enhance structural transformation with higher-value 
production or foreign exchange earnings (see, e.g., Romer, 1998; Sargent & Matthews, 2004; 
Kaplinsky, 1993). EPZ programmes should for this reason target investments within industry 
where the country has good possibilities for becoming increasingly competitive, ultimately by 
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having a comparative advantage in production. The desperate need for employment 
generation may however yet induce the government to target labour-intensive industry. Table 
5.2 summarises the findings in the case studies linked to the second subquestion.  
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Table 5.2. 
Obstacles to investment within the zones in Kenya and Lesotho 
 Kenya Lesotho 
Overall 
business 
environment 
Kenya is the trade and financial hub in East 
Africa. The country’s competitiveness and 
ease of doing business is ranked relatively 
low, but Kenya is still among the top countries 
in SSA on both indices. Improved global 
competiveness is one of main targets in the 
country’s development plan.  
The country’s competitiveness and ease of 
doing business is ranked very low, also 
compared to many other SSA countries.  
Unit labour 
costs 
Unit labour costs are high compared to Asian 
competitors, such as China, India, and 
Bangladesh, but low relative to many other 
SSA countries with similar programmes.  
Labour unit costs are high relative to Asian 
competitors. Studies dispute how such 
costs compare with other SSA countries.  
Electricity 
supply 
The electricity supply is relatively well 
developed, but expensive compared to prices 
in Asia and larger countries in the region, such 
as Egypt and South Africa.  
Lesotho’s electricity supply is relatively 
good, especially compared to countries 
with similar levels of income. Supply of 
electricity to the industry is prioritised.  
Water supply  Large fluctuations in water supply cause 
challenges for industry, also within zones.  
Water supply is relatively good and stable.  
Port 
infrastructure  
The capacity of the port of Mombasa is 
relatively good compared to many other SSA 
countries, but capacity and efficiency still 
need to be improved.  
The country is landlocked, but benefits 
from access to South African ports, which 
is good compared to other SSA zones.  
Railway and 
road 
infrastructure 
Poor roads and railways hamper investments 
within the zones. Zones close to Mombasa, 
which has better access to global markets, 
appear most attractive to investors.  
Railway and road infrastructure are 
relatively poor, and improvements are 
needed. Zones located in proximity to the 
largest cities are for this reason preferred 
by investors.  
Red tape  Reduced red tape is likely to have significant 
impact on investments and trade within the 
zones, and the country overall. Corruption is 
perceived as one of the largest obstacles for 
business.  
Reduced red tape linked to investing, 
exporting and importing is expected to 
have a positive impact on trade and 
investments. Corruption remains among 
the greatest constraints for business, along 
with access to finance.  
Timing The first EPZs were established in 1990, prior 
to the initiation of AGOA and the end of the 
MFA. This is likely to have had a significant 
positive impact on investments.  
The industrial areas were established prior 
to most similar zones in SSA, and ties with 
early settled Asian investors have been 
crucial for further investments.  
Location The country is the East African trade hub, 
with good connections to neighbouring 
countries by air and road. EPZ firms do 
however currently mainly produce to markets 
outside SSA. 
The country is landlocked, but has access 
to South Africa’s infrastructure. Lesotho 
hence has relative good access to global 
markets to many other SSA countries. 
SACU constitute an increasingly important 
market for exports.  
Political and 
macroeconomic 
stability 
There have been incidents of political and 
macroeconomic instability. The country is 
relatively stable now, but insecurity has been 
linked to the election in 2013 and high levels 
of corruption.  
Currently stable, though there have been 
incidents of political and macroeconomic 
instability with notable effect on 
investments.  
 
 
Trade 
agreements 
The textile and apparel sector within the zones 
benefited greatly of the initiation of AGOA in 
2000, but investments and employment levels 
declined some again following the end of the 
MFA.  
Production and employment within the 
textile and apparel sector saw a notable 
increase with the initiation of AGOA in 
2000, but production and employment later 
declined, despite measures by the 
government to maintain investments. 
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5.4 Summary and Conclusions 
Regardless of the zone programmes’ questionable impact as found in the literature, 
especially in SSA, many African governments have initiated and/or remained committed to 
their EPZ programmes. The number of zone programmes in SSA has consequently seen a 
noteworthy growth. Large investments are most often required to develop and support zone 
programmes, as good quality infrastructure is needed to attract investors. The success of the 
zones and the return on the investments are however uncertain. Many SSA zones have low 
investments and employment levels, which suggests that the zones are not large enough to 
provide the expected benefits; to have a significant effect on export earnings, economic 
diversity, or employment growth; or to contribute to a structural transformation of the 
economy. However, as many SSA countries are characterized by low levels of formal 
employment, and depend on subsistence agriculture and exports earnings from natural 
resources, the introduction of nontraditional industry (or services) may still have a potentially 
notable effect on the economy.  
The relatively low levels of investment in many of SSA’s zone programmes are 
explained by factors such as poor overall investment climate, poor infrastructure, and high 
levels of corruption. The timing of the programmes’ launch, the existing large clusters of 
industrial activity, and regional supply chains elsewhere furthermore put many SSA countries 
at a disadvantage due to the lack of economies of scale. Low global demand in recent years 
may also help explain small inflows of FDI. Scarcity of skilled workers and unfavourable 
labour unit costs further hamper SSA’s competitiveness in labour-intensive industries, which 
typically have located within EPZs globally. The perceived risk of investing in SSA zones 
may also be relatively high, due to frequent policy changes and the political and economic 
instability in some countries. Uncertainties linked to continued preferential market access are 
also likely to have a significant negative impact on the level of investments within the SSA 
zone programmes, especially in labour-intensive industries where SSA competitiveness is 
comparatively low. Furthermore, though EPZ programmes may significantly improve 
infrastructure in a specific area, and as such facilitate trade, overall infrastructure in the 
countries still have effects on trade and production costs, and hence investments. More 
developed SSA countries are for this reason more likely to be able to foster successful zone 
programmes, and EPZ programmes are a poor tool to generate economic growth in the 
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poorest countries. Yet, the case study of Lesotho shows that also small, poor and landlocked 
countries can foster relative successful programmes if circumstances are right.  
The size of the zones does not alone determine their effect: vertical or horizontal 
linkages between EPZ firms and the domestic economy determine the potential for 
technology and knowledge spillovers, and decide the overall long-term effect on the 
economy. One of the main factors causing zone programmes to fail to have an overall positive 
effect on the domestic economy is that the zones are merely enclaves without linkages to the 
domestic economy. Direct employment and foreign exchange earnings alone may not cover 
the significant costs of the zone programme. It is crucial that the zones are integrated in the 
domestic economy to ensure use of local inputs, labour circulation, training and education 
facilities which provide tailored skills for the industry, and for knowledge and technology to 
transfer to domestic producers. EPZ programmes should to a greater extent target investors 
that will be likely to have great positive effect on the overall host economy. Ultimately, 
spillovers from FDI within the zones have the potential to boost domestic economic activity, 
and increase the quality and efficiency of local suppliers, foster local firms that can be 
globally competitive, and have a positive effect on labourers’ skills and productivity.  
The significant growth in the number of countries offering similar incentives to 
investors increases the pressure on countries to stand out and offer the most alluring 
incentives. This may substantially increase the costs of the incentive packages necessary to 
satisfy investors, and consequently the opportunity costs of the programmes. It also becomes 
more difficult to extract shares of zone investors’ profits with the growing number of 
alternative locations for investors. The possible net benefits of zone programmes are hence 
expected to decline with the number of zone programmes, in particular if countries are not 
able to build an advantage over other countries. Many SSA countries may be more likely to 
build a comparative advantage in more capital-intensive industries that take advantage of a 
country’s natural resource wealth. Such industries may also be more likely to increase value 
added in production, if competition from non-African countries is lower. The potential for 
direct employment generation from these types of industry is however smaller. Indirect 
employment, through the production of raw and intermediate inputs, is on the other hand 
often higher, as seen in Kenya and Lesotho, causing overall employment and income 
generation to potentially be greater.   
Though EPZ programmes are not alone sufficient to increase investments, tax 
incentives and subsidized infrastructure may still be important for SSA countries to receive 
heightened shares of FDI, especially within nontraditional sectors. SSA EPZ programmes 
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have contributed to increasing their countries’ ability to utilize preferential trade agreements, 
such as the AGOA. Preferential market access to the US and the EU has at the same time 
been essential to facilitate production within many SSA zones, and remains crucial to 
preserve the level of production in many SSA EPZs, such as the production of textiles and 
apparels. However, although AGOA has had a substantial effect on investments, further 
investments within AGOA have been somewhat hampered by the short periods during which 
the agreement is applicable, as seen in the case studies. The effect of the EBA has furthermore 
been limited for processed exports, especially textile and apparel production, due to a strict 
rule of origin for all countries. Special market access and EPZ incentives are intended to 
ultimately help African countries foster economies of scale. However, for now, industry in 
many SSA EPZs, including Kenya and Lesotho, provides some employment opportunities but 
few linkages to the domestic economy; knowledge and technology transfers are therefore 
limited. Trade agreements with longer time frames may encourage more stable investments 
with greater backward linkages, and result in a larger long-term effect on economic growth. 
Yet, trade agreements and zone programmes, even though perceived as successful, have their 
limitations, and are not alone a solution for economic development and structural change in 
SSA. Factors such as macroeconomic and political stability, the competiveness of the 
exchange rate, overall infrastructure and institutions, corruption, trade costs, and labour unit 
costs, are essential for both foreign and domestic investment, and impact the economic 
growth in SSA in the long-term.  
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Appendix 
 
The Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA)  
Textile and apparel exports from many developing countries were in the period 
1974−2005 subject to quota regulations by the major importing countries, through the Multi-
Fibre Arrangement (MFA). The aim of the regulations was to protect the textile and apparel 
industry in developed countries by allowing them to adjust to the significant increase in textile 
and apparel products from low-cost countries. The poorest countries were exempted from the 
regulations and several countries benefited from a surge of textile and apparel production, as 
production was moved to circumvent the quotas, e.g., in Bangladesh (see, e.g., Easterly, 
2002). The quotas were negotiated bilaterally. The MFA departed from the basic General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rules, and in the Uruguay Round it was decided that 
the quotas set by the MFA should be phased out through the WTO Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing (ATC). The ATC came into affect on 1 January 1995 (WTO, 2013).  
 
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) 
The AGOA was initiated in 2000, and aims to offer selected SSA countries duty-free 
and quota-free access to the US market for certain goods. The agreement is to encourage 
greater trade and investment in SSA. Countries have to meet government and human rights 
requirements to be eligible for AGOA benefits, and to take measures to improve the rule of 
law, human rights, and labour standards. Thirty-four countries were eligible for AGOA 
benefits in 2000 (AGOA info, 2013). Some countries have become eligible for AGOA 
benefits following 2000, as these factors have been improved, while other have lost eligibility 
due to changing conditions, such as political turmoil or failure to meet political and 
democratic rights (see, e.g., Frazer and Briesebroeck, 2010). AGOA benefits currently apply 
to 39 SSA countries (see table A1). The AGOA builds on the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP), and gives preferential access for about 1,800 items, including textile and 
apparel products, to eligible countries to the US market in addition to the about 5,000 items 
given access under the US GSP. For comparison, 127 developing countries are eligible for US 
GSP benefits (AGOA info, 2013).  
For textile and apparel exports it is required that yarn or fabric used in production 
must be made in either the US or in an African country for the finished good to be eligible for 
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AGOA. The rules of origin are to ensure that goods are not merely routed through eligible 
countries, but contribute to employment and the intended economic effect in the countries. 
However, AGOA distinguishes between two groups of African countries: less-developed 
countries (LDCs) in SSA and other SSA countries. Countries categorised as LDC, that is 
countries with a 1998 per capita GNP less than 1,500 dollars, based on World Bank data, 
were initially exempted from the rule of origin, or given a third-country fabric provision, 
through the end of 2004, and allowed to source fabric from non-African countries. The third-
party fabric provision was later extended to 2012 and then to 2015. The aim is to give LDCs 
the opportunity to develop local raw and intermediate materials. Currently South Africa, 
Gabon, and the Seychelles are the only eligible countries not categorised as LDCs, and hence 
have to follow the rule of origin. The extension of AGOA up to 2019 is contingent on a 
successful conclusion to the WTO Doha Development Agenda Round of Negotiations before 
the end of 2015. The different amendments to the AGOA legislation can be found in Bill H.R. 
4101 (AGOA info, 2013).  
 
Everything but Arms and the Cotonou Agreement 
The Everything but Arms (EBA) agreement was initiated in 2001, and gives LDCs, 
according to UN classifications, duty-free access to the European Union market. The 
agreement builds on the generalised system of preferences system for the EU. In 2011, 49 
LDC countries benefited from the agreement, including 33 SSA countries, which can be 
found in the table below, and 16 non-SSA countries (EC, 2013a, 2013b). In contrast with 
AGOA, EBA’s rule of origin applies to textile and apparel exports also from LDCs, which 
has resulted in the EBA having significantly less effect on textile and apparel exports to 
Europe (see, e.g., Portugal-Perez, 2008). If or when countries exit the group of LCDs, EBA 
preferences are seen as no longer required and EBA preferences stop being applicable after a 
transition period of three years (EC, 2013a, 2013b). The EU also has an economic partnership 
agreement (EPA) with African, Caribbean, and Pacific Countries (ACP) based on the 
Cotonou Agreement. Seventy-nine ACP countries signed the Cotonou partnership agreement 
in 2000. The EPA is a reciprocal trade agreement, but LDCs of the ACP countries, are not 
required to open up their market and instead can sell their goods through the EBA (EC, 
2013a, 2013b).  
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Table A1. 
Beneficiaries of AGOA and EBA 
 AGOA EBA  
(in 2011) 
 AGOA EBA  
(in 2011) 
Angola X X Malawi X X 
Benin X X Mali  X 
Botswana X  Mauritania X X 
Burkina Faso X X Mauritius X  
Burundi X X Mozambique X  
Cameroon X  Namibia X  
Cape Verde X  Niger X X 
Central African 
Republic 
 X Nigeria X  
Chad X X Rwanda X X 
Comoros X X Sao Tome and Principe X X 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Suspended X Senegal X X 
Congo, Rep. X  Seychelles X*  
Cote d’Ivoire X  Sierra Leone X X 
Eritrea  X Somalia  X 
Ethiopia X X South Africa X*  
Gabon X X* South Sudan   
Gambia X X Sudan  X 
Ghana X  Swaziland X  
Guinea X X Tanzania X X 
Guinea-Bissau Suspended X Togo X X 
Kenya X  Uganda X X 
Lesotho X X Zambia X X 
Liberia X X Zimbabwe   
Madagascar Suspended X    
Source: AGOA info (2013); EC (2013a, 2013b) 
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Table A2. 
Incentives given by the Kenyan EPZ programme 
A 10-year corporate income tax holiday, followed by 
a tax rate of 25%. 
EPZ commercial enterprises, such as regional 
distribution centres, order taking and repacking, and 
bulk-breaking, have an unlimited tax holiday, but are 
not allowed to sell any goods and services on the 
domestic market. 
Ten-year withholding tax holiday.  This advantage applies to dividends and other 
remittances to nonresident parties.  
Investors are given perpetual exemption from VAT 
and customs import duty on inputs.  
This applies to raw materials, machinery, office 
equipment, certain petroleum fuel (e.g., for 
generators), building materials needed for housing, 
and other supplies. VAT exemption also applies to 
local purchases of goods and services supplied by 
companies in the Kenyan customs territory or 
domestic market.  
Investors are given a permanent exemption from 
payment of stamp duty on legal instruments. 
 
New investment in EPZ buildings and machinery 
(should be applicable over 20 years) are subject to a 
100% investment deduction.  
 
EPZ investors are to only need one license issued by 
KEPZA to be able to set up and operate EPZ projects.  
EPZ investors are hence exempted from various laws 
in Kenya, such as the Import, Export and Essential 
Supplies Act, the Standards Act, the Industrial 
Registration Act, the Factories Act, and the Statistics 
Act.  
KEPZA is to provide project approval and licensing 
within 30 days.  
Projects requiring environmental license may take 
longer.  
EPZ investors meet no exchange controls and the 
authority facilitates repatriation of capital and profits.  
EPZ investors are also given access to foreign 
currency accounts, and allowed domestic and offshore 
borrowing. 
KEPZA does not require local shareholders in EPZ 
investments.  
 
‘One-stop shop’ service is available. KEPZA provides assistance to EPZ companies in the 
areas of staff recruitment, labour regulations, work 
permits, import-export logistics, application for utility 
connections, registration with tax authorities, etc. 
KEPZA provides serviced land and factory buildings.  Buildings are available for sale or lease to licensed 
EPZ companies. Utilities, such as electricity, water 
and waste handling, are offered, together with 24-hour 
security.  
Office premises and storage warehouses are available 
for lease in most zones.  
 
Source: KEPZA (2013) 
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Source: World Bank (2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3.  
Business environment indicators, from 2007 enterprise survey by the World Bank 
 Kenya Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Low income 
Percentage of firms identifying corruption 
as a major constraint 
38.3 30.0 31.7 
Percentage of firms identifying access to 
finance/costs as a major constraint 
41.8 47.9 43.6 
Percentage of firms identifying transport as 
a major constraint 
30.6 23.9 21.9 
Percentage of firms identifying electricity 
as a major constraint 
27.6 48.1 48.8 
Value lost due to power outages (% of sale) 6.4 5.9 6.8 
Percentage of firms identifying customs 
and trade regulations as a major constraint 
23.6 19.6 19.1 
Average time to clear imports from 
customs 
12.0 9.1 10.8 
Average time to clear direct exports 
through customs 
5.6 5.4 6.1 
Percentage of firms identifying labour 
regulations as a major constraint 
4.3 9.3 6.6 
Percentage of firms identifying crime, theft 
and disorder as a major constraint 
33.1 23.6 20.2 
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Table A4. 
The main incentives given for manufacturing firms in Lesotho 
Manufacturing profit generated from exporting 
manufactured goods outside of the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU) are subject to a 0% corporate 
tax.  
A manufacturing corporate tax rate of up to 10% 
applies to profits from sales within the SACU region.  
A VAT rate of 0% for raw materials intended for 
export products sold outside SACU.  
 
A VAT rate of 14% on raw materials used in 
production sold within the SACU, which ensures 
harmonization with the RSA. The Lesotho Revenue 
Authority has introduced flexible VAT payment 
systems, to tax compliant firms, to ease cash flows. 
No withholding tax on dividends to neither local nor 
foreign shareholders. 
 
Costs induced by giving training to the staff are 
allowable at 125% for tax purposes. 
 
Payments made for external management skills and 
royalties related to manufacturing operations are 
subject to withholding tax of 10%. 
The LNDC is to facilitate easy repatriation of 
manufacturing profits. 
 
 
Investors can lease serviced land, and industrial and 
commercial building from the LNDC.  
Foreigners are not allowed to own land in Lesotho. 
A one-stop-shop for red tape.  LNDC is to offer investors the possibility to only deal 
with one office for all administrative procedures, such 
as permits and licenses.  
Source: LNDC (2013) 
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Source: World Bank (2009) 
 
 
 
 
Table A5. 
Business environment indicators, from 2009 Enterprise survey by the World Bank 
 Lesotho Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Low income 
Number of power outrages in a typical 
month 
6.8 10.3 7.9 
Value lost due to power outages (% of 
sales) 
6.7 5.8 4.8 
Number of water shortages in a typical 
month 
2.5 7.2 6.5 
Security costs (% of sales)  4.2 1.8 1.7 
Percentage of firms that use email to 
communicate with clients/suppliers 
44.3 44.0 58.3 
Days to obtain import license 4.0 19.2 19.6 
Average time to clear imports from 
customs 
4.4 12.8 13.0 
Average time to clear direct exports 
through customs 
5.4 6.5 6.9 
Percentage of firms believing the court 
system is fair, impartial, and uncorrupted 
33.2 43.3 39.2 
Percentage of firms feel it is expected of 
them to give gifts to secure government 
contract 
26.4 38.3 26.3 
